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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers the decisions of the Florida courts and Florida
legislation produced during the period from July 1, 1996, through June 30,
1997, especially selected for this article as being of potential interest to the
real estate practitioner.
II. ATTORNEYS' FEES
Brevard County v. Canaveral Properties, Inc.' The attorneys' fees
awarded in this eminent domain case were calculated to include twenty
percent of the benefit to the landowner, which included severance
23damages. However on appeal, the severance damages were stricken.3 When
reconsidering the attorneys' fees, the trial court merely subtracted the benefit
and left the rest of the calculation intact.4 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
found that to be an unacceptable approach. The court pointed out that the
statute6 required the court to give the greatest weight to the benefit the
attorney achieved for the client, and that the calculation in this case was
"based on expert testimony which itself was predicated on the landowners'
very substantial recovery." 7 When the district court reduced the recovery, it
reduced the benefit achieved by the attorney.8 Consequently, the trial court
was required to completely recalculate the attorneys' fees based upon the
record.9 Furthermore, it ruled, no additional attorneys' fees should be
awarded for relitigating the attorneys' fee.1
0
1. 689 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
2. Id. at 1309.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1309-10.
6. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (1993).
7. Canaveral Properties, 689 So. 2d at 1309.
8. Id. at 1310.
9. Id.
10. Id. (citing Seminole County v. Butler, 676 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1996)).
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This case returned to the district court after the trial court awarded
$55,647.00 in appellate attorneys' fees.11 The County claimed the amount
was excessive and the district court agreed because it concluded that multiple
attorneys had performed duplicate tasks. 12 For example, four attorneys had
prepared for the oral argument and two had attended the argument even
though only one had actually presented the argument. Furthermore, the firm
had claimed over 402 hours were spent on the appeal, even though much of
the research should have already been performed for the trial. The fact that
four property owners were represented by the one law firm was considered,
but did not figure into the court's ultimate reasoning. Each owner could have
had its own counsel, but declined individual representation. The criterion for
measuring attorneys' fees was reasonableness. 13  Where the hours were
bloated, or a task was performed by more attorneys than were needed, the
public should not have to pay the excess.
14
Broward County v. LaPointe.15 The County made an offer to buy land
for $2,404,000 subject to the condition that if environmental contamination
was found, it could cancel the contract or adjust the price based on the cost of
the environmental clean up. When the landowners rejected the offer, the
County began a condemnation proceeding. In 1991, the County's expert
estimated the cost of additional testing and clean up at $1,147,267. The
parties entered an agreed order of taking to allow title to pass to the County
and proceeded to litigate the landowner's compensation. The case was
eventually settled and the settlement terms were incorporated into a stipulated
final judgment. 16
In addition to the award of $3,704,480 for the land taken, the settlement
provided that the landowner was entitled to: 1) back rent from a billboard
tenant; 2) the right to lease back part of the condemned land for billboards;
and 3) the agreement that if the County was ever required to perform an
environmental clean up of the taken land, it would install a system where it
could perform that clean up, not only for the taken land, but also for the
adjacent land still owned by the condemnee. The settlement also provided
that the court would retain jurisdiction over the agreement for the purpose of
11. Brevard County v. Canaveral Properties, 696 So. 2d 1244, 1244 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
12. Id. at 1244-45.
13. Id. at 1245.
14. Id.
15. 685 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
16. Id. at 890-91.
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awarding attorneys' fees and costs "including all costs of environmental
contamination issues.
17
In figuring the attorneys' fees for the landowners' trial counsel, the
circuit court first figured that the firm "had reasonably spent 2,400 hours...
at a reasonable blended rate of $250 per hour."18 This produced a "lodestar"
amount of $600,000. Due to the fact that the contamination issues made the
case "'novel and complex,"' 19 the trial court also awarded a success bonus.
20
The court figured this amount by starting with the initial government offer of
$2,404,000 and subtracted its initial clean up estimate of $1,147,267 to
produce an adjusted offer of $1,256,753.21 It subtracted the adjusted offer
from the compensation award of $3,704,000 to produce a benefit achieved of
$2,447,267.22 The court added to this the monetary value of the other
settlement provisions, which it determined was $1,129,000, to produce a total
benefit value of $3,576,267.23 The success bonus of ten percent of that total
benefit, i.e., $357,626, was added to the lodestar amount to produce an
attorneys' fee of $957,626.24
The County objected to the method by which the success bonus was
calculated. The County claimed that its initial offer should not have been
reduced by its initial clean up estimate. Additionally, the County claimed that
the benefit should be mechanically calculated by subtracting the initial offer
from the final figure. In response, the district court pointed out that the initial
offer contained a clean up contingency that could have substantially reduced
the amount the landowners received.25 The landowners' counsel was
successful in eliminating that contingency, in effect shifting the burden of
environmental clean up to the County. It was not an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to consider that as a benefit achieved for the landowners or to
set the value at the County's own initial estimate.26 In addition, it was not an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to set a monetary figure for the value of
the other settlement provisions and to include that in the calculations.27 The
17. Id. at 891.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting the trial court).
20. LaPointe, 685 So. 2d at 891.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. LaPointe, 685 So. 2d at 892.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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court's valuation was within the range of expert testimony in the record.
28 On these issues, the trial court's decision was affirmed.29
A more difficult issue was whether the County should pay the attorneys'
fees of two law firms hired to represent the landowners in dealing with the
Department of Environmental Regulation. They did obtain a favorable
consent order which made possible the eventual settlement of the
condemnation case, but the court concluded that whether the County was
liable for their fees should be determined by the settlement agreement itself.
30
The agreement provided for payment of the landowners' "costs and
attorney's fees, including all costs of environmental contamination issues.'
a3
The court placed great importance on the fact that the settlement agreement
allowed for reimbursement of costs, not all costs and attorneys' fees of
environmental contamination issues.32 Invoking the plain meaning canon of
construction, although negative implication would have been more
convincing, the court decided that the agreement did not include paying
attorneys who handled related regulatory matters.33 The court ignored the
point that the very statute under which attorneys' fees and costs were
recoverable in condemnation cases included attorneys' fees within the term
"Cots." 3 4
City of Jacksonville v. Tresca.35  The City was involved in a
redevelopment project. It tried unsuccessfully to obtain an option to purchase
the land for $107,000. Later, when condemnation proceedings had begun, the
City deposited $50,000 into the registry of the court. The district court said
that this was "presumably the good-faith estimate of the property value based
on a valid appraisal," a point never disputed by the City.36  The jury
concluded that the proper amount of compensation for the landowner was
$182,000. 31 Attorneys' fees under section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes are
to be based "'solely on the benefits achieved for the client.' 38 Thus, "[biased
28. Id.
29. Id. at 892-93.
30. Lapointe, 685 So. 2d at 892.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 892-93.
33. Id. at 893.
34. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1989).
35. 692 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
36. Id. at 992.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 992-93 (qouting FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (1995)).
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on the $107,000 figure, the trial court awarded a fee in the amount of $24,750
(thirty-three percent of $182,000 minus $107,000)."" 9
The district court found that to be error.40 The statute defined benefit as
the difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment or
settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning
authority before the defendant hires an attorney. If no written offer
is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an
attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer
after the attorney is hired.4'
The "offer" contemplated by the statute was an offer to buy which, when
accepted by the landowner, would obligate the condemnor to buy at that
42price. But, a purchase option would not even have obligated the City to buy
the property.43 The proper measure of betterment would be to use the
$50,000 deposit as urged by the condemnee's attorneys. 44
Department of Environmental Protection v. Gibbins.45 The landowner's
neighbor operated a service station which discharged gasoline from
underground storage tanks. In order to define the extent of the resultant
contamination, the Department of Environmental Protection notified the
landowner that it wanted to drill a number of wells on the landowner's
property. The landowner resisted and demanded compensation, so the
Department served him with an administrative order for access. In response
to the landowner's demand for a formal hearing, the Department withdrew its
administrative action and filed a complaint in court for injunctive relief
against the landowner interfering with the installation of wells on his land.
The Department later decided that was unnecessary and moved for voluntary
dismissal, but the landowner filed a motion for attorney's fees on the theory
that he had defeated an attempt by the government to take his land. The
circuit court agreed and awarded substantial attorney's fees.
46
39. Tresca, 692 So. 2d at 992.
40. Id. at 993.
41. Id. (citing Fla. STAT. § 73.092(1)(a)).
42. Tresca, 692 So. 2d at 993.
43. Id. See generally, Ronald Benton Brown, An Examination of Real Estate Purchase
Options, 12 NOVA L. REv. 147, 147-54 (1987).
44. Tresca, 692 So. 2d at 993. It is not clear from the case whether the $50,000 was
considered the final written offer before the hiring of the attorney or the first written offer after
the hiring the of attorney.
45. 696 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
46. Id. at 888-89.
274 [Vol 22:269
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The district court reversed.47  It reasoned that no condemnation
proceeding was ever begun so the landowner could not have succeeded in
defeating the condemnation attempt.4 As the statutes relied upon only
provide for attorney's fees in condemnation proceedings,49 there would be no
basis for awarding attorney's fees in this case.
5 0
Department of Transportation v. Winter Park Golf Club, Inc.51 The
Department of Transportation began a quick taking of an easement for
sidewalk construction. After the landowner marshalled evidence that the
taking would result in a significant reduction in the market value of its land
and significant severance damages, the Department decided to locate the
sidewalk elsewhere. The stipulated judgment terminating the taking action
provided that the Department would pay the landowner's reasonable costs and
attorney's fees. The trial court used a lodestar figure reached by multiplying
the number of hours by a reasonable hourly rate ($225 per hour). 2 This
amount was adjusted upward to reflect the benefit achieved for the landowner.
However, the trial court erred in one respect. It included in the calculation
the hours that the landowner's attorney spent litigating the attorney's fee.
53
The district court remanded the case for recalculation of the lodestar amount
which did not include fees for time spent litigating the attorney's fee. 4
Lee County v. Pierpont.55  The County did a "quick taking 56 of the
property and, accordingly, filed a good faith estimate of the property's
value. When the landowners filed an answer to the condemnation complaint
through an attorney, the County's attorney sent him a letter making an offer
for the property at twenty percent over the good faith estimate. That offer was
rejected, but the case was eventually settled. The only issue left was
attorney's fees.57
In 1994, the legislature amended the attorneys' fees provision in eminent
domain proceedings.58  Previously, the statute had provided that "the court
47. Id. at 890.
48. Id.
49. FLA. STAT. §§ 73.091-.092 (1993).
50. Gibbins, 696 So. 2d at 890.
51. 687 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
52. Id. at 971.
53. Id. (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1993);
Seminole County v. Butler, 676 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
54. Id. at 971.
55. 693 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
56. See generally, Marc I. Sachs, Order of Taking, THE FLORIDA BAR CLE: FLORIDA
EemwNT DMAIN PRAcTCE AND PRocEDuRE Ch. 7 (4th ed. 1988).
57. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d at 995-96.
58. Id. at 995.
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shall give greatest weight to the benefits resulting to the client from the
services rendered." 59  This was amended to read, "the court, in eminent
domain proceedings, shall award attorney's fees based solely on the benefits
achieved for the client."60 The statute went on to define benefits as
the difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment or
settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning
authority before the defendant hires an attorney. If no written offer
is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an
attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer
after the attorney is hired.61
Here, the trial court determined betterment by subtracting the good faith
estimate from the final settlement. 62 The Second District Court of Appeal
held that the trial court determination was incorrect and reversed.63
The court used the plain meaning approach to interpreting the new
64statute. The legislature had specified that the benefit was to be calculated
from the first written offer; however, it had not provided that the good faith
estimate could be used as an alternative figure. 65 In addition, the good faith
estimate was not a functional equivalent of a written offer because the
condemnee could not accept that figure creating an enforceable contract, and
the condemnor was in no way bound by that good faith estimate. 66
Judge Blue dissented on this point.67 First, he contends there is no clear
precedent that the condemnee cannot simply accept the good faith estimate. 68
The precedents only hold that the condemnor is not bound at trial by the prior
good faith estimate.69 He utilized a purpose approach to reach a contrary
conclusion. Figuring attorneys' fees from the good faith estimate would
"encourage condemning authorities to make realistic estimates" since a low
estimate might later result in higher attorneys' fees. 70 The majority's approach
would encourage condemning authorities not to make a written offer, but to
59. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (1993).
60. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d at 995 (citing FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (Supp. 1994)).
61. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1)(a) (Supp. 1994)).
62. Id. at 996.
63. Id. at 997.
64. Id. at 996-97.
65. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d at 996.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 997 (Blue, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 998.
70. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d at 998.
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use the estimate as the starting point in negotiations. 71 This would allow the
advantage of using a low estimate, the same way the initial offer is used, but
without the disadvantage of having attorneys' fees figured from that low
number.72 Since that approach could artificially shrink attorneys' fees in
condemnation cases, landowners might have greater difficulty in finding
competent counsel to handle these cases, thereby defeating the constitutional
right to compensation. 73 This author74 agrees with Judge Blue's approach.
The burden should be on the condemnor to make a timely written offer.
Where the condemnor has not done so, he should not be allowed to penalize
the victim of for the victim's tardiness.
The district court also rejected the landowners' claim that the county
attorney's letter was not a valid offer because it was made in violation of the
State of Florida's Sunshine Law.7 Essentially, their argument is that the
county attorney was vested with discretion about the amount of money to
offer and that before exercising that discretion, he was obliged to hold a pubic
meeting.76 Even if that was a valid argument, the landowners' would have no
standing to raise it on appeal, as it was not challenged at trial."
Regency Homes of Dade, Inc. v. McMillen.78 The homeowners brought
this action based on claims of breach of the construction contract, negligence,
and fraud. The contractor counterclaimed on numerous theories and sought
foreclosure of its construction lien. The homeowners prevailed on the merits,
and they sought attorney's fees based solely on the statutory provision
applicable to actions to enforce construction liens.79 They could not seek
attorney's fees for the other claims because the construction contract did not
provide for attorney's fees. The contractor appealed the attorney's fees award
because the court did not apportion the attorney's time and fees between the801
different claims.80 The district court affirmed. It reasoned that "the issues
involved in defending against the construction lien claim are intertwined with
the remaining issues in the case, and that the attorney's time cannot
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Professor Ronald Benton Brown.
75. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d at 997 (citing FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1993)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 689 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
79. Id. at 1204-05 (citing FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1995)).
80. Id. at 1205.
81. Id.
1997]
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reasonably be apportioned., 82  It distinguished an earlier case in which
apportionment was possible because the issues were distinct.8 3
Sanctuary of Boca, Inc. v. Careers USA, Inc.84 The landlord and tenant
got into a dispute over the proper amount of rent due under the lease. The
tenant brought and won a declaratory judgment action and sought attorneys'
fees under the lease which stated,"[i]n any litigation between the parties
hereto to enforce the terms and conditions of this Lease, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to recover all costs incurred in such action, including
attorneys' fees at all levels from the nonprevailing party."85 The trial court
denied attorneys' fees, reasoning that the action had not been brought "to
'enforce' the terms and conditions" but to interpret them. 6 The district court
rejected this logic and reversed.8 7 The court determined that the substance of
the landlord's defense was the equivalent of trying to enforce its interpretation
of the lease.88 If the landlord had failed to defend this action, it would have
been precluded from trying to enforce its claim in a later action. The court
also distinguished cases involving attorneys' fees provisions that applied in
the event of a breach.89 Since no breach had occurred in this case, the tenant
would not be in a position to claim attorneys' fees under such a provision.
However, that was not the provision in this lease. Noting that different results
have been reached in other districts, 90 the court certified the conflict to the
Supreme Court.91
Seminole County v. Coral Gables Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n.92 In
this eminent domain case, attorney's fees were awarded pursuant to section
82. Id.
83. McMillen, 689 So. 2d at 1205 (citing Metro-Centre Assocs. v. Environmental
Eng'rs, Inc., 522 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding apportionment was
possible because a counterclaim for goods and services was raised in response to an action to
enforce a mechanic's lien)).
84. 691 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
85. Id. at 598.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Sanctuary of Boca, 691 So. 2d at 598-99 (citing Casarella, Inc. v. Zaremba Coconut
Creek Parkway Corp., 595 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Fairways Royale Ass'n
v. Hasam Realty Corp., 428 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Chesterfield Co. v.
Rizzenheim, 350 So. 2d 15 (FIa. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
90. Id. at 599. See Martin L. Robbins, M.D., P.A. v. I.R.E. Real Estate Fund, Ltd., 608
So. 2d 844, 846 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Ocala Warehouse Invs., Ltd. v. Bison Co., 416
So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
91. Sanctuary of Boca, 691 So. 2d at 599.
92. 691 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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73.092 of the Florida Statutes.93 The County appealed claiming that the
statute was "unconstitutional because it deprives trial courts of the ability to
determine a reasonable fee to a landowner based upon the criteria listed in
Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe."94 This argument had already
been tried unsuccessfully with an earlier version of the statute95 and was
proved unsuccessful again because the Supreme Court of Florida had already
ruled that "the legislature can enact attorney's fees provisions which 'it deems
will result in a reasonable award."' 96
The County next tried the novel approach of claiming that the trial court
should not have admitted the County's written offer because section 90.408 of
the Florida Statutes prohibits introduction into evidence of an offer to settle
litigation.97 That section directly contradicts the mandate of section 73.092 of
the Florida Statutes because it provides that attorneys' fees shall be based on
the benefits achieved which are measured by the difference between the last
written offer and the final judgment or settlement.98 The court utilized two
canons of statutory interpretation to reject this argument.99 First, a later
enactment prevails over an earlier one where there is a direct conflict.0
Second, a specific statute prevails over a general one. 10 1 Section 73.092 is
specific in that it applies only to eminent domain proceedings, while section
90.408 is applicable to litigation in general.1
02
Seminole County v. Cumberland Farms, Inc.10 3 In this eminent domain
case, the trial court apparently based the award of attorneys' fees on the
following formula: One-third of the benefit (the amount paid for the property
less the County's original offer) times two, plus the lodestar (hourly rate),
93. FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (Supp. 1994).
94. Coral Gables Fed Say., 691 So. 2d at 614 (citing Florida Patient's Compensation
Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)).
95. See Seminole County v. Delco Oil, Inc. 669 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1996); Seminole County v. Clayton, 665 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(challenging FLA. STAT. § 73.02 (1993)).
96. Coral Gables Fed. Say., 691 So. 2d at 615 (quoting Shick v. Department of Agric.
& Consumer Servs., 599 So. 2d 641, 664 (Fla. 1992)).
97. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (1995).
98. Coral Gables Fed. Sav., 691 So. 2d at 615; see FLA. STAT § 73.092 (1995).
99. Coral Gables Fed Say., 691 So. 2d at 615 (citing Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659
So. 2d 1064, 1067 (Fla. 1995); People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. County
of Leon, 583 So. 2d 1373, 1377 n.5 (Fla. 1991)).
100. Id. (citing Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So. 2d 1064, 1067 (Fla. 1995)).
101. Id. (citing People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. County of Leon,
583 So. 2d 1373, 1377 n.5 (Fla. 1991)).
102. See FA STAT. §§ 90.408, 73.092 (1995).
103. 688 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1997]
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divided by three. 0 4 While the trial court's method was based on a fourth
district case,105 the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed.10 6  Two
subsequent fifth district cases 107 had established that the court should have
used the lodestar as the basis for the fee and then expressly set
forth the number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation and
the reasonable hourly rate. The benefit obtained should have then
been used to adjust the lodestar up or down by a specific dollar
amount as opposed to a multiplier, to reflect the attorney's unusual
success or failure. 08
Department of Transportation v. ABS Properties Partnership.0 9 The
Department of Transportation ("DOT") began a condemnation proceeding
and made an initial written offer. Mediation produced a stipulated settlement
that was approved by both parties when DOT decided to indefinitely postpone
the project. DOT obtained a voluntary dismissal of the condemnation action.
The landowner filed a motion for attorney's fees. The trial court's award was
based on the difference between DOT's written offer and the agreed upon
price in the stipulation or the benefit achieved under section 73.092(1) of the
Florida Statutes."I 
0
DOT's position on appeal was that the "benefit achieved" subsection
should not be used when the benefit was never realized due to the case being
withdrawn. That presented a question of first impression."' The district
court agreed with DOT and reversed.1 2 The applicable method was in the
second subsection which governed attorney's fees "'incurred in defeating an
order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings,
when not otherwise provided for."'13 To the court, a voluntary dismissal
seemed to fit within that definition." 4 Under subsection two, the court would
have to consider a number of factors, such as: 1) novelty; 2) difficulty and
104. Id. at 373; see also Solid Waste Auth. v. Parker, 622 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1993).
105. Solid Waste Auth., 622 So. 2d at 1010.
106. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 688 So. 2d at 373.
107. Seminole County v. Delco Oil, Inc., 669 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1996); Seminole County v. Clayton, 665 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
108. Cumberland Farms Inc., 688 So. 2d at 373 (citations omitted).
109. 693 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
110. Id. at 703-04 (citing FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (1995)).
111. Id. at 704.
112. Id. at 705.
113. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 73.092(2) (1995)).
114. ABS Properties Partnership, 693 So. 2d at 705.
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importance of the questions involved; 3) the skill employed by the attorney; 4)
the amount of money involved; 5) the responsibility born by the attorney; 6)
the time and labor required of the attorney to adequately represent the client in
relation to the benefits; and 7) the customary rate or fee for a comparable
case. 
115
This author1 16 prefers the trial court's conclusion. The condemnor's
change of heart should not affect the amount of attorney's fees for work that
has already been done, and the calculation in subsection two is needlessly
complicated when a simple measure is provided by subsection one, i.e., based
upon the benefits achieved. It seems obvious that subsection two should be
used when there is no logical way to use subsection one, but that is certainly
not the case here where an agreement had already been reached.
Ill. BROKERS
The Brokerage Relationship Disclosure Act 1 7 became effective on
October 1, 1997. It is the latest step in Florida's attempt to solve the
problems inherent in the relationships, agency or nonagency, that brokers may
have with buyers and sellers." 8 The legislature has now outlawed brokers
acting as dual agents, i.e., simultaneously acting in an agency relationship for
both the buyer and the seller." 9 However, it continues to allow brokers to be
transaction brokers who provide "limited representation to a buyer, a seller, or
both, in a real estate transaction, but does not represent either in a fiduciary
capacity or as a single agent.'' 120 The act further requires that the broker or
salesperson disclose to customers upon first contact, that they can only engage
that professional as a single agent or transaction broker.' 21 The statute defines
those relationships and specifies the duties of each type of broker. 22 For a
115. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 73.092(2) (1995)).
116. Professor Ronald Benton Brown.
117. FLA. STAT. §§ 475.2701-.2801 (1995), amended by 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-42. See
Ronald Benton Brown and Joseph M. Grohman, Goodbye Dual World: Real Estate
Brokerage Changes Again, But Not Enough, 71 FLA. B.J. 54 (Nov. 1997).
118. See Ronald Benton Brown & Joseph M. Grohman, Real Estate Brokers:
Shouldering New Burdens, 11 PROBATE & PROPERTY 14 (May/June 1997); Ronald Benton
Brown et al., Real Estate Brokerage: Recent Changes in Relationships and a Proposed Cure,
29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 25 (1995). See also Ronald Benton Brown & Thomas H. Thurlow,
Buyers Beware: Statutes Shield Real Estate Brokers and Sellers Who Do Not Disclose that
Properties are Psychologically Tainted, 49 OKLA. L. REv. 625 (1997).
119. FL,%. STAT. § 475.01(1)(j) (1995), amended by 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-42.
120. Id. § 475.01(1)(m).
121. Id. § 475.272(2).
122. Id. § 475.01(l)(m).
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residential sale, the disclosure requirements are now more extensive. Section
475.276 of the Florida Statutes now requires potential buyers and sellers to
be given a statutory notice of nonrepresentation at the first contact.
23
Additionally, section 475.278 of the Florida Statutes now provides what must
be in the disclosure forms describing the transaction or single agency
brokerage relationships. 124
Caserta v. Department of Business & Professional Regulation.25 The
Florida Real Estate Commission ("FREC") issued a final order revoking
Caserta's real estate license. 126 Caserta's counsel had filed a request for a
subject-matter index of the all agency orders imposing discipline since
January 1, 1975. FREC had responded by giving him a subject-matter index
starting at January 1, 1992. On appeal, Caserta claimed that reversal of the
order was required because the index FREC had provided was not sufficient
to satisfy the statutory requirements. The Fifth District Court of Appeal
disagreed and affirmed the order.
2 7
Section 120.53(2) of the Florida Statutes previously required that each
state agency make available to the public a subject-matter index of rules and
orders issued or adopted after January 1, 1975.28 However, the statute was
amended, 129 and the 1975 starting date does not appear in the revised
statute. The court concluded that the legislature, recognizing the
impossible burden that the 1975 starting date had imposed on many agencies,
intended the effective date of the amended statute to be the new starting date
of the required indices.1 31 Consequently, Caserta could not escape discipline
on that technicality.
Claycomb v. Combs. 32  Facing foreclosure, landowners listed two
properties with a broker. No sale was produced even though the listing
agreement was extended. The mortgagee foreclosed, took title, and then sold
one property to the broker's father and mother. The mother just happened to
be a real estate agent working for her son. The landowners (now former
landowners) brought an action to have a constructive trust imposed on the
123. Id. § 475.276(2).
124. FLA. STAT. § 475.278(2)(c) (1995), amended by 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-42.
125. 686 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
126. Id. at 651.
127. Id. at 652-53.
128. Id. at 652 (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2) (1991) (amended 1993)).
129. Id. (referring to FLA. STAT. § 120.53 (amended 1993)).
130. Caserta, 686 So. 2d at 652 (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.53 (amended 1993)).
131. Id. at 653.
132. 676 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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property. The trial judge entered judgment on the pleadings for the broker's
parents, but the district court reversed.
33
Imposition of a constructive trust is an equitable remedy for the breach of
a confidential relationship.13 4  Consequently, "to survive a motion for
judgment on the pleadings," the landowners' complaint would have to show
that landowners had a confidential relationship with the broker's
parents.135 The court found that the combination of facts was sufficient to
raise the inference that a confidential relationship might have existed.
36
However, the court held that the landowners had not alleged that the
foreclosure was in any way defective. 37 Therefore, their claim was that the
property had been purchased, or should have been purchased, on their behalf.
Before the landowners could prevail, they would have to tender to the parents
the price that they had paid for the land. While the court does not explain
further, this is merely an example of the old maxim, he who seeks equity must
do equity.
Cordis Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.138  A broker had the
commercial lease listing for Cordis Corporation's property. The broker
showed the property to Baxter, but Baxter's offer to lease a portion of the
property was rejected. Cordis later exercised its option to terminate the listing
agreement. Nine months later, Baxter approached Cordis through its own
broker, and a lease for the entire property was arranged. That lease contained
an indemnity clause that provided that each party to the lease promised "to
indemnify and hold the other party harmless from and against any claims by
any other broker, agent or other persons claiming a commission."'
39
The broker claimed that Cordis, after terminating the listing agreement,
had "orally agreed to pay the broker a commission if it produced a prospect
who purchased or leased" its property. 40  As a result, the broker had
continued to prospect for buyers and lessees, including maintaining contact
with Baxter. Consequently, after learning that Baxter had leased the property,
broker sued Cordis for a brokerage commission. Cordis then sought
indemnification from Baxter.14  The trial court entered a judgment on the
133. Id. at 524.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Claycomb, 676 So. 2d at 525.
138. 678 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
139. Id. at 848.
140. Id. at 847-48.
141. Id. at 848. Even though Cordis was ultimately held not liable for the broker's
commission, Cordis still sought indemnification for the costs and attorneys' fees. Id.
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pleadings in favor of Baxter and the district court affirmed. 142 The district
court reasoned this was simply a case of interpreting the indemnification
clause. 143 It noted that as a general proposition, an indemnity clause should
be construed against the indemnitor if it is an incident of a contract not
primarily concerned with indemnification, rather than an indemnification
promise by one in the insurance business. 144 Furthermore, an indemnity
clause will not be interpreted to provide a party indemnification for its own
wrongful acts unless that intent is clearly and unequivocally expressed. The
essence of the broker's claim was that Cordis had committed wrongful acts.
Specifically, Cordis represented either expressly or impliedly, that it would
pay a commission if the broker produced a tenant and accepted the benefits of
that performance. 145 Both rules of interpretation lead to the conclusion that
indemnification was not required. The court offered its opinion that the
clause was really intended to provide protection from a surprise demand by a
146broker that one party did not know had been involved with the other party.
Certainly, that was not the case here.
ERA Carico Real Estate Co. v. Manfredonia. 147 The broker had won an
action for a commission in county court, but on appeal to the circuit court that
was reversed. 148 The district court, in turn, reversed and ordered the county
court's judgment in favor of the broker reinstated. 149 The facts are that the
broker was the one who first brought the property to the attention of the
buyer. However, the buyer and seller negotiated directly. The circuit court
held that because the buyer and seller did not "intentionally" exclude the
broker from participating in the sale, the broker was precluded from
recovering a commission. 15  According to the district court, the
aforementioned holding was based upon a misreading of Sheldon Green &
Associates v. Rosinda Investments, N. V. 151 Since the broker was the one who
initially brought the parties together, he/she was the "procuring cause" and, as
such, was entitled to his/her commission.
152
142. Cordis Corp., 678 So. 2d at 847.
143. Id. at 848.
144. Id. (citations omitted).
145. Id.
146. Id. (citation omitted).
147. 689 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
148. Id. at 1208.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1209 (citing Sheldon Green & Assocs. v. Rosinda Invs., N.V., 475 So. 2d
925 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
152. Manfredonia, 689 So. 2d at 1209.
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Gimelstob Realty v. Sechrest Co. 153  One broker sued another on a
variety of tort theories because some of his/her associates left to work for the
other firm. Both firms were members of the Realtor Association of Greater
Fort Lauderdale whose rules required "arbitration of disputes 'arising out of
the real estate business.', 154 Therefore, the trial court held that this claim was
subject to mandatory arbitration. 155  The fourth district, in a per curiam
opinion that did not provide a detailed analysis, agreed that "this dispute
between these realtors is within the meaning of that provision."'
156
Waterfront Properties, Inc. v. Coast to Coast Real Estate, Inc.157 The
majority of the panel issued a per curiam affirmance of the trial court's
decision, but Judge Gross filed a dissenting opinion. 158 The dissent reveals
that the listing broker continued to list the property in the multiple listing
service, and one of its employees gave a brochure of the property to the
selling broker after the listing had expired.159 The selling broker showed its
buyers the property, but when the buyers later met the seller, they were
informed that the property was not then listed with any broker. The buyers
then bought the property directly from the seller. Because neither broker had
been paid a commission, they both sued.
160
The trial court held that neither the seller nor the buyers were liable for a
commission, but the broker with the expired listing was liable to the selling
broker for the equivalent of a three percent commission.' 6 ' The dissent argues
that recovery could not be justified by any contract theory, including
promissory estoppel.162 This author 163 must disagree. Although promissory
estoppel is often invoked as a consideration substitute, "promissory estoppel
is an equitable principle that empowers a court to design a remedy avoiding
injustice and achieving corrective justice between the parties in commercial
transactions."'164 By listing the property in the multiple listing service or
153. 676 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
154. Id. at 83 (citations omitted).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 679 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
158. Id. at 48 (Gross, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Waterfront Properties, Inc., 679 So. 2d at 49 (Gross, J., dissenting).
163. Professor Ronald Benton Brown.
164. Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WiLiLAmr L. REv.
263, 363 (1966). See also id. at 360-67 (supplying a summary of the Florida law of
promissory estoppel); Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20
SaArTnrU. L. REv. 45 (1966).
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handing out the property brochure, a listing broker invites other members of
the multiple listing service to earn a share of the sales commission by
producing a buyer. A listing broker has, both expressly and by his/her
conduct, represented to the other brokers in the multiple listing service that
he/she is in the position to fulfill that promise. Once the selling broker has in
good faith relied to his/her detriment on that representation, the broker
without a listing, e.g., one whose listing has expired, should be estopped from
asserting that he/she did not receive the commission upon the sale. The
critical elements should be that the "listing" broker knew, or should have
known, that he/she did not have the power to perform that promise because
he/she did not have a current listing, and that a selling broker who went
through the effort of producing a buyer would suffer significant harm if there
was no commission to share. Conversely, the selling broker could not
reasonably be expected to inspect the listing agreement of each property
he/she plans to show because it would be impractical for a broker planning a
full day of showings to inspect all those documents, even if he/she were
available. The dissent argues that allowing the selling broker to recover "is to
base recovery on concepts of relative fault, a tort notion which was not
pled."'165 However, that misses the point that fault is also an important
concept in equity and that estoppel is an equitable doctrine.
PK Ventures, Inc. v. Raymond James & Associates,166 Wassail v.
Payne,167 and Woodson v. Martin.168 In Woodson, the buyer sued her real
estate agent claiming she had misrepresented the house as being in good
condition.1 69 In a very brief opinion, which did not include a recitation of the
facts, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the following certified
question:
IS THE BUYER OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PREVENTED
BY THE "ECONOMIC LOSS RULE" FROM RECOVERING
DAMAGES FOR FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT AGAINST
165. Waterfront Properties, Inc., 679 So. 2d at 48-49.
166. 690 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1997).
167. 682 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
168. 663 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), quashed by 685 So. 2d 1240 (Fla.
1996).
169. Id. at 1327. Note that the facts reported here do not seem to match the certified
question in Woodson, which assumes that the broker was the agent of the seller. Woodson v.
Martin, 685 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1996). However, it does not seem that this will have any
impact on use of this case as precedent.
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THE REAL ESTATE AGENT AND ITS INDIVIDUAL AGENT
REPRESENTING THE SELLERS?
170
The unanimous answer was negative, based upon the reasoning provided in
HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 171 which was decided at the
same time. HTP, Ltd. dealt with a claim for damages based on the allegation
that the party had been fraudulently induced to enter into a settlement
agreement. 172 The district court denied the damage claim reasoning it was
barred by the economic loss rule because it flowed from a contractual breach
and was solely for economic losses. 73 The Supreme Court of Florida rejected
this analysis. 74 It held that fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract was
an independent tort, separate and distinct from any breach of contract. 175 In
HTP, Ltd., the supreme court specifically rejected the logic of the Woodson
court, noting that Judge Altenbernd's dissent therein had been correct.
1 76
These precedents should make brokers and sellers worry that they might
be held accountable for the harm they could cause by misrepresenting
property. Note that this case does not make either a broker or a seller an
insurer of the property. The claimant must still prove the elements of
fraud. But, it might have some salutary results. A recent news story on the
effects of this case reported an interview with a broker who said that, "he has
already alerted his sales people that, 'You don't lie, no matter
what."",177 What a novel concept to introduce into real estate sales.
HTP, LTD. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A.178 was also the basis
for the decision in Wassail v. Payne.179 Wassail had considered buying a
particular property. He asked the owner and his broker whether the property
was subject to flooding. Allegedly, their response was a
misrepresentation. Wassail did not buy the property, but he eventually leased
it from the person who did buy it. When flooding occurred, Wassail sued the
seller and his broker alleging, inter alia, fraudulent and negligent
170. Woodson, 685 So. 2d. at 1241.
171. 685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996).
172. Id. at 1238-39.
173. Woodson, 663 So. 2d at 1329.
174. Woodson, 685 So. 2d at 1241.
175. HTP, Ltd., 685 So. 2d at 1239.
176. Id. (quoting Woodson v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (Altenbemd, J., dissenting)).
177. Terry Sheridan, New Legal Woes for Realty Agents, BRowARD DAILY Bus. REv.,
Oct. 31, 1996, at 1.
178. 685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996).
179. 682 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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misrepresentation. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for the
defendants because the plaintiff was not in privity with them, but the First
District Court of Appeal reversed.1 80 Wassall's cause of action was not a
breach of contract. His action was in tort, and privity was not an element of
the tort. Consequently, if the seller and his broker made a misrepresentation
to Wassail that was the proximate cause of his harm, they could be held
liable."'
This trilogy was completed by PK Ventures, Inc. v. Raymond James &
Associates. 182 That case involved the sale of commercial real estate rather
than residential property. The Supreme Court of Florida specifically held that
it did not matter whether the property was residential or commercial when
damages were sought against a seller's broker for misrepresentation.
18 3
Woodson stood for the proposition that the economic loss rule could not be
used to bar recovery for the independent tort of misrepresentation by the
broker.18
4
IV. CONDOMINIUMS
Carlandia Corp. v. Obernauer18 5 The question before the court was
whether section 718.1255 of the Florida Statutes requires nonbinding
arbitration before suit can be filed for the stated causes of
action.1 6 Carlandia, as a unit owner, filed suit against the condominium
association and the board of directors alleging construction defects existed in
common areas subject to redress under warranty. The trial court granted the
association's and the board's motion to dismiss the complaint for failing to
conduct nonbinding arbitration prior to filing suit.
18 7
This Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed because the complaint
failed to reveal a "dispute" within section 718.1255(4)(a).188 The statutory
section mandates that the parties to a "dispute" submit to nonbinding
180. Id. at 681.
181. Id.
182. 690 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1997). To be consistent, the Supreme Court of Florida
subsequently quashed Linn-Well Dev. Corp. v. Preston & Farley, Inc., 666 So. 2d 558 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Linn-Well Dev. Corp. v. Preston & Farley, Inc., 696 So. 2d 693 (Fla.
1997).
183. PK Ventures, Inc., 690 So. 2d at 1296.
184. Woodson, 685 So. 2d at 1238.
185. 695 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
186. Id. at 409.
187. Id.
188. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4)(a) (1992).
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arbitration prior to court proceedings. 189 The statute also excludes any
disagreement that "'primarily involves... the interpretation or enforcement
of any warranty"' from the definition. 190 The statute expands the exclusion
"to include those legal theories where application of a warranty is a critical
element."1 9 The fourth district determined that this case falls within the
statutory exclusion because the determination of the association's statutory or
fiduciary liability first requires a finding that there were actionable warranty
violations on the common areas.
192
Section 718.1255(3) of the Florida Statutes is designed to protect unit
owners from the cost and time constraints involved when litigating with a
condominium association. 193  Arbitration was not mandated for all
condominium disputes.19 4 Statutory nonbinding arbitration is designed to deal
with day-to-day condominium disputes.195  However, construction defect
cases do not fit that category because of the factual and legal complexity
involved. 196
Cricket Club Condominium, Inc. v. Stevens.197 Stevens filed a suit
alleging misdeeds of the condominium association. The suit alleged all
condominium residents were damaged by misrepresentations made in letters
concerning the vote over a cable contract. The trial court certified the class
without holding an evidentiary hearing. 198
The Third District Court of Appeal only concerned itself with the trial
court's finding of adequacy of representation. 199 The third district concluded
that the adequacy requirement of the rule can not be satisfied if Stevens is
involved in other litigation against the Cricket Club.200 At the time of this
action, Stevens was involved in a counterclaim against the Cricket Club and
another unit owner for intentional infliction of emotional distress.20' If
Stevens were to represent the class in this dispute, the best interests of that
189. See FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4) (1992).
190. Carlandia Corp., 695 So. 2d at 409 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(1) (1992)).
191. Id. at 410.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Carlandia Corp., 695 So. 2d at 410.
196. Id.
197. 695 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
198. Id. at 827.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 827-28.
201. Id. at 827.
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class must be Stevens' sole concern. 20 2 The third district reversed the trial
court's determination of adequacy of representation. 20 3
Lambert v. Berkley South Condominium Ass'n.2°4 The question before
the Fourth District Court of Appeal was whether the Association, or the
individual owners of commercial units, should assume ownership and
maintenance responsibility for a hallway located on the first floor of the
condominium.20 5 The Association argued that the hallway could not be
considered a common element and was, therefore, not its responsibility
because the required approval of all record unit owners to change the
hallway's classification was not obtained. In response, Lambert contended
that the "governing documents were ambiguous" and that the trial court was
correct in considering the parties intent in determining that the hallway was
converted to a common element. 20
6
The fourth district determined the trial court improperly considered parol
evidence in determining that the hallway was a common element.207 It
reasoned that parol evidence should only be addressed when the document is
ambiguous on its face. 20 8 Ambiguity depends upon whether the document is
subject to multiple interpretations. However, simply because the document is
open to interpretation, does not mean the document is ambiguous. As long as
the language is clear, a court cannot begin to interpret the plain meaning of
the document.20 9
The condominium documents, taken as a whole, affirmatively state that
the hallway was owned by the commercial unit owners as tenants in common.
All units were labeled with the letter "C" to signify their unit, and the
hallway itself was numbered "C-45" which revealed that the hallway was the
last commercial unit.210 In examining the documents and analyzing their plain
meaning, it is obvious that no ambiguity existed. There is nothing in the
documents that say the hallway is a common element. Rather, all
documentary evidence showed that the hallway "' is owned in common by
each of the Commercial Condominium Unit Owners."' 21' Parol evidence
should not have been considered in this case since the document's language is
202. Cricket Club Condominium, Inc., 695 So. 2d at 827.
203. Id.
204. 680 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
205. Id. at 590.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Lambert, 680 So. 2d at 590.
210. Id.
211. Id. (quoting amendment to governing condominium documents).
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facially clear. The trial court discovered ambiguity within the documents only
after considering the extrinsic evidence introduced.212
Finally, when a subsequent amendment is made to the document which
did not address the hallway, it cannot be assumed that the hallway would be
considered a common element.13 Section 718.110(4) of the Florida Statutes
requires that all record unit owners must approve an amendment to the
documents. 1 4 When the effort to amend is unsuccessful because not all unit
owners approved it, the hallway can not be eliminated as a private unit and
converted to a common element.
215
Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc.2 16 In this case the
Supreme Court of Florida answered the following question certified by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal:
WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 718.203(2),
FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP. 1992), IMPOSE ON A
CONTRACTOR AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR
THE INTENDED USE AND PURPOSE WHERE THE
CONTRACTOR WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE
CONTRACT DOCUMENTS SUGGESTS AND SUPPLIES A
MANUFACTURED ITEM SUCH AS INDIVIDUAL AIR
CONDITIONING UNITS TO A DEVELOPER FOR USE IN A
BUILDING PROJECT, WHERE SUCH ITEMS LATER PROVE
NOT TO BE FIT FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE FOR WHICH
THEY WERE SUPPLIED?
217
The supreme court held that the warranty of fitness was not applicable, but
under the provisions of section 718.203(2) the contractor does not warrant
those items for a "specific purpose."
218
Leisure Resorts was the developer of a twenty-two story
condominium. Each unit was designed to include its own individual air
conditioning unit with a condenser on the balcony; however, the design had a
problem. Rooney was the air conditioning subcontractor and suggested the
use of Tappan units. Tappan had represented that its units would work
properly under the planned design. However, they did not work properly and
212. Id.
213. Id. at 591.
214. Lambert, 680 So. 2d at 591 (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.110(4) (1995)).
215. Id.
216. 654 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1995).
217. Id. at 912.
218. Id.
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several unit owners brought a class action against Leisure Resorts alleging a
variety of construction defects. Leisure sought indemnity from Rooney, after
settling with the unit owners, alleging breach of warranty among other claims.
The trial court held that pursuant to section 713.203(2), manufactured items
for which there was a manufacturer's warranty were not within the scope of
the definition of "materials supplied" as set forth in the statute, and that the
subcontractor made no warranty of fitness.219 The Supreme Court of Florida
held that manufactured items are "materials" within the statute, and thus, a
warranty by the subcontractor attached.220
However, the supreme court noted a distinction between the scope of the
"developer's warranty mandated by section 718.203(1) and the contractor's
warranty mandated under section 718.203(2). ''22l The developer warrants
merchantability and fitness "for the purposes or uses intended., 222  The
contractor, on the other hand, only warrants fitness "as to the work performed
or material supplied," with no reference to fitness for intended purpose.23
The supreme court remanded to the Fourth District Court of Appeal to
decide: 1) whether the units were merely unfit for the specific purpose, in
which case the contractor would not be liable; or 2) whether the units were
unfit for ordinary purposes (unmerchantable), in which case the contractor
would be liable.2 
4
National Title Insurance Co. v. Lakeshore 1 Condominium
Ass'n.225 National was the owner of the first mortgage on two of the
condominiums at Lakeshore 1 Condominium. 226 Association was obligated to
purchase insurance "'for the benefit of the Association, the Unit Owners and
their respective mortgagees"' to cover building and insurable
improvements.227 The mortgagees had no control over matters of insurance or
reconstruction.228
As a result of Hurricane Andrew, Lakeshore 1 Condominium sustained
damage which forced unit owners out of their homes. The Condominium
insurer paid Association money for the damages and Association executed a
contract with the construction company to make needed repairs. National's
219. Id. at 913.
220. Id. at 914.
221. Leisure Resorts, Inc., 654 So. 2d at 914.
222. Id. (emphasis removed).
223. Id. (emphasis removed).
224. Id. at 915.
225. 691 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
226. Id. at 1105.
227. Id. (quoting the Declaration of Condominium 14.1 (emphasis removed)).
228. Id.
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mortgag6rs defaulted, and National foreclosed. Thereafter, National had
acquired title to the damaged units and filed suit against Association seeking
damages for dissipation of proceeds that National claimed an interest in. The
trial court granted Association summary judgment and National appealed.229
The Third District Court of Appeal recognized that the first issue that
had to be addressed was "whether the Association owed National a duty of
reasonable care in managing the insurance proceeds."2'30 The third district
held that Association owed National, a mortgagee, such a
duty. 31 Association was managing insurance proceeds on behalf of the
owners and mortgagees pursuant to the Declaration of Condominium, of
Lakeshore 1.232
The second issue was whether National was a member of the group to
which Association owed a duty.2 33 The court believed Association did owe a
duty to National. 34 The terms of the Declaration of Condominium reflected
that the unit owners' rights were subject to mortgagee's interest.23 5 The
insurance that the Association secured was to protect unit owners' and
mortgagees' interests in the insured's property. National did have "an interest
in the insurance proceeds," and "invasion of that interest was actionable."
236
RIS Investment Group, Inc. v. Department of Business & Professional
Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums & Mobile
Homes.237 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed an order requiring
RIS to remit assessments to Indian Springs due on units owned from the date
of recording of declaration through the date of unit sales and imposing civil
penalty.23 8  RIS was the developer of Briarwood Condominium. The
Department issued a notice to show cause to RIS alleging that RIS, while
controlling the association, failed to pay assessments due on developer owned
units in violation of sections 718.116(l)(a) and 718.116(9)(a) of the Florida
229. Id. at 1106.
230. National Title Ins. Co., 691 So. 2d at 1106.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1107.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. National Title Ins. Co., 691 So. 2d at 1107.
236. Id.
237. 695 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), opinion clarified, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D721
(4th Dist. Ct. App. March 19, 1997), review denied, 698 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1997).
238. Id. at 357.
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Statutes.239 After a hearing, the Department determined that RIS was liable
for assessments from the date the declaration was recorded.240
The fourth district disagreed with the Department's conclusion. 241 The
Department claimed that RIS was required to pay the assessments because of
a provision in the RIS Declaration of Condominium.242 The fourth district
recognized that the Department failed to consider the definition of "unit" in
the Condominium Act.243 Section 718.103(24) of the Florida Statutes defines
"unit" as "part of condominium property which is subject to exclusive
ownership."" "A unit may be in improvements, land, or land and
improvements together, as specified in the declaration."2 45  The fourth
district's revious opinion in Welleby Condominium Ass'n One v. William
Lyon Co. 46 was controlling.247 In Welleby, the developer prevailed because
the land in question was neither "condominium units" as described in the
Declaration of Condominium nor defined by the statute.24 8
The writer of the Declaration of Condominium for RIS could have
defined a condominium unit in various ways. Although the definition of
"condominium parcel" in Welleby was clearly defined, the definition of "unit"
in this case was not.249 However, it could still be discerned from the
definition here that the term "unit" was not meant to encompass raw land.250
Section 3.2 of the Declaration discusses the boundaries of a unit as
"unfinished surface of the ceilings and floors, perimeter walls and any interior
walls that are shown within the maximum limits of each unit on the plot
plan. 251  This section indicates the intent not to include land within the
definition of a unit.252 Therefore, the court reversed the order requiring RIS to
remit assessments.
253
239. Id. at 357-58.
240. Id. at 358.
241. Id.
242. RISInv. Group, 695 So. 2d at 358.
243. Id.
244. FLA. STAT. § 718.03(24) (1995).
245. Id.
246. 522 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
247. RISInv. Group, 695 So. 2d at 358.
248. Id. at 358-59 (citing Welleby Condominium Ass'n One, Inc. v. William Lyon Co.,
522 So. 2d 35, 36 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
249. Id. at 359.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. RIS Inv. Group, 695 So. 2d at 359.
253. Id. at 360.
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V. CONSTRUCTION
Godwin v. United Southern Bank.254 Landowners were unhappy with the
performance of their home construction contractor. Allegedly, the
construction lender released the "final draw," i.e., the last installment of the
construction loan, to the contractor without the landowner's
endorsement. This was after the lender's construction inspector would not
approve the final draw due to construction defects. As a result, the
landowners sued their construction lender on a variety of theories. The trial
court dismissed the complaint, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed
on all counts except the count claiming a breach of the construction loan . 5
The loan agreement provided that "construction shall not be deemed
complete for purposes of final disbursement unless and until Lender shall
have received all of the following: .... Acceptance of the completed
improvements by Lender and Borrower., 256 The fifth district concluded that
the factual allegations were sufficient to allege that the final disbursement had257
been made without acceptance by either. Judge Dauksch dissented,
pointing out that an additional provision of the contract appeared to give the
lender total control over the decision to make any payments to the
contractor.25 8  The dissent failed to explain the theory of contract
interpretation and apparently chose to ignore the rules of construction that a
contract should be interpreted against its drafter, most likely the lender, and
that no part of a contract should be interpreted so as to make another part
meaningless.259 The dissent's interpretation would certainly make the
provision on final disbursement, which the majority relied upon, totally
meaningless.
Island House Developers, Inc. v. AMAC Construction, Inc.260  In a
dispute over a construction contract, the issue raised was whether the general
contractor had a valid license. The trial court granted the contractor's motion
to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contract.
261
However, under Florida law, the construction contract, including the
arbitration clause, could not be enforced by an unlicensed contractor.262
254. 688 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
255. Id. at 374.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Godwin, 688 So. 2d at 374-75 (Duksch, J., dissenting).
259. Id.
260. 686 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
261. Id.
262. See FLA. STAT. § 489.128 (1995).
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Consequently, the motion should not have been ruled upon until the court had
determined that there was a valid and enforceable contract.
2 63
Mercedes Homes, Inc. v. Osborne.264 The owners and builder entered
into a contract for the construction of a home in Hillsborough County. Before
the owners were to take possession, the parties entered into a presettlement
agreement which provided that the builder would replace certain ceramic tile.
When disagreements arose between the parties, the owners filed suit. The
complaint contained three counts based on the following: 1) the builder
breached its express one-year warranty by failing to correct the defective
ceramic tile; 2) the builder had breached the pre-settlement agreement to
replace the tile; and 3) the builder had negligently failed to obtain the
extended third party warranty for which the owners had previously paid. The
contract provided that venue for any action "'arising herein or related
hereto",'2 ,5 would be in Brevard County, but the complaint was filed in
Hillsborough County. The builder's motion challenging the venue was
denied, and the builder appealed. 66
The Second District Court of Appeal noted that "parties to an agreement
may provide therein where an action must be brought to enforce it."'267 The
trial court accepted the landowner's argument that the second count arose out
of the presettlement agreement, rather than the construction contract
containing the venue provision.268 Thus, the second count had proper venue
in Hillsborough County. Applying section 47.041 of the Florida Statutes
would allow the other counts to stay in Hillsborough County along with count
two. 26 9 The second district rejected this logic and reversed. 270 It concluded
that the venue provision had not been eliminated by the subsequent
presettlement agreement, i.e., it was not a novation.27 1 Furthermore, the venue
provision included an action to enforce the presettlement agreement because
that was a modification of the rights and responsibilities of the parties under
that contract.272 Since all three counts were within the scope of the valid
263. Island House Developers, Inc., 686 So. 2d at 1377.
264. 687 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
265. Id. at 840 (quoting the contract).
266. Id. at 841.
267. Id. (citing Southeastern Office Supply & Furniture Co. v. Barley, 427 So. 2d 1139
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
268. Id.
269. Osborne, 687 So. 2d at 841 (citing FLA. STAT. § 47.041 (1993)).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
296 [Vol 22:269
Brown / Grohman
venue agreement, the second district never reached the question regarding the
effect of section 47.041.73
VI. CONTRACTS
Holiday Pines Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Rowen 27 4 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal "reverse[d] the final judgment in favor of the owners
in this action by a homeowners association to enforce restrictive
covenants." 275 The fourth district, in reversing final judgment, concluded that
the voluntary homeowners "association lacked standing to bring the
action.' 276 The association must either be "the assignee of the developer's
right to enforce the restrictive covenants or the direct successor of the
developer's interest" in order to have the requisite standing.277 Neither is true
in this case. In addition, there were no provisions allowing the association to
seek judicial enforcement of the covenants. 8
Oceania Joint Venture v. Trillium, Inc. 2 79 The issue before the court was
"whether, under the mortgage contingency in the purchase contract, Meretsky
was entitled to return of the deposit."280 Meretsky entered into a contract and
placed a deposit to purchase a unit at the Oceania III Condominium. A
separate document executed granted Meretsky the right to take title in the
name of a corporation if he was a principal of the corporation. The seller was
obligated to inform Meretsky when the condominium neared completion
while Meretsky, in turn, was obligated to make a mortgage application. The
agreement to purchase was contingent on Meretsky obtaining a mortgage for
the price of the unit less the deposit amount. If Meretsky could not obtain the
mortgage, the seller had to grant the loan itself or allow Meretsky to rescind
on his purchase agreement and receive back his $55,400 deposit.2 1
When it was time for Meretsky to obtain the mortgage, he informed the
Great Western Bank that he wanted to take title to the condominium unit. The
unit would be the only asset of Meretsky's corporation. Great Western was
willing to grant Meretsky an individual loan, but not the type of corporate
273. Id.
274. 679 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
275. Id. at 825.
276. Id.
277. Id. (citing Palm Point Property Owners' Ass'n v. Pisarski, 626 So. 2d 195 (Fla.
1993)).
278. Id. at 824.
279. 681 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
280. Id. at 882.
281. Id.
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loan he desired. However, Flagler Federal Savings and Loan would grant the
loan only if Meretsky gave a personal guarantee. Meretsky failed to secure a
loan from any of the institutions he questioned. Needless to say, the seller
claimed that Meretsky failed to satisfy his obligations under the mortgage
contingency, explaining that Meretsky's only options were to forfeit the
deposit or proceed to closing on the condominium unit.
282
The seller then proceeded to set a closing date at which Meretsky would
not close, thus, the seller kept the $55,400 deposit. Consequently, Meretsky
brought suit for the return of the deposit. The trial court found for Meretsky,
agreeing that Meretsky complied with the mortgage contingency. 28 3  The
Third District Court of Appeal reversed the final judgment and remanded for
further proceedings.284 The court reasoned that once Meretsky failed to
supply the personal guarantee which Flagler Federal required to secure the
corporate mortgage loan, he failed to comply with the contingency
agreement.285
Rubell v. Finkelstein.8 6 The question before Third District Court of
Appeal was whether the contract agreement for the sale and purchase of real
property merged into the deed. 87 Rubell, "Buyer," entered into a contract
that was for the sale and purchase of real property that was encumbered by
existing leases. Finkelstein, "Seller," was to furnish Buyer with copies of
those existing leases. After Buyer received the copies, he then had the option
to accept or terminate the contract. The contract also stated that Buyer had to
approve any new lease into which Seller wished to enter prior to the closing
date. Seller executed a new lease without obtaining Buyer's approval. After
Seller and Buyer closed on the property, Buyer sought a release from the
unauthorized lease and filed suit to recover damages.288
The third district reversed the final judgment entered in favor of
Seller.289  As a general rule, "the acceptance of a deed tendered in
performance of a contract to convey land merges or extinguishes the
preliminary agreements and understandings contained within the contract."
290
282. Id. at 883.
283. Id.
284. Oceania Joint Venture, 681 So. 2d at 885.
285. Id. at 883.
286. 679 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
287. Id. at 889.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 890.
290. Id. at 889 (citations omitted).
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However, this accepted rule does not apply to provisions of the sale contract
not intended to be extinguished or merged into the deed.29'
In this case, the contract between Buyer and Seller contained a provision
which stated that Seller must reveal all leases.292 Those leases revealed must
be the only agreements or understandings pertaining to the property. The
contract also expressly provided that "'representations and warranties made
by the Seller ... shall survive closing.,,293 Since the new lease breached the
contract between Seller and Buyer, the trial court erred in applying the merger
294
rule in this situation.
Whitehurst v. Camp.295 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court's finding that the statutory rate computed by the state comptroller
should be applied when awarding post-judgment interest.296 Whitehurst
appealed the lower court's final summary judgment which foreclosed upon
deeded property.297 The property at issue was real and personal property over
which the Camps and Whitehursts entered into a deed agreement. The
agreement provided that the Camps would pay the Whitehursts $450,000
"'with interest at the rate of 10 per centum (10%) per annum payable on the
whole sum remaining from time to time unpaid.', 298 The agreement
contained no provision governing the payment of interest on any judgment
entered pursuant to the agreement. 99
Section 55.03(1) of the Florida Statutes allows the parties to set the rate
of post-judgment interest by contract. 300 However, the agreement here only
set the rate of interest for the debt and did not govern the rate of post-
judgment interest. The parties must expressly state in the contract that the
decided interest rate is meant to govern post-judgment interest as well. If not
expressly stated, upon entry of a judgment, the lender can no longer charge
the interest designated by contract but is obligated to charge the amount
specified by statute.30' Since the terms of the agreement here between
291. Rubell, 679 So. 2d at 889 (citations omitted).
292. Id. at 890.
293. Id. (quoting the contract).
294. Id.
295. 677 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 687 So. 2d 1308
(Fla.), approved in part, 699 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1997).
296. Id. at 1362.
297. Id.
298. Id. (quoting the agreement).
299. Id.
300. Whitehurst, 677 So. 2d at 1362.
301. Id. at 1363. See Sciandra v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 638 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Altenbernd, J., concurring).
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Whitehurst and Camp were not specific to address post-judgment interest, the
eight percent statutory rate should apply.
302
VII. COVENANTS, DEEDS, AND RESTRICTIONS
Mann v. Mann.03 The question before this court was "whether the deed
at issue effectively transferred a joint interest in the home to Former Husband
and Former Wife. '304  The First District Court of Appeal reversed and
remanded the trial court's decision that the parties owned the home as tenants
in common.
30 5
In 1989, Former Husband and his first wife, who is not the Former Wife
in this litigation, deeded property to Former Husband's mother. The mother
never recorded. In 1993, Former Wife altered the deed by "whiting out" the
Former Husband's mother's name as grantee and replacing it with the parties'
names. The Former Wife alleged that the changes to the deed were made with
the consent of Former Husband, his mother, and his sister. On the other hand,
Former Husband claimed that the changes to the deed were made without his
consent. Former Husband alleged that Former Wife's intent was to obtain a
joint interest in the property.30 6 Under either version of the story, the altered
deed did not convey any joint interest in the property to the parties
represented in this action.30 7 Presently, the title to the property may belong to
Former Husband's mother, who was not a party of the divorce proceedings;
thus, the property does not fall under the court's jurisdiction.30 8
Stev-Mar, Inc. v. Matvejs.31  The Third District Court of Appeal
reversed an adverse summary final judgment in favor of Matvejs. 310 Matvejs
divided her piece of property in two, whereby she had her home on one half
and listed the vacant half for sale as a homesite. Real estate agents placed an
ad to sell the vacant property. Stev-Mar was interested in buying the land for
a retirement home. The agent told Stev-Mar that the property was zoned and
platted for a single family home. Consequently, Stev-Mar entered into a
contract to buy the land. Although Stev-Mar was to take title subject to
302. Whitehurst, 677 So. 2d at 1363.
303. 677 So. 2d 62 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
304. Id. at 62.
305. Id. at 63.
306. Id. at 62-63.
307. Id. at 63.
308. Mann, 677 So. 2d at 63.
309. 678 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996), review denied sub nom. Carico Real
Estate Co. v. Stev-Mar, Inc., 686 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1996).
310. Id. at 835.
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certain restrictions, nothing in the contract prevented the "'use of [r]eal
[p]roperty for residential purposes."' 31' In addition, Stev-Mar's attorney
verified that the area zoning permitted the building of a single family
residence.312
When the seller delivered the general warranty deed to Stev-Mar, the
deed did not have the required disclosure statement which advises the buyer
that "'under the Monroe County Land Development Regulations the division
of land into parcels of land [which] are not approved as platted lots under the
regulations confers no right to develop a parcel of land for any purpose."'
313
Later on, Stev-Mar discovered that the property was not properly replatted or
subdivided and could not be legally used for its desired purpose.314 Stev-Mar
brought suit against the owner, real estate agent, and real estate agency for
intentional fraud and negligent misrepresentation. 315 The trial court held for
Matvejs, stating that Stev-Mar hired an attorney to investigate the property
and did not rely on the representations of Matvejs.316
The third district reversed the trial court's decision.317 The court relied
on the decision in Besett v. Basnett.318 In Basnett, the Supreme Court of
Florida held that a recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation may rely on the
truth of such representation, even though its falsity could have been
discovered through investigation, unless he knows, or it is obvious to him,
that the representation is false.319 In this case, the seller misrepresented the
land as properly platted for use as a homesite. Stev-Mar entered a contract
based on that misrepresentation. In addition, Stev-Mar's attorney was
negligent in his investigation of the land because he failed to investigate
beyond zoning. The attorney never discovered that the property had not been
replatted.320
The question is whether Matvejs avoids liability just because Stev-Mar's
attorney conducted a negligent investigation. The district court recoguized
that even though Stev-Mar's attorney was negligent, the seller, real estate
agent, and real estate agency cannot avoid the intentional fraud charge.
321
311. Id. at 835-36 (quoting the contract).
312. Id. at 836.
313. Id. (quoting the contract).
314. Matvejs, 678 So. 2d at 836.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 839.
318. Id. at 837 (citing Besett v. Basnett, 389 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 1980)).
319. Besett v. Basnett, 389 So. 2d 995, 998 (Fla. 1980).
320. Matvejs, 678 So. 2d at 837.
321. Id.
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"'[T]he law should not permit an inattentive person to suffer loss at the hands
of a misrepresenter.'
322
VII. EASEMENTS
Nerbonne, N. V v. Florida Power Corp.323 The issue before the Fifth
District Court of Appeal was:
Whether Orange County's grant of a permit to Florida Power
Corporation in 1991 to construct a power line over an easement
deeded to the County in 1952 and the subsequent erection of the
power line exceeded the scope of the grant of easement to the
324County and, thus, constituted a taking of Nerbonne's property.
The "Right-of-Way Agreement" in question provided that in exchange for one
dollar, the Florida Power Corporation would be given "'a right-of-way for
public road purposes and full authority to enter upon, . . . TO HAVE AND
TO HOLD the said easement. '"' 3
25
Florida has not directly decided this issue, but the majority of courts in
other jurisdictions have concluded that the construction of a power line, which
did not interfere with highway travel, was a proper use of a highway
easement.326 It "is not regarded as imposing an additional burden or servitude
on the underlying estate." 327 When looking to other cases such as Fisher v.
Golden Valley Electric Ass'n,328 the reasoning appeared consistent with
Florida cases that have considered the scope of a public road right-of-way. 329
Since the document failed to exclude public utilities from the easement, the
court construed the grant of a right-of-way to include such utilities.330
State Department of Transportation v. B & C Foods, Inc.331 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision ordering the City
of Fort Lauderdale to reconvey an easement to McDonald's Corporation
322. Id. at 837-38 (citing Besett v. Basnett, 389 So. 2d 995, 998 (Fla. 1980)).
323. 692 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
324. Id. at 928.
325. Id. (quoting the agreement).
326. Id. at 929 (citations omitted).
327. Id. (citations omitted).
328. 658 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1983).
329. Nerbonne, 692 So. 2d at 930 (citing Dickson v. St. Lucie County, 67 So. 2d 662,
665 (Fla. 1953)).
330. Id.
331. 687 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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according to section 255.22 of the Florida Statutes.332 The language in the
1979 easement stated that the easement was for "'right[-]of[-]way
purposes.0'3 33 This purpose was for a "'specified purpose or use"' which was
intended to be addressed under subsection (3) of the Florida Statutes.334 Fort
Lauderdale did not use or identify the easement in a comprehensive plan of its
own within ten years of the conveyance date. 35 Since subsection (1) required
the transferee to identify the property as such in the comprehensive plan, the
Department of Transportation could not rely on Broward County's
comprehensive plan as a way around subsection (3).336
IX. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Condemnation
Broward County v. LaPointe.337 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
ruled that where a researcher had been hired as both an expert witness and as
a litigation consultant, it was error to award an expert witness fee for all of the
researcher's time.338 "On remand, the trial court must determine what portion
of [his] fee can be allocated to the formation of an expert opinion which
related to the valuation of the property. ' 339 The condemnor can be required to
pay only that portion of his bill.
Department of Transportation v. Springs Land Investments, Ltd.40 To
effectuate its comprehensive plan, the city was planning on down-zoning an
area that included this owner's land. Since that "would have significantly
reduced the property's market value," the landowner took the steps necessary
to have the commercial zoning vest so it would survive a general re-zoning of
the area, primarily by hiring an engineering firm to acquire the city's
preliminary site plan approval for a shopping center.341 Then, the Department
of Transportation began this condemnation proceeding which was eventually
332. Id. at 5. See FLA. STAT. § 255.22(l) (1994).
333. B & CFoods, Inc., 687 So. 2d at 5.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. 685 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). For more discussion of this case,
see also the Attorneys' Fees section of this survey.
338. Id. at 893.
339. Id.
340. 695 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
341. Id. at 416.
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settled. Subsequently, when the condemnee filed a motion to tax costs, it
included the engineering firm's fees.342
The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that those fees should not have
been allowed.343 Section 73.091 of the Florida Statutes provides for "all
reasonable costs" of the condemnation proceeding. 344 Here, however, the fees
were incurred to maintain the value of the property by avoiding down-zoning,
not to litigate the condemnation. It would seem like double compensation if
this landowner was compensated for the land with the commercial zoning in
order to pay for both the land with the more valuable zoning and to pay the
fees to get that zoning.
Garber v. State Department of Transportation.345 Following a stipulated
judgment, the trial court entered an order on attorneys' fees and costs
pursuant to section 73.091 of the Florida Statutes.346 However, the trial court
denied expert witness fees for the condemnee's marketing expert who was a
real estate broker engaged "to help assess the impact a loss of parking places
would have on the property's continued viability as the location of three
physicians' practices. 347 The First District Court of Appeal ruled "that the
trial court erred in categorically rejecting" an expert witness fee for the
marketing expert.348 Neither the plain language of the statute nor the decision
in State Department of Transportation v. Woods349 precluded expert witness
fees for a marketing expert. 31 The latter denied fees for an expert that the
fourth district concluded had assisted the condemnee's lawyer in the litigation
rather than act as an expert witness.351 However, this trial court had made no
similar finding of facts that this expert was not hired "as a witness to render or
assist in rendering an opinion on just valuation and to testify, as needed. 352 If
this person had done what the condemnee claimed, then an expert witness fee
would have been appropriate. Furthermore, it must not be duplicative, and it
must be necessary to the presentation of the condemnee's case.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 415.
344. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1993).
345. 687 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
346. Id. at 3.
347. Id. at 4.
348. Id.
349. 633 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
350. Garber, 687 So. 2d at 4.
351. Id. (citing Department of Transp. v. Woods, 633 So. 2d 94, 95 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
352. Id.
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M & C Associates v. State Department of Transportation.35 3 Mediation
produced a settlement agreement that was incorporated into a stipulated final
judgment. One provision was "that the trial court would 'reserve jurisdiction
to assess any damage"' caused to the landowner's pool by the Department's
construction.354 However, the trial court later denied the landowner's motion
to enforce this provision "on the basis that construction damages are not
recoverable in an eminent domain proceeding. '3 55  The second district
reversed, noting that "[t]here is no requirement that the terms of a settlement
agreement be confined to issues cognizable in the litigation giving rise to the
dispute." 356 The court held that the rights and obligations of the parties
merged into the settlement agreement.35 7 Consequently, the agreement was
binding on the parties and the trial court.358 From the limited facts given, it
appears that the Department's conduct was outrageous, but the opinion is a
monument of judicial restraint, simply stating the law and the results without
casting aspersions on the Department's actions.
Murray v. Department of Transportation.59  The Department of
Transportation took sixteen parking spaces from a restaurant parking lot. The
restaurateur sought both business and severance damages under the statute in
addition to compensation for the land. The issue on appeal centered on proof
of the business damages. The trial court admitted the testimony of the
restaurateur's expert, which stated:
[He had] calculated a projected loss of sales resulting from the lost
parking spaces and deducted from that sales amount the business
costs which, in his opinion, would have been attributed to
production of those sales had the sales not been lost. The expert
then capitalized the recurring shortfall and concluded that the
capitalized amount would be the loss to the ongoing business. 360
The first district reversed, ruling that the expert's testimony was inadmissible
as a matter of law because it did not deduct a percentage of all fixed costs
353. 682 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
354. Id. at 640.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. M& CAssocs., 682 So. 2d at 640.
359. 687 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1997).
360. Id. at 825.
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from the sales amount.361 The first district then certified two questions.362The first was whether:
IN AN EMINENT DOMAIN CASE IN WHICH AN
ESTABLISHED BUSINESS IS NOT TOTALLY DESTROYED
BY A TAKING, DOES SECTION 73.071(3)(B), FLORIDA
STATUTES [(1991)], CONTEMPLATE CALCULATION OF
BUSINESS DAMAGES BY ANY MEANS OTHER THAN A
LOST PROFIT ANALYSIS?
3 63
The Supreme Court of Florida declined to answer this question, reasoning that
all the experts in this case had used a lost profit analysis.364 However, the
Supreme Court of Florida directed its attention to the second certified
question which was:
IN THE INSTANT CASE IS THE EXPERT'S BUSINESS
DAMAGE CALCULATION A LOST PROFIT ANALYSIS
REQUIRING THE DEDUCTION OF FIXED EXPENSES, SUCH
AS SALARIES, INTEREST, DEPRECIATION, AND
UTILITIES, OR AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS,
COGNIZABLE UNDER SECTION 73.071(3)(b) [FLORIDA
STATUTES (1991)], BASED ON DEDUCTION OF CERTAIN
VARIABLE EXPENSES AND THE EXCLUSION OF FIXED
EXPENSES FROM THE ANALYSIS? 365
The supreme court answered that "a business-loss calculation based on certain
variable expenses and excluding some fixed expenses can be cognizable
under section 73.071(3)(b), depending upon the factual circumstances of a
particular case., 36 6 The unanimous opinion written by Justice Wells noted
that business damages are related to lost profits, but they are not limited to lost
profits.367 The supreme court rejected a "mechanically applied, one-size-fits-
all formula."368 It would have been error not to deduct managerial salaries in
the amount deducted from sales in a case where the business had closed as a
361. State Dep't of Transp. v. Murray, 670 So. 2d 977, 980 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1996), quashed by Murray v. State Dep't of Transp., 687 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1997).
362. Id. at 980.
363. Id.
364. Murray, 687 So. 2d at 826.
365. Id. at 825-26.
366. Id. at 826.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 827.
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result of the taking.369 However, in this case the business did not close. In the
case at hand, it was a question of fact as to which fixed expenses should be
included in the calculation because it was not certain that managerial expenses
would be reduced by the decreased trade that the restaurant would suffer from
the loss of parking spaces. Both sides had presented expert testimony on that
issue. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this
testimony.
37 °
Trinity Temple Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Orange County.371 Part
of the church's property was taken, and the church sought, inter alia, statutory
business damages.372 The courts did not hesitate to grant severance damages,
but the trial court rejected the business damage claim, and the fifth district
agreed. 373  First, the court concluded that a tax-exempt church was not a
business within the meaning of the statute.374 The court noted that the statute
is to be "strictly construed. 3 75 The dictionary definition of a business is one
that involved an "activity engaged in for a gain or livelihood, 376 but, the
statute providing the church tax-exempt status requires that the church be
used "predominately for a . . . religious ...purpose."377 The court also
rejected the church's equal protection argument by primarily relying on the
difficulty in calculating business damages for something that was not a
business and already was getting preferential tax treatment.78
Trump Enterprises, Inc. v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. 37 9 The lease for an
unimproved outparcel in a shopping center did not contain a condemnation
clause. A restaurant was built on the parcel, and thereafter, almost thirty-five
percent of the parcel was taken for road widening. Although the lessee
presented unrebutted expert testimony as to the value of the leasehold taken,
the trial court held that the lessee was not entitled to a portion of the
condemnation award.380 It reasoned that the lessee had suffered no harm
because the land taken was part of the grassy strip running along the road.38,
369. Murray, 687 So. 2d at 827 (distinguishing Department of Transp. v. Manoli, 645
So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
370. Id.
371. 681 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
372. Id. at 766. See also FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1995).
373. Trinity Temple, 681 So. 2d at 766.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 198 (6th ed. 1990)).
377. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 196.196(1) (1995)).
378. Trinity Temple, 681 So. 2d at 766.
379. 682 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
380. Id. at 168.
381. Id. at 170.
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Therefore, the restaurant building was not disturbed because it had lost no
parking spaces and its business was not affected. 8 2 The Fourth District Court
of Appeal disagreed and reversed.8 3
The right to compensation for a governmental taking is not a matter of
damages in the contract or tort sense. A leasehold is an interest in land for
purposes of taking jurisprudence. When a fee simple subject to a lease is
taken, the lessee is entitled to share in the condemnation award as
compensation for the interest lost. The lessee's share should be proportionate
to the value of the leasehold in relation to the value of the fee simple taken.
Consequently, this lessee's share in the condemnation award should be the
decrease in the value of its leasehold, which its expert had figured from the
proportionate loss of area minus the value of the landlord's reversion.38 4
The lack of a condemnation clause in the lease did not defeat the lessee's
right to compensation. Quite the contrary, when a lease is silent about
condemnation, the lessee is entitled to compensation for its lost leasehold
interest. The court pointed out in dicta that condemnation clauses limiting a
tenant's right to compensation for a governmental taking are disfavored and
should, therefore, be construed, whenever possible, not to defeat a tenant's
right to compensation.385
B. Inverse Condemnation
Department of Environmental Protection v. Gibbins.386  The
landowner's neighbor operated a service station which discharged gasoline
from underground storage tanks. To define the extent of the contamination,
the Department of Environmental Protection notified the landowner that it
wanted to drill several wells on the landowner's property. The landowner
resisted, demanding compensation; thus, the Department served him with an
administrative order for access. After the landowner responded with a
demand for a formal hearing, the Department withdrew its administrative
action and filed a complaint seeking an injunction against the landowner for
interfering with the installation of wells on his land. The Department then
decided that was unnecessary and moved for voluntary dismissal; however,
the landowner filed a motion for attorney's fees on the theory that he had
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Trump, 682 So. 2d at 170.
385. Id. (relying on Mullis v. Division of Admin., 390 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1980)).
386. 696 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. of App. 1997).
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defeated an attempt by the government to take his land. The trial court agreed
and awarded substantial attorney's fees.387
The fifth district reversed.388 Its analysis does not address whether the
Department's conduct amounted to an "inverse condemnation" or whether
attorney's fees can be awarded in an inverse condemnation case, although the
court disagreed with the landowner's contention that the "DEP's action,
whether deliberate or inadvertent, was highly intrusive behavior, and hence a
taking. 3 89 Rather, the fifth district reasoned that because no condemnation
proceeding had begun, the landowner could not have succeeded in defeating a
condemnation attempt.390 As the statutes relied upon only provide for
attorney's fees in condemnation proceedings, 391 there would be no basis for
awarding attorney's fees in this case.
3 92
Diamond K Corp. v. Leon County.393 A creek crossed a comer of
Diamond K's property. The County dredged a channel in the creek for
mosquito control. The County approved development and the installation of
culverts under the nearby state road to allow for the increased flow of water in
the creek. Cumulatively, these culverts caused the creek to widen and, in a
heavy rainstorm, the water would back up and not drain properly. The
landowner brought suit claiming inverse condemnation, but lost at the trial
level.394 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed because the record did
not contain evidence of a permanent deprivation of the beneficial use of the
land, and suggested that the landowner should have brought an action for
damages against any third party responsible for increasing the surface water
flow across its land.395
Jacobi v. City of Miami Beach.396 Landowners owned two lots, with the
house on one lot overlapping onto the second lot. In order to obtain a
building permit for the second lot, the owners sought to reconfigure the two
lots to eliminate any overlap. The City's Department of Planning and Zoning
approved the requested reconfiguration and then issued the building permit,
which was reversed by the Board of Adjustment.397 The property owners
387. Id. at 888-89.
388. Id. at 890.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. See FLA. STAT. §§ 73.091-.092 (1993).
392. Gibbins, 696 So. 2d at 890.
393. 677 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
394. Id. at 91.
395. Id.
396. 678 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1996).
397. Id. at 1366.
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finally got their approval after a successful appeal to the trial court's appellate
division. They then sued for losses allegedly incurred as a result of the Board
of Adjustment's erroneous reversal on the theories of inverse condemnation
and violation of their due process rights.398 The trial court granted the City's
motion for summary judgment and the landowners appealed.
The third district rejected the taking claim because the record reflected
that, despite the denial of the permit application, the landowners still occupied
and even improved the existing house.400 Consequently, they were not
deprived of "'substantially all economically beneficial or productive use of
land."'40' 1 The third district rejected the property owners' substantive due
process claim.402 The decision of the Board of Adjustment was executive, not
legislative in nature.40 3 Noting that "'[t]he notion that the Constitution gives a
property owner a substantive right to a correct decision from a government
official . . . is novel indeed,,4 04 the court pointed out that an executive act
would violate substantive due process only if the right affected was "'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty."'40 5 But none of the fundamental rights of
these property owners had been infringed. Their interest in the
reconfiguration approval and building permit issued by the Department of
Planning and Zoning was not a fundamental right. Moreover, it was a right
that was restored when relief was sought following the appeals process. In
sum, the court declined to find that property owners who successfully appeal
denials of building permits and the like are, without more, entitled to recover
from the government for their resulting losses.406
Nerbonne, N.V. v. Florida Power Corp.4°7 A landowner granted the
County a right-of-way for public road purposes. Subsequently, the County
granted the power company a permit to construct power lines along that right-
of-way. The servient landowner claimed that the County had exceeded the
398. Id. A violation of their civil rights would be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994).
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Jacobi, 678 So. 2d at 1366 (citation omitted).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1367.
404. Id. at 1367-68 (quoting Boatman v. Town of Oakland, 76 F.3d 341, 346 (11th Cir.
1996)).
405. Id. at 1367 (quoting C.B. By and Through Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 387
(I th Cir. 1996)).
406. Jacobi, 678 So. 2d at 1367.
407. 692 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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scope of the easement and demanded compensation. This action based upon
inverse condemnation followed.4"'
The fifth district found that this was a case of first impression in
Florida. °9 It reviewed decisions from other states and found decisions in
Alaska410 and Minnesota411 particularly persuasive for the proposition that a
right-of-way easement includes compatible uses by which energy or
412information might be transmitted. The court stated that "[i]f the grantor
had intended in 1952 to exclude public utilities from the easement, it would
have been possible to do so. Since the document is silent, we construe the
grant of right-of-way for public road purposes to include public utilities.'A
13
Palm Beach County v. Cove Club Investors Ltd.4  Palm Beach County
acquired title to a residential mobile home lot by eminent domain. The
mobile home lot was subject to a declaration of covenants that obligated the
lot owners to pay a monthly recreation fee and required the Club to operate a
golf course and country club for the use of the lot owners. The Club brought
this suit claiming that it had suffered the loss of a property right in that the
condemnation of the lot had deprived it of the income to which it was entitled.
The trial court agreed, holding that a taking of property had occurred and
reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of compensation due. 5 The
County appealed the taking determination, but the Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed.416
The fourth district distinguished this case from Board of Public
Instruction of Dade County v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands,417 North Dade
Water Co. v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 418 and Division of
Administration, Department of Transportation v. Ely.41 9 The critical point
seemed to be that the Club was still required to operate the golf course and
country club facilities for the other owners, but without the support of the
408. Id. at 928.
409. Id. at 929.
410. Fisher v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n, 658 P. 2d 127 (Alaska 1983).
411. Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 63 N.W. Il1 (Minn. 1895).
412. Nerbonne, 692 So. 2d at 929 (citation omitted).
413. Id. at 930.
414. 692 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. 81 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 1955) (holding that mutual restrictions within a
subdivision did not create property rights).
418. 114 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959), dismissed, 120 So. 2d 621 (Fla.
1960) (holding that an exclusive contract to sell water to subdivision was not a property right).
419. 351 So. 2d 66, 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (concluding that a contract to sell
gas to mobile home park residents was not a property right).
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income stream from the condemned lot. The trial court concluded that this
amounted to a taking and that "[t]he trial court's determination on liability in
an inverse condemnation suit is presumed correct and its findings will not be
disturbed on appeal if supported by competent, substantial evidence. ' 420 The
fourth district also rejected the County's claim that public policy would be
violated by making the County pay for the Club's lost income because the
public policy is to compensate owners whose property is taken.42' The fourth
district subsequently granted the motion to certify the following question to
the Supreme Court of Florida as being of great public importance:
WHETHER THE RIGHT OF A PRIVATE COUNTRY CLUB TO
RECEIVE A STREAM OF INCOME FROM A MONTHLY
RECREATION FEE ASSESSED AGAINST THE OWNER OF A
RESIDENTIAL MOBILE HOME LOT CONSTITUTES A
PROPERTY RIGHT COMPENSABLE UPON INVERSE
CONDEMNATION BY THE COUNTY FOR USE OF THAT
LOT IN A PUBLIC ROAD WIDENING PROJECT? 4
22
XI. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Ober v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection.2 1 The fifth
district held that Ober was entitled to reimbursement for the clean-up of
storage tanks and contaminated soil on Ober's property.424 Ober owned
property that was leased and used as an AAMCO transmission shop. During
inspection of the property, the Environmental Control Division determined
the site, containing underground storage tanks and an oil/water separator, was
contaminated. Ober employed an environmental contractor to remedy the
situation, and once this was completed, the contractor filed a closure report.
Ober later applied for entry into the Abandoned Tank Restoration Program
pursuant to section 376.305(7) of the Florida Statutes, providing for
"financial assistance to a clean site contaminated by petroleum or petroleum
products." 425 The Department of Environmental Regulation later told Ober
420. Cove Club, 692 So. 2d at 999.
421. Id. at 1000.
422. Id.
423. 688 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
424. Id. at 436.
425. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 376.305(7) (1995)).
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that the contamination at his site was eligible for reimbursement under the
statute.
426
When Ober filed for reimbursement of the $46,765.24, the Department
of Environmental Protection ("DEP") denied the request, concluding that the
costs accrued were due to surface spillage of contaminants not covered by the
statute. Further, the DEP found that that the source of contamination was
"improper disposal and storage methods; and that the underground storage
system was not the source of contamination of the facility.' , 27 Ober filed a
petition for an administrative hearing. The hearing officer found the
contamination to be the result of discharge of petroleum products specified
under section 376.301 of the Florida Statutes.
428
The issue before the court was whether the waste oil and transmission
fluid (which the hearing officer found to be the source of the contamination)
were "petroleum products" as defined by section 376.301 of the Florida
Statutes.429 The court rejected the Department's argument that distinguished
between "waste oil" and "used oil" because it overlooked the fact that the
intent of the statute was to reimburse property owners for remedying
contaminated sites.430 The court looked to rule 62-770.200(12) of the Florida
Administrative Code where it defined used oil.431 It recognized the rule had
no definition of waste oil even though the hearing officer and Ober's witness
at the hearing used the terms "used oil and waste oil interchangeably.
'
,
3 2
Since there was evidence that lubricants described as waste oil or transmission
fluid, which contaminated the soil from underground tanks were used in
Florida as fuel, "the conclusion of the hearing officer that these lubricants
were liquid fuel commodities made from petroleum and thus 'petroleum
products' . . . should have been sustained. ' ' 33 Thus, Ober should have been
reimbursed.
Florida Department of Environmental Protection v. Fleet Credit
Corp.43 4 The fourth district reversed summary judgment granted in favor of
Fleet Credit on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired before
Florida's Department of Environmental Protection filed the action. 435 The
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Ober, 688 So. 2d at 436-37.
429. Id. at 437.
430. Id. at 438.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Ober, 688 So. 2d at 438.
434. 691 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
435. Id. at 514.
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court reasoned that summary judgment was inappropriate because "the statute
of limitations begins to run when the last element of a cause of action
accrues. '436  "Florida's environmental resource and recovery management
statutes are remedial in nature" and have the purpose to clean up unused
waste disposal sites to protect the public health and safety.437 It was irrelevant
when Fleet abandoned the property because the ongoing contamination
constituted continuing disruption. 438  In conclusion, when there is a
continuing invasion of rights with regard to environmental concerns, the
statute of limitations does not run until the wrongful invasion terminates.'t 9
XII. EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Lee County v. Fort Myers Airways, Inc. 440 Arbitrators decided that both
the landlord, Lee County, and the tenant, Fort Myers Airways, had breached
the lease and both were entitled to damages.44' The trial court confirmed the
decision and also ordered the landlord to maintain the buildings structurally as
required by the lease.442 The maintenance order was reversed by the Second
District Court of Appeal, which reasoned that the order was a mandatory
injunction.443 According to the second district, "mandatory injunctions are
looked upon with disfavor and should be granted sparingly and cautiously."
444
Injunctions should be granted only upon a showing of "(1) a clear legal right,
(2) the inadequacy of a remedy at law, and (3) that irreparable injury will
occur if such relief is not granted."" 5 Unfortunately, the trial court had not
made a finding that the prerequisites were satisfied.446 Furthermore, an
injunction should not be issued where it would produce hardship
disproportionate to the one the injunction would prevent; however, the trial
court made no finding concerning relative hardship to the parties.447 These
defects in the judgment mandated reversal.448
436. Id.
437. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 403.702 (1995).
438. Fleet, 691 So. 2d at 514.
439. Id.
440. 688 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
441. Id. at 390.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Lee, 688 So. 2d at 390.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id.
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Chief Judge Threadgill dissented regarding the injunction.4 49  He
recharacterized the order as granting specific performance and found ample
authority in section 44.104(11) of the Florida Statutes for the trial court to
grant specific performance based on the arbitrators' award without making
further findings.450 He also urged deference to the opinion of the trial judge,
noting that the litigation had been in progress for eight years.
451
Licea v. Anllo.a52 The buyer brought suit for specific performance of a
real estate sales contract and filed a notice of lis pendens. In response, the
seller filed a motion asking for either discharge of the lis pendens or that the
buyer be required to post a bond. Over the buyer's objection that an
evidentiary hearing was necessary, the trial court heard the matter on its
motion calendar and set bond for $350,000.413 The Third District Court of
Appeal reversed.454
A bond is needed for a notice of lis pendens only if the property owner is
likely to suffer and demonstrates loss or damage if the notice later proves
unjustified. If a bond is appropriate, its amount must bear a "reasonable
relationship" to that potential loss or damage.45 5 A court could only make the
finding that harm or damage is likely and determine the reasonable amount of
the bond after an evidentiary hearing.456
Morton v. Cord Realty, Inc.457 As part of the settlement of complex
litigation, a development company transferred the development property to its
president and then ceased doing business. The broker, seeking to recover
sales commissions from the development company, filed supplementary
proceedings under section 56.29(6)(a) of the Florida Statutes to set aside the458 459
transfer. The trial court voided the transfer and the case was appealed.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court erred in relying
entirely upon section 56.29 because that only provided the procedural
mechanism for setting aside a fraudulent transfer and not the substantive
law.460 That is now found in chapter 726 of the Florida Statutes, Fraudulent
449. Id. at 391 (Threadgill, C.J., dissenting).
450. Lee, 688 So. 2d at 391.
451. Id.
452. 691 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
453. Id. at 30.
454. Id.
455. Id. (citation omitted).
456. Id.
457. 677 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
458. Id. at 1323. See FLA. STAT. § 56.29(6)(a) (1993).
459. Morton, 677 So. 2d at 1324.
460. Id.
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461Transfers. Consequently, the case had to be reversed and remanded for
retrial.46
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AAA Asphalt, Inc.463 Subcontractors sought
equitable relief against the landowner under section 713.31 of the Florida
Statutes, which provided for such relief "'[w]hen the owner or any lienor
shall, by fraud or collusion, deprive or attempt to deprive any [construction]
lienor of benefits or rights to which such lienor is entitled.... ."A' The trial
court granted summary judgment to the subcontractors and the landowner
appealed.4 65 The question was what the legislature meant by "fraud. ,4 66 The
trial court concluded its meaning encompassed constructive fraud, committed
by "negligently failing to determine the invalidity of the [contractor's]
payment bond, 'A67 but the First District Court of Appeal disagreed. 68
The district court noted that fraud, for the purposes of this section, had
not been defined by statute or by any case.4 69 However, in other construction
cases involving the term "fraud," courts had interpreted the term as involving
intentional conduct.470 Moreover, the term "fraudulent lien" within the same
section had been interpreted to mean a lien for an amount that had been
willfully exaggerated.4  The court reasoned that fraud as used in this chapter
should be interpreted consistently. 72 Consequently, equitable relief was
available only if the landowner had the intent to defraud. Therefore, the trial
court's finding that the landowner was negligent did not satisfy that
requirement.473
461. See FLA. STAT. § 56.29(6)(a) (1993).
462. Morton, 677 So. 2d at 1324.
463. 677 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
464. Id. at 94 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.31 (1993)).
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Wal-Mart, 677 So. 2d at 94.
469. Id.
470. Id. See First Interstate Dev. Corp. v. Ablanedo, 511 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1987);
Taylor v. Kenco Chemical & Mfg. Corp., 465 So. 2d 581, 589 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
471. Wal-Mart, 677 So. 2d at 94 (citing Vinci Dev. Co. v. Connell, 509 So. 2d 1128,
1132 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
472. Id.
473. Id.
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XOII. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
381651 Alberta, LTD. v. 279298 Alberta, LTD.474 The issue before this
court was "whether 27 Alberta's action to set aside the conveyances is one at
law or equity given the fact that 27 Alberta seeks also that the proceeds from
the sale of the property be applied to satisfy the money judgment?' 75 27
Alberta, a Canadian corporation, received a $2,375,811.17 judgment against
Adams, an individual 76  Adams' personal property, including two
condominiums was held by Eljada Holdings Family Trust Corporation. 477
"After the entry of the judgment Eljada transferred the mortgages on the
condominiums to Adams' brother's company, 381651 Alberta, Ltd., ("38
Alberta"), allegedly as security for a loan.' 78
"Therefore, 27 Alberta filed suit against Adams, Eljada, and 38 Alberta
seeking an order setting aside the transfers as fraudulent conveyances and
mandating the sale of the real property to satisfy the judgment."479 The trial
court denied 3 8 Alberta's request for a jury trial and later found that Adams
"evaded personal liability by titling.., personal assets" in Eljada's name.4 80
The trial court determined that the mortgages were fraudulent conveyances
and set them aside.48 l The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the final
judgment, but wrote an opinion to address the jury trial issue.482
The right to a jury trial applies only to legal causes of action,483 and
actions seeking monetary judgments are traditionally ones at law.484 The
fourth district distinguished other federal decisions to review this
case. However, it noted that in Mission Bay Campland, Inc. v. Sumner,48 5 the
district court held "'[b]ecause the equitable remedy of annulment for a
fraudulent transfer of assets was sought, there was no federal constitutional
474. 675 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
475. Id. at 1387.
476. Id. at 1386.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. 38 Alberta, 675 So. 2d at 1386.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 1387.
483. Id. (citing King Mountain Condominium Ass'n v. Gundlach, 425 So. 2d 569 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
484. 38 Alberta, 675 So. 2d at 1387 (relying on Hutchens v. Maxicenters, U.S.A., 541
So. 2d 618, 623 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
485. 72 F.R.D. 464 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
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right to a jury trial. ''A86 This case parallels the situation in Alberta. 27
Alberta had an equitable claim against Adams' assets.487 "[A]n action to set
aside the fraudulent conveyance of Adams' real property is equitable in nature
since it does not result in a general adjudication of title to the property. 'As
Section 56.29 of the Florida Statutes states one cannot give, transfer, convey,
or assign anything to hinder or defraud creditors. 489 The fourth district found
that Alberta should be handled like the Mission Bay and Allied cases.490
Therefore, because 27 Alberta's pursuance of Adams' property is equitable in
nature, there is no right to ajury trial.49'
XIV. HOMEOWNERS' AssocIATIoNs
Sanzare v. Varesi.492 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed final
summary judgment in favor of Varesi and the Coconut Key Homeowners
Association ("Association"). The fourth district remanded the case to resolve
genuine issues of material fact concerning the Association's knowledge of the
presence and vicious propensities of a tenant's dog.
493
While Sanzare walked his dog on a nondedicated street running through
a "common area!' owned by the Association, he was bitten by a dog owned by
two people leasing a residence within the community. Sanzare filed a
negligence action against the Association. In turn, the Association moved for
summary judgment arguing it owed no duty to Sanzare. The Association
claimed that "liability for the dog-bite incident could be extended only to the
owner of the dog or the landlord of the property where the dog was kept.
' ' 94
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Association.495 The district court reversed the trial court's holding, noting
that genuine issues of material fact remain to be addressed.496 A landowner
may be liable for injuries resulting from an attack of a tenant's dog, if the
landowner knows of the animal's vicious propensity and has the ability to
486. 38 Alberta, 675 So. 2d at 1387 (quoting Mission Bay Campland, Inc. v. Sumner
Fin. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 464 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (citation omitted)).
487. Id. at 1388.
488. Id.
489. FLA. STAT. § 56.29(6)(b) (1993).
490. 38 Alberta, 675 So. 2d at 1388.
491. Id.
492. 681 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
493. Id. at 786.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id.
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control the animal's presence. 97 The district court recognized factual issues
remain as to whether the Association had knowledge of the animal's presence
and vicious propensities, as well as the Association's ability to control the
dog's presence. 49 8
Westwood Community Two Ass' v. Lewis.499  In this case the
homeowners filed suit to enforce sections 760.20-.37 of the Florida Statutes,
the familial status provisions of the Florida Fair Housing Act.500 The
homeowners association appealed adverse summary judgment in favor of the
appellees, homeowners in Westwood community.50 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's holding, reasoning that the
association was without the authority to exempt itself from the above statutory
provisions .502 The association was enjoined from representing the community
as "housing for older persons" where one must be fifty-five years of age or
older to reside.0 3
In 1989, the sixteen-year-old age requirement set forth in the Westwood
declaration of restrictions was nullified by an amendment to the Fair Housing
Act504 This amendment was intended to prevent the Westwood community
from discriminating based on familial status. As a result, the Westwood
homeowners association amended its bylaws to fit within the "housing for
older persons" exemption to familial status. 5  Paragraph fifteen of the
Westwood declaration of restrictions stated that "covenants, restrictions,
reservations[,J and servitudes" run with the land and bind those claiming
ownership or use of land until March 1, 2022.506 The association's bylaws
provided for amendments, but the bylaws stated that "'[n]o amendment shall
be made which is in conflict with the Declaration of Restrictions.'
50 7
However, "Westwood's declaration of restrictions did not reserve to the
association the right to amend the covenants or provide for amendment of the
covenants by a vote of lot owners. 50 8 When it amended its bylaws, the
497. Sanzare, 681 So. 2d at 786 (citing Vasques v. Lopez, 509 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
498. Id.
499. 687 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
500. Id. at 297.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Lewis, 687 So. 2d at 297.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id.
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association exercised authority it did not have.50 9 The association could not
amend its declaration of restrictions just because the Fair Housing Act voided
the sixteen-year-old age restriction.510
XV. HOMESTEAD
Crain v. Putnam.511 The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that
the elderly owner of a home was still entitled to homestead exemption even
though she was placed in a nursing home.512 Crain was placed in a nursing
home after suffering extensive brain damage in 1992. In 1994, her son, the
appellant, applied for tax exemption for the property pursuant to section
196.101 of the Florida Statutes, entitled "[e]xemption for totally and
permanently disabled persons. 513 Even though Crain satisfied the statutory
provisions and qualified for the exemption, both the property appraiser and
the trial court denied tax exemption because Crain failed to reside on the
property. 14 The question before the fourth district was "whether the property
was being 'used' within the meaning of section 196.101 (1) or (2). ' '515
The court found no cases on point with regard to Article VII of the
Florida Constitution, which addresses homestead exemption from forced sale
and limits on devise. However, the court considered several cases that
addressed the homestead exemption in Article X, section 4, which exempts
homesteads from forced sale and limits their devise. No cases were found on
point with regard to Article VII of the Florida Constitution. Although the two
homestead provisions found in the Florida Constitution are separate and
distinct, the court articulated no reason why Mrs. Crain could not keep her
homestead exemption under Article VII when she would retain it under
Article X.516 The court reversed and remanded for entry in favor of the
appellant, concluding that physical presence was not a requirement to receive
homestead exemption.1 7
509. Lewis, 687 So. 2d at 297.
510. Id. at 298.
511. 687 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
512. Id. at 1325.
513. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 196.101 (1993).
514. Crain, 687 So. 2d at 1326.
515. Id. at 1325-26.
516. Id. at 1326.
517. Id.
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Snyder v. Davis.5 18 This case came before the Supreme Court of Florida
under the following certified question:
WHETHER ARTICLE X, SECTION 4, OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION EXEMPTS FROM FORCED SALE A DEVISE
OF A HOMESTEAD BY A DECEDENT NOT SURVIVED BY A
SPOUSE OR MINOR CHILD TO A LINEAL DESCENDANT
WHO IS NOT AN HEIR UNDER THE DEFINITION IN
SECTION 731.201(18), FLORIDA STATUTES (1993).519
The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative and
quashed the district court's decision.5 20 Betty Snyder died testate in 1995 and
was survived by her only son Milo Snyder and his daughter, the appellee,
Kelli Snyder. Betty Snyder, in her last will and testament, devised her
residual estate, including her homestead to Kelli Snyder.521
Kelli Snyder petitioned the probate court seeking a determination that
Betty Snyder's homestead passed to her free and clear of claims of creditors
because Kelli was recognized as an "heir" under the intestate
statute. Alternatively, Kent W. Davis, the personal representative of the
decedent's estate, and the appellant in this cause of action, sought to sell the
homestead property to satisfy creditor's claims and other expenses. Mr. Davis
argued that under section 732.103 of the Florida Statutes, Milo Snyder was
the sole heir to the decedent's estate. Therefore, because the estate was
devised to the granddaughter and not to the heir, Mr. Davis contended that the
property was not exempt from forced sale to satisfy such claims and
expenses. The trial court granted Kelli Snyder's petition.522 The Second
District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order and remanded for
further proceedings.
523
Article X, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution states that a homestead
is "exempt from forced sale . . . except for the payment of taxes and
assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement or
repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor
518. 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1997). Although the Supreme Court of Florida did not render
this decision until after June 30, 1997, (the last date that this survey period covers), the
authors included it to avoid confusing the reader.
519. Id. at 1000.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Davis v. Snyder, 681 So. 2d 1191, 1193 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1997]
Nova Law Review
performed on the realty., 524 At issue was whether Kelli Snyder "is an heir as
contemplated by [A]rticle X, section 4, of the Florida Constitution and as
defined in sections 731.201(18) and 732.103."525
Under 731.201(18), "heirs" are defined as "those persons, including
surviving spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to
the property of a decedent., 526 In contrast to the Second District Court of
Appeal's reasoning in the common law understanding of what might
constitute an "heir," the Supreme Court of Florida concurred with the First
District Court of Appeal in Walker v. Mickler527 and applied a broader
definition to the term "heirs" to include "any of the class of potential heirs
under the intestacy statute., 528 The Supreme Court of Florida emphasized
that: 1) the homestead provision's purpose is to protect and maintain the
family homestead; and 2) the testator is the one who would be in the best
position to know which family member would most likely need the homestead
or would most likely be in a position to maintain its position.529
Farrior v. Estate of Farrior5 30 The issue before the court was whether
the devised homestead was exempt from the apportionment of estate taxes
under section 733.817(d) of the Florida Statutes.' This court looked to the
Second District Court of Appeal decision in Davis v. Snyder,532 which held
that where a decedent was not survived by a spouse or minor children and the
homestead was properly devised, the devisee takes the decedent's former
homestead subject to claims of the decedent's creditors.533 Here, the decedent
was survived by three grandchildren and two adult children.534 Accordingly,
this court affirmed the trial court's order holding Jay Farrior, appellant and
grandson of decedent, "liable for apportionment of estate taxes on property
devised to him by his grandfather and which property was [his] decedent
grandfather's primary residence and homestead. 535  However, that decision
has since been quashed by the Supreme Court of Florida.536
524. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)).
525. Id. at 1192.
526. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(18) (1993).
527. 687 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
528. Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1004.
529. Id. at 1005.
530. 694 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
531. Id. at 804. See FLA. STAT. § 733.817(d) (1995).
532. Davis, 681 So. 2d at 1191.
533. Id.
534. Farrior, 694 So. 2d at 804.
535. Id.
536. See Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1000.
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State Agency for Health Care Administration v. Conner.5 37 The Second
District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's determination that Madalyn
Skiles' interest in a house devised to her by the decedent was entitled to the
Florida Constitution homestead exemption from forced sale.538 Madalyn
Hinterleiter, decedent, devised a life estate in her home to Myron Conner, a
friend. The remainder of the estate and the home were left to Skiles. The
issue here centered on Hinterleiter's being survived by her granddaughter,
Skiles, and by also by a daughter.
539
Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution provides a homestead
exemption from forced sale which "inure[s] to the surviving spouse or heirs of
the owner."540 The trial court ruled that Skiles was entitled to homestead
exemption, but there was no authority on point at the time. 541 Subsequently,
the Second District Court of Appeal decided Davis v. Snyder.542 The Davis
court said devised property was not entitled to homestead exemption from
forced sale based upon the definition of heirs located in the Probate Code.
54 3
The Davis case prompted the court to certify the following question of great
public importance:
WHETHER ARTICLE X, SECTION 4, OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION EXEMPTS FROM FORCED SALE A DEVISE
OF A HOMESTEAD BY A DECEDENT NOT SURVIVED BY A
SPOUSE OR MINOR CHILD TO A LINEAL DESCENDENT
WHO IS NOT AN HEIR UNDER THE DEFINITION IN
SECTION 731.201(18), FLORIDA STATUTES (1993)? 544
This court recognized that the Davis case governed the case at bar and
reversed the trial court's order.545 In addition, the court also certified the
question above as one of great public importance.546 As noted above,
however, the Supreme Court of Florida has since quashed the Second District
Court of Appeal's decision in Davis.
547
537. 692 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
538. Id. at 235.
539. Id.
540. Id. See FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 4.
541. Conner, 692 So. 2d at 235.
542. Davis, 681 So. 2d at 1191.
543. Id. at 1193. See FLA. STAT. §§ 731.201(18), 731.103 (1993).
544. Davis, 681 So. 2d at 1193.
545. Conner, 692 So. 2d at 236.
546. Id.
547. Davis, 681 So. 2d at 1191.
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Knadle v. Estate of Knadle.548 The First District Court of Appeal
certified the following question as one of public importance:
DOES SECTION 4(b), ARTICLE X OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION PROTECT THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE
OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY WHERE DECEDENT'S WILL
DIRECTS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO SELL
THE PROPERTY AND PLACE THE PROCEEDS INTO THE
RESIDUE OF THE ESTATE FOR DISTRIBUTION TO
DECEDENT'S ADULT CHILDREN?
549
On November 14, 1994, the decedent, Evangeline Stewart Knadle, died
testate and was survived by two adult children. Her "estate included personal
assets and real property declared as her homestead., 550 The decedent's will
contained a provision addressing the homestead property and what should be
done with it. Most importantly, the provision expressed the decedent's wish
that her personal representative sell the homestead and add the net proceeds to
the rest of the estate. Arbor Health Care filed a claim against the decedent's
estate seeking payment of past bills. Michael Knadle, the son and personal
representative of decedent, filed a petition to determine homestead real estate
asserting it was entitled to exemption.55'
The lower court held that homestead property was an asset of the estate,
vulnerable to creditors, because decedent devised the property by will making
it a gift to her children. 2 Michael Knadle appealed to the First District Court
of Appeal.5 53 The decedent's will specifically directed that her homestead be
sold and the proceeds placed in the residue for distribution with the other
assets:554 Because the decedent devised her homestead as she did under these
circumstances, the court reasoned that the property lost its homestead status
and creditors, such as Arbor Health Care, could assert their claims.555
Rutherford v. Gascon.556 The question before the Second District Court
of Appeal was whether Mrs. Smith waived her homestead rights by entering
into a settlement agreement with Don Gascon wherein she agreed to hold only
548. 686 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
549. Id. at 633.
550. Id. at 632.
551. Id.
552. Id.
553. Knadle, 686 So. 2d at 632.
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. 679 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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a life estate in the disputed property." Mr. and Mrs. Robert Smith resided at
a condominium, owned by Mr. Smith, which was located in St. Petersburg,
Florida. After they were married, Mr. Smith executed a will which gave his
wife, Mrs. Smith, the right to live in the condominium as long as she wished.
However, in the event she died or chose not to reside there, Mr. Smith gave
and devised the condominium to his nephew, Don Gascon 8
After a dispute arose between Mrs. Smith and Gascon concerning Mrs.
Smith's rights to probate assets under her deceased husband's will, a
settlement agreement followed where Mrs. Smith signed a document waiving
her elective share in the probate estate and accepting a life estate in the
property.559 After Mrs. Smith died, her estate representative filed a petition to
have the condominium declared homestead property. The trial court denied
this petition, reasoning that Mrs. Smith waived homestead rights when she
entered the settlement agreement with Gascon and accepted a life estate.
560
The second district reversed on the grounds that the settlement
agreement neither displayed an intent by Mrs. Smith to waive homestead
rights nor showed that Mrs. Smith had knowledge that she relinquished a
homestead interest.Y Evidence offered revealed that Mrs. Smith was in fact
unaware that a fee simple interest in the homestead vested in her immediately
upon her husband's death.562 Therefore, in order to find that Mrs. Smith had
waived homestead protection, there must have been evidence showing she
intended to do so.
5 63
Tramel v. Stewart.564 Chief Justice Kogan and Justices Overton, Shaw,
Grimes, and Harding concurred in this per curiam opinion.565 Justice Anstead
566 567dissented with an opinion,566 and Justice Wells concurred with an opinion.
The court reviewed the following certified question:
WHETHER ARTICLE X, SECTION 4, FLA. CONST.,
PROHIBITS CIVIL FORFEITURE OF HOMESTEAD
557. Id. at 330.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Rutherford, 679 So. 2d at 330-31.
562. Id. at 331 (citing FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c); FLA. STAT. § 732.4015 (1993); In re
Estate of Finch, 401 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1981) ("[H{omestead may not be devised by will to
pass less than a fee simple interest where testator dies leaving a surviving spouse.").
563. Id.
564. 697 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1997).
565. Id. at 825.
566. Id. (Anstead, J., dissenting).
567. Id. (Wells, J., concurring).
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PROPERTY PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 932.701-.702, FLA.
STAT., WHEN THE PROCEEDS OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY ARE
INVESTED IN OR USED TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY?
68
Forfeiture procedures were initiated against Stewart for selling and growing
marijuana on the premises of their home. Stewart claimed the real property
was homestead property that was not forfeitable. Nevertheless, the trial court
entered judgment forfeiting all personal and real property.569  The First
District Court of Appeal reversed the ruling as to the homestead forfeiture and
certified the above question to the Supreme Court of Florida. 70
The Supreme Court of Florida looked to Article X, section 4 of the
Florida Constitution which construed homestead as exempt from forced
sale.5 71 The supreme court has previously held that Article X, section 4
prohibited civil or criminal forfeiture of homestead used in the course of
racketeering activity in violation of Florida's Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Act.572 The court agreed with the district court's holding that the
state did not have a right to the forfeiture of a homestead on the basis of an
equitable lien.573 Based on the constitution, the court could not find that a
forfeiture of homestead could be predicated on the Forfeiture Act.
574
Before the Forfeiture Act could provide a basis for the forfeiture of
homestead property, the constitution's homestead exemption must be liberally
construed to permit a forfeiture for a violation of the Forfeiture Act.575 The
court recognized that Article X, section 4 did not provide an exception for the
forfeiture of homestead property for a violation of the Forfeiture Act.
5 76
Although acquiring homestead through felonious activity is wrong, permitting
forfeiture on this basis would require a constitutional revision.577 Therefore,
the Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question in the
affirmative and agreed with the district court's reversal with respect to the
forfeiture of homestead property.
5 78
568. Id.
569. Tramel, 697 So. 2d at 821.
570. Id.
571. Id. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
572. Tramel, 697 So. 2d at 823. See Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla.
1992).
573. Tramel, 697 So. 2d at 824.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. Tramel, 697 So. 2d at 824.
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Walker v. Mickler.579 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the
decision that the decedent's grandson, Bayle, was entitled to protection under
Article X, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution from the estate's creditors
when a remainder interest was devised to him.580  Article X, section 4(b)
provides that exemptions and protections established for homestead "'shall
inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of the owner."'5 8 ' Heirs are "those who
may under the law of the state inherit from the owner of the homestead.58 2
Bayle, as grandson, was a lineal descendant of the decedent and qualified as a
person entitled to receive under intestacy and for Article X purposes. 3
The First District Court of Appeal found the reasoning in Bartelt v.
Bartelt persuasive. 4 The Bartelt court found it insignificant that the son and
daughter would have taken equally under intestacy, but that the daughter was
omitted from the will.58 5 The Bartelt court, as the court here, concluded the
sequence and share of inheritance as established under the intestacy statutes
did not necessarily determine entitlement to homestead exemption. 6
Although the decision here was contrary to the Second District Court of
Appeal's decision in Davis, this court recognized that the opinion was
contrary to the goal of homestead exemption against forced sale.58 7 This
direction was supported by the Supreme Court of Florida in Snyder.58  The
constitution is silent as to the drafters' intent with regard to creditors' rights to
homestead, but Article V, section 4(b) as amended in 1984, reflected the
intent that homestead exemption inure to whomever gets the property.5 89 This
court reasoned it is clear that the intent of homestead exemption is to protect
the decedent's homestead from his creditors for the benefit of his heirs.590 It
should make no difference if the person chosen to receive property under the
579. 687 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997), affid, 699 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1997).
In Snyder v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Florida recognized that the decision in Walker was
in conflict with that given by the Second District Court of Appeal in Davis v. Snyder. Snyder,
699 So. 2d at 1000.
580. Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1328.
581. Id. at 1329 (quoting FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 4)).
582. Id. (citing State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Trammell, 508 So. 2d
422 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct App. 1987)).
583. Id. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.103(1), 732.401(1) (1993).
584. Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1329. See Bartelt v. Bartelt, 579 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1991).
585. Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1329.
586. Id.
587. Id. at 1330.
588. Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1997).
589. Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1330.
590. Id.
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will would not be the closest consanguine heir.591 The person is still one
entitled to take by intestate succession.5 92 In addition, the constitution could
not intend that creditors gain a windfall by allowing them to take homestead
by forced sale because the beneficiary under the decedent's will was not the
closest consanguine heir. To deny Bayle the property would go against
constitutional intent.593 Therefore, this court affirmed the lower court's
decision and recognized conflict with the Davis court.
59 4
XVI. INSURANCE
Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Sheaffer.595  The
Sheaffers sought recovery under their homeowners insurance policy for
damages caused by hurricanes Erin and Opal. This court reversed the trial
court decision and agreed with the insurance company that the appraisal
provision in the policy required arbitration, which was a condition precedent
to the Sheaffers maintaining an action on the policy.
596
The Sheaffers' damaged roof was made of unique ceramic tiles that
could no longer be matched. The insurance policy covered losses "at
replacement cost without deduction for depreciation. 59 7  The Sheaffers
wanted the insurance company to pay for replacement of the entire roof to
return it to its condition and value before the hurricane. The insurance
company refused, and stated that the roof could be repaired by replacing the
damaged or missing tiles with other tiles not consistent with the ones already
there.5 98 The trial court denied the insurance company's motion to dismiss
concluding that the dispute between the parties involved an issue of coverage
under the policy.
599
This court concluded that the issue was not coverage but rather the
amount of the loss. 600 The court relied on J.J.F. of Palm Beach, Inc. v. State
Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,60 1 which stated that "'[w]here the amount owed
on a claim, arguably within the policy coverage, is dependent on the
591. Id.
592. Id.
593. Id. at 1331.
594. Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1331.
595. 687 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
596. Id. at 1332.
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Sheaffer, 687 So.2d at 1332.
601. 634 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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resolution of disputed issues of fact and the application of policy language to
those facts ...the extent of the claim does not constitute a "coverage"
question.' 60 2 Once it is determined that the claim is covered by the policy,
"'whether the claimant is actually entitled under the facts of the case to be
paid on a claim and, if so, the precise amount to which the claimant is
entitled, is a question reserved for the arbitrator."'60 3  Since the insurance
company agreed that damage to Sheaffers' home was a covered claim, the
only question was the scope of the required repair and the amount of loss.
604
New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Podhurst, Orseck,
Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin & Perwin, P.A.605 This case was originally
a suit against the insurer, Affiliated FM Insurance Co., for property damage
coverage due to Hurricane Andrew. P.P. Partners, Ltd. and Parkhill Partners,
Ltd., the owners of two shopping centers insured by Affiliated, brought suit
against the Insurer for payment of damages. The owners later retained the
Podhurst law firm which requested it be paid on a contingent fee basis. New
England Mutual held mortgages on the two shopping centers and was given
the right to direct how the insurance proceeds were to be used. When the law
firm obtained the insurance money, the checks were made jointly to the
owners and to New England, the lender. Therefore, both the lender and the
owners had to agree to disburse the funds.
606
The lender refused to disperse money to satisfy the law firm's contingent
share.60 7 The lender stated that its interest in the insurance proceeds had
priority over the attorney's fee claims. The law firm filed a motion to impose
an attorney's charging lien on the proceeds and to get a disbursement order to
release the funds from the escrow account. The trial court ruled in favor of
the firm and entered orders for disbursement.
60 8
The question the Third District Court of Appeal determined was what
rule of priority governs competing claims to first in time insurance
proceeds.609 The lender's lien arose from the mortgage. The firm's claim
arose later in time. 61  The general rule of priority is first in time, first in
602. Sheaffer, 687 So. 2d at 1334 (quoting J.J.F. of Palm Beach, Inc. v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 634 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
603. Id. (quoting J.J.F. of Palm Beach, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 634 So. 2d
1089, 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
604. Id.
605. 690 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
606. Id. at 1354-55.
607. Id. at 1355.
608. Id.
609. Id. at 1356.
610. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 690 So. 2d at 1356.
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right.61 Here, the lender was a loss payee on the insurance policy. So, the
firm was chargeable with notice of the lender's earlier in time claim to the
proceeds.612  The owner's agreement to pay the contingent fee was not
binding on the lender.613 If the law firm wanted to receive priority over the
lender, the firm would have to secure the lender's consent.
614
The owners, pursuant to the mortgages, must maintain the property and
have the burden to make post hurricane repairs, including steps to pursue
insurance proceeds.61 To shift priorities, the court reasoned, would allow
owners' contingent fee agreement to by-pass the lenders first in time lien
without securing the lender's consent.6 ' In addition, under section 627.428
of the Florida Statutes, "an insured who successfully obtain[ed] judgment
against its insurer in an insurance lawsuit is entitled to recover attorney's fees
from the insurer. 617 Therefore, the court reversed.618
Secured Realty Investment Fund, LTD, II v. Highlands Insurance CO.
6 19
The question before the court was "'whether the mortgagee may recover
insurance proceeds under a policy containing a New York Standard Mortgage
clause after the mortgage debt has been fully satisfied by foreclosure or
otherwise."
620
On October 17, 1991, the Garcias entered into a mortgage and security
agreement with Century Investment Company.621 The mortgage encumbered
two properties, one in Key Largo, the other in Dade County.622 Century
assigned the interest on the note and mortgage to Secured Realty, who later
became the sole mortgagee. 62 The Garcias had an insurance policy issued by
Highlands to cover the Key Largo investment.624 When the Garcias defaulted
on payment, Secured Realty initiated foreclosure proceedings. At the
foreclosure sale, Secured Realty took title to both the Key Largo and Dade
611. Id.
612. Id. at 1357.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 690 So. 2d at 1357.
616. Id.
617. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 627.428 (1995).
618. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 690 So. 2d at 1358.
619. 678 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
620. Id. at 855 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 279 So. 2d 460, 462
(Ala. 1973)).
621. Id. at 853.
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Secured Realty Inv. Fund, 678 So. 2d at 853.
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properties. 625 When the Key Largo property was later discovered to be
damaged, Secured Realty notified Highlands of the damage in order to make a
claim under the policy initially secured by the Garcias.626 In early July, 1993,
Secured Realty sold both properties. Later in the month, Highlands offered
$45,000 for the damage to Key Largo and Secured rejected the offer and filed
a complaint.
627
The trial court agreed with Highland that Secured did not have an
insurable interest in the Key Largo property at the time the damage
occurred. 628 When Secured took title of the properties, the fair market value
exceeded the redemption amount.629 Since the debt was satisfied, Secured
Realty could no longer be considered the mortgagee.
630
The Third District Court of Appeal was forced to construe the mortgage
loss payable clause contained within the insurance policy issued by Highlands
to the Garcias.31 The court found the clause to be a New York Standard
632Mortgage clause. This type of clause provides that the loss is payable and
the owner/mortgagor's acts or neglect would not invalidate the insurance as
long as the lienholder/mortgagee shall pay the premium if the
owner/mortgagor fails to do so.
633
The general rule established by Wilborn recognized that the "'loss payee
clause affords protection to the mortgagee as his interest may appear before or
after foreclosure or other methods of change of ownership or title or other
mediums of increased ownership of the mortgage property and the insurance
follows the property.' 63 4  The exception to this rule states that "'if the
mortgage indebtedness is fully satisfied after loss by foreclosure or otherwise,
then the insurance company is no longer liable to the mortgagee.' 63 5 The
third district held that Secured Realty retained an insurable interest in the Key
Largo property after it acquired title to it by foreclosure. 63 6 The third district
625. Id.
626. Id.
627. Id.
628. Id.
629. Secured Realty Inv. Fund, 678 So. 2d at 853.
630. Id. at 853-54.
631. Id. at 854.
632. ld. at 855.
633. Id. at 854.
634. Secured Realty Inv. Fund, 678 So. 2d at 855-56 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Wilbom, 279 So. 2d 460, 465 (Ala. 1973)).
635. Id. at 856 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 279 So. 2d 460, 465
(Ala. 1973)).
636. Id.
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reversed the lower court holding because Secured Realty had an insurable
interest at the time of the Ioss.
637
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Licea.6 38 Justice Harding wrote the
court's opinion with which Justices Overton, Shaw, Grimes, Wells, and
Anstead concurred.639 The Supreme Court of Florida held that an insurance
appraisal clause was not void for lack of mutuality because of a retained rights
clause.640
Licea's home was damaged by Hurricane Andrew. When a dispute arose
as to the amount of damage, the insurance policy stated that State Farm and
Licea were each to select an appraiser and the appraisers chosen would then
pick an impartial umpire. If the appointed appraisers could not make the
selection, the court would be advised to pick one. This is exactly what
happened here. Because the chosen appraisers could not reach an agreement,
State Farm petitioned the court to appoint an umpire.
641
In addition, a clause in the policy stated that an appraisal of damage did
not waive any rights of the parties involved.642 The Liceas argued that
because of this clause, State Farm reserved its rights. So, the parties were not
equally bound by the appraisal.643 As such, the Liceas contended the
appraisal clause should be declared void for lack of mutuality.644 The trial
court denied State Farm's request for an umpire and the Third District Court
of Appeal affirmed.645
The Supreme Court of Florida rejected the Third District Court of
Appeal's decision and relied on the rationale set forth in the dissent in
American Reliance Insurance Co. v. Village Homes at Country Walk.646 The
Country Walk dissent set forth the rule that "'by participating in an arbitration
proceeding to determine the amount of loss suffered by an insured the insurer
637. Id.
638. 685 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1996).
639. See generally id.
640. Id. at 1286.
641. Id.
642. Id.
643. Licea, 685 So. 2d at 1286.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. Id. at 1288 (relying on American Reliance Ins. Co. v. Village Homes at Country
Walk, 632 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Cope, J., dissenting), overruled by
Paradise Plaza Condominium Ass'n v. Reinsurance Corp., 685 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
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is in no way deprived of the right to later contest the existence of insurance
coverage for that loss.
'
,
647
If a court decides coverage exists, the dollar value agreed upon under the
appraisal process will be binding on the parties6 48  When appraisal is
necessary, the insurer can only try to assert there is no coverage under the
policy for the loss, or there has been a violation of the usual policy conditions
such as fraud, lack of notice, or failure to cooperate. 49 The appraisal clause
in this case required an assessment of the amount of loss. As such, the clause
would not be void for lack of mutuality.650
XVII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
Badaraco v. Suncoast Towers V Associates.651 The tenant brought an
action for damages against the landlord who was in the process of renovating
a rental building so it could be converted into a condominium. The tenant
based his cause of action on section 83.67 of the Florida Statutes, which
prohibited landlords from terminating or interrupting utility services and
provided that a violator would be liable for the greater of three months rent or
actual and consequential damages.65 2 The circuit court dismissed the
complaint and the third district affirmed.53
Judge Gersten started by noting that the critical factor in statutory
interpretation is determining the legislative intent.654 He then invoked the
golden rule exception to the plain meaning approach to statutory
interpretation, i.e., the statute should not be given a literal reading because
that would produce an absurd or unreasonable conclusion.55 He reasoned
that the legislature could not have intended a minimum three month rent
penalty for a landlord who was performing necessary maintenance.65 6 His
review of the legislative history, including the legislative staff analysis and
staff summaries, revealed that the legislature's purpose in enacting the statute
647. Id. at 1286 (quoting State Farm Casualty Co. v. Licea, 649 So. 2d 910, 911 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)); see Country Walk, 632 So. 2d at 108-09 (Cope, J., dissenting).
648. Licea, 685 So. 2d at 1287-88.
649. Id. at 1288.
650. Id.
651. 676 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
652. Id. at 503. See FLA. STAT. § 83.67 (1995).
653. Badaraco, 676 So. 2d at 503.
654. Id. (relying on State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1981)).
655. Id. See Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1993); State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d
820 (Fla. 1981).
656. Badaraco, 676 So. 2d at 503.
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was to prevent landlords from using utility shutoffs to coerce tenants to
vacate.65 7 Here, the tenant admitted that the landlord had no such motive.658
This outcome troubles this author.659 The opinion is logical, but the facts
suggest that the landlord might have been violating the rights of his tenants to
have utility service for the sole purpose of making these units more saleable.
Landlords ignoring the rights of tenants for their own gain is the sort of evil
that the legislature sought to prohibit, even if it is not the particular landlord
misconduct that the legislature had in mind at the moment of enactment. It is
suggested that the purpose to the statutory interpretation approach would lead
to a better conclusion. The modem residential tenant has a critical need for
and right to utility service. Reasonable interruptions for the performance of
maintenance are inevitable, and it is unlikely that the legislature intended to
penalize such interruptions, but the interruption here does not seem to have
occurred as part of maintenance. The brief statement of facts suggests that the
interruptions were caused by the landlord changing the property so he could
sell it after the lease ended. A tenant would not ordinarily be expected to
tolerate the landlord renovating his unit for a prospective sale. Why should
the current tenant bear the burden of loss of utility services during the term of
the lease because the landlord has plans for the property after the lease
expires? Certainly the legislature could not have intended to allow this. To
the degree that this landlord was interrupting the tenants' utility service, not
for maintenance but to prepare it for sale, the landlord should be held liable.
The complaint should not have been dismissed.
Brandt v. Dade Dental Center, Inc.660 The commercial lease provided
that the tenant would be responsible for paying fifteen percent of any increase
over the base year in the real estate taxes and insurance premiums. When the
tenant discovered that it occupied only 2.4 percent of the building, the tenant
refused to pay. The trial court refused to enforce this clause, holding it to be
unconscionable and "monstrously harsh."66 ' The fact that the landlord would
have been able to make a profit from a tax or premium increase by similarly
overcharging all the tenants was used by the circuit court to confirm its
conclusion. 662 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed based on its
finding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support judgment,
noting that the clause required the tenant to pay over six times its pro rata
657. Id. at 503 n.1.
658. Id. at 503.
659. Professor Ronald Benton Brown.
660. 680 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
661. Id. at 1064.
662. Id.
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share. 6 The third district seemed to place particular importance on the fact
that the tenant had thought that it was being charged its share of the increases
and was surprised to discover that the clause required it to pay such a
disproportionate amount.
664
This author6 65 finds this an odd case to invoke the doctrine of
unconscionability. The tenant was a dental office, so the case did not deal
with an uneducated or unable tenant. Nor was it a tenant who did not have
access to adequate legal representation. The crux of the decision seems to be
that the clause implicitly misrepresented the facts to the tenant, i.e., that the
share of the increase it would have to bear was proportional to the share of the
land that it had leased. The landlord misrepresented the crucial fact, so the
666
court penalized him by denying him the increase. It seems that the better
solution would be reformation, i.e., reform the clause to reflect the proper
percentage. The trial court may not have felt it had that option because it was
not the relief requested, and the district court, faced with the same poor
choices, chose to affirm as the lesser of two evils. This illustrates the old
adage, "hard cases make bad law."
Land O'Sun Realty Ltd. v. REWJB Gas Investments.667 The parties were
involved in twenty-two commercial leases utilizing a common lease
document. This case involved the interpretation of two clauses in that lease.
Paragraph three provided that the total of the initial term plus all renewal
terms would be twenty-seven years. Paragraph four, however, provided:
"[n]otwithstanding any conflicting or inconsistent provisions ... including
specifically paragraph 3 hereof, the term of each of the Leases and all renewal
terms shall automatically terminate at the date that is eighteen months after the
date of this Amendment. 668 The issue was which controlled, the twenty-
seven year or the eighteen month maximum.669 The jury decided in favor of
the longer period and the landlord appealed.670
The district court found that the terms were in irreconcilable conflict,
making it impossible to answer the question without resort to parol
evidence. 671 It pointed out that reading paragraph four to control paragraph
three would render three meaningless, violating the rule of construction that
663. Id.
664. Id.
665. Professor Ronald Benton Brown.
666. See generally Brandt, 680 So. 2d 1064.
667. 685 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
668. Id. at 871.
669. Id.
670. Id.
671. Id. at 871-72.
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an interpretation should not render any part of the contract
superfluous.672 The court should have also pointed out that the converse was
also true, i.e., reading paragraph three to control paragraph four would render
four meaningless. That was the irreconcilable conflict. Having established
that the trial court properly admitted parol evidence, the only remaining task
for the appellate court was to determine that the decision was supported by
sufficient evidence, even though the testimony of the parties was "as
hopelessly in conflict as the written agreement."
673
Judge Jorgenson dissented, emphasizing the word "notwithstanding" in
paragraph four of the amendment of the lease.674 He reasoned that paragraph
four expressly provided how to deal with the apparent conflict between the
paragraphs eliminating any conflict in their application.675 Consequently, he
would have held that the admission of parol evidence was unjustified.676
Mayor's Jewelers, Inc. v. State of California Public Employees'
Retirement System. 677 The commercial lease for space in this mall provided
that the tenant would keep the business open on all business days of the
calendar year. The tenant, however, gave notice that it intended to break the
lease and vacate. The landlord sued to temporarily enjoin the tenant from
breaking the lease and to force the tenant to perform as required by the open-
for-business covenant. The circuit court granted a temporary injunction, but
the fourth district reversed.678
The district court decided that the case was not governed by Lincoln
Tower Corp. v. Richter's Jewelry Co.67 9 because it did not involve a tenant
680
who wanted to vacate.6 0 Consequently, the case was one of first impression
in Florida.681 The court noted that injunctions should not be granted when
that would involve the court in the business of supervising future
performance. 682  In this case, the temporary injunction (and subsequent
672. Land O'Sun Realty, 685 So. 2d at 871.
673. Id. at 872 n.3.
674. Id. at 873 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting).
675. Id.
676. Id.
677. 685 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
678. Id. at 904.
679. 12 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1943) (holding that a tenant could be enjoined from breaching
the lease by failing to remain open year-round).
680. Mayor's Jewelers, Inc., 685 So. 2d at 905.
681. Id.
682. Id.
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specific performance order) would, in effect, force the court to supervise the
operation of the mall, so the relief should be denied.68
Also, injunctions and specific performance, as forms of equitable relief,
should not be granted where there is an adequate remedy at law. In this case,
the landlord's harm would be purely economic, making an action for damages
for breach of the lease an adequate remedy. However, the court declined to
reach any conclusion on this issue because it had already decided the case on
the first issue.684
Judge Farmer provided a wonderfully written special concurrence.685 In
essence, he found that the lease had a liquidated damages clause that provided
the landlord with an adequate remedy at law, thereby depriving the landlord
of an essential ingredient of a claim for equitable relief. He explained that
the cumulative remedies clause allowed the landlord to seek both eviction and
damages rather than allowing it equitable relief to which it would not
otherwise be entitled.68 7 Furthermore, he pointed out that mandatory
injunctions, i.e., injunctions requiring the party to act in a certain way, are
generally disfavored, particularly where the contract involves personal
services and stated, "[i]n my opinion, requiring a tenant by specific
performance to occupy leased premises for the full term... is much akin to
requiring an employee to serve out his contractual term of employment.,
688
Finally, Judge Farmer questioned the intervention of equity on behalf of
a party who was ignoring economic reality.689 This was an older mall which
had passed its prime. Most of the tenants, including the anchors, had moved
out. To require an upscale jeweler to remain open in that setting made no
sense.690 "[W]hat purpose," Judge Farmer asked rhetorically, "is served by
the intervention of equity, other than to support the unproductive economic
decisions of the landlord?"'6 9
683. Id.
684. Id. at 908 (Farmer, J., concurring).
685. Mayor's Jewelers, Inc., 685 So. 2d at 906 (Farmer, J., concurring).
686. Id. at 907.
687. Id.
688. Id. at 910.
689. Id. at 911.
690. Mayor's Jewelers, Inc., 685 So. 2d at 910-11.
691. Id at911.
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XVII. LIENS
Grant v. Wester.692 The issue before the court was whether Mr. Grant
was entitled to attorneys' fees under his claim that he had a right to foreclose
a mechanic's lien.693 Grant contracted with the Westers to build a home on
Westers' land. When most of the work was completed on May 11, 1992,
Westers gave Grant a list of items still needed to be finished or corrected in
the home.694 On May 15, 1992, the Westers moved into the home and a
certificate of occupancy was issued. In addition, all items on the Westers' list
had been remedied.695
Afterwards, Wester told Grant he would not make full payment until
Grant added a hot water recovery unit to the air conditioning system and until
he covered the foundation of the house with stucco. 6 9 6 Grant complied and
charged accordingly for the new requests. When Grant asked to be
compensated for his work, Mrs. Wester added two more items to the list of
corrections. Grant obliged and once again requested payment. The Westers
refused. Grant then delivered an affidavit to the Westers stating that all
lienors under the contract had been paid in full. Grant recorded a notice of
claim of lien stating the unpaid balance.
697
Grant filed a complaint seeking enforcement of a mechanic's lien under
section 713.01 of the Florida Statutes and also seeking attorneys' fees under
section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes.698 In addition, Grant stated a claim for
breach of contract. 69 9 Although Grant prevailed on the breach of contract
claim, the court determined that Grant should not get attorneys' fees because
he did not prove count one of the complaint to enforce the lien.700
As Grant appealed count one, he filed notice of lis pendens to protect the
asserted lien and to collect money from the judgment as to the other count for
breach of contract.701 The sheriff levied Westers' goods pursuant to court
order to collect Grant's judgment money. Wester filed an emergency motion
to set aside the lis pendens and writ of execution.702 At the emergency
692. 679 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
693. Id. at 1306.
694. Id. at 1303.
695. Id.
696. Id.
697. Grant, 679 So. 2d at 1303.
698. Id. (relying on FLA. STAT. § 713.01, -.29 (1991)).
699. Id.
700. Id. at 1304.
701. Id.
702. Grant, 679 So. 2d at 1304.
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hearing, the trial court ordered the Westers to pay the balance of the
judgment.7 3 After payment was made pursuant to court order, the trial court
also ordered that no interest would accrue after the money was deposited.0
The First District Court of Appeal noted that Grant received some money
under the judgment.70 5 The general rule is that "'one cannot ordinarily accept
a benefit under a judgment or decree and then appeal from it, when the effect
of his appeal may be to annul the decree as a whole."' 706 "[C]ase law reveals
that there are two exceptions to this stated rule: 1) where the relief denied is
separate and severable from the relief granted; or 2) where the appellant is
entitled in any event to at least the amount received., 70 7 There is also a
general rule that "'where a judgment is appealed on the ground that the
damages awarded [were] inadequate, acceptance of payment of the amount of
the unsatisfactory judgment does not, standing alone, amount to an accord and
satisfaction of the entire claim."'
70 8
The question presented here as to attorneys' fees falls within one of
the stated exceptions. Just because Grant collected judgment money, he
is not precluded from bringing an appeal to recover attorneys' fees. 709
"'Where a contractor complies with all provisions of Chapter 713, Florida
Statutes, and has substantially performed the contract, he is entitled to a
mechanic's lien."', 710  Since the trial court awarded money reflecting a
finding that Grant completed 97.7 percent of his obligation, that
percentage constituted substantial performance. 711  As such, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal stated it was error not to allow foreclosure of
Grant's mechanic's lien.71
When a mechanic's lien is foreclosed, the prevailing party recovers
attorneys' fees. However, "'to be a prevailing party entitled to the award of
attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, a litigant must have recovered an
amount exceeding that which was earlier offered in settlement of the
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. Id. at 1305.
706. Id. (quoting Capital Fin. Corp. v. Oliver, 156 So. 736, 737 (Fla. 1934)).
707. Grant, 679 So. 2d at 1305 (quoting McMullen v. Fort Pierce Fin. & Constr. Co.,
146 So. 567 (Fla. 1933)).
708. Id. at 1306 (quoting United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 312 (1960)).
709. Id.
710. Id. at 1307 (quoting Viking Communities Corp. v. Peeler Constr. Co., 367 So. 2d
737, 739 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted)).
711. Id. at 1308.
712. Grant, 679 So. 2d at 1308.
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claim.', 713  Wester argued that Grant tried to settle by offering
payment. The offer must have been timely and adequate in amount to
preclude an award for attorneys' fees.714  The court recognized that the
issues of adequacy and timeliness were never addressed because the lower
court denied foreclosure on the lien.7 15 As such, the court reversed the
judgment because it denied foreclosure of the lien and remanded for the
award of attorneys' fees, if the lower court decided Wester did not make a
timely, adequate offer to settle.716
Herpel, Inc. v. Straub Capital Corp.717 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed the lower court decision and held that the lien was timely
recorded as required by section 713.08(5) of the Florida Statutes.7 '8 Herpel,
by contract, was required to make a mantel for a new residence owned by
Blossom Estate. 719 The contract was only for materials. After the mantel was
delivered and installed, George Straub, the owner's authorized agent, was not
satisfied with its appearance. Herpel's workers removed the mantel for
refinishing and later reinstalled it.
720
Herpel filed a claim of lien 113 days after the original delivery but within
ninety days of the date of redelivery.2  Section 713.08(5) of the Florida
Statutes states that "' [t]he claim of lien may be recorded at any time during
the progress of the work or thereafter but not later than 90 days after the final
furnishing of the labor or services or materials by the lienor."', 722 The trial
court determined that the claim of lien was not timely filed.723
This court reversed the trial court decision.724 The fourth district
recognized that the cases the trial court relied on were not sufficient because
they did not address the "final furnishing" of purchased materials.725 The trial
court stated:
[T]he majority rule is that, after the installation of fixtures or
equipment in a building, later services in the nature of correction or
713. Id. (quoting C.U. Assoc. v. R.B. Grove, 472 So. 2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 1985)).
714. Id.
715. Id.
716. Id.
717. 682 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
718. Id. at 661.
719. Id. at 661-62.
720. Id. at 662.
721. Id.
722. Herpel, 682 So. 2d at 662 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.08(5) (1993)).
723. Id.
724. Id. at 663.
725. Id. at 662.
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repair are not regarded as a part of the installation so as to make the
time within which to file under a mechanic's lien based on the
original installation run from the time of performance of such later
services. This rule is followed in Florida. . . . Therefore, this
warranty work was not the final furnishing of labor or materials.726
In addition, the court applied the test used in Century Trust Co. of
Baltimore v. Allison Realty Co. 27 "The test to be applied is whether the work
was done in good faith, within a reasonable time, in pursuance of the terms of
the contract, and whether it was necessary to a 'finished job.' 728 "[W]ork
done in fulfillment of the contract is contemplated by the contract and extends
the time for filing, since the contract is not complete until the work is
done." 729 Corrective or repair work does not extend the time for filing the
claim of lien because the contract is already complete. 73 0 Here, the contract
was for materials only so the rationale cited from the cases above should be
applied.73 1
The fourth district held that the final furnishing of the materials occurred
when the mantel was reinstalled.732 The additional work after the initial
installation was only to complete the job as set out in the contract.733 As such,
the lien was properly recorded within the ninety days required by the
statute.
7 3 4
Personal Representative of Estate of Jacobson v. Attorneys' Title
Insurance Fund, Inc.73 5 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
lower court's decision, since the lien was not valid due to the Monroe County
Code Enforcement Board's failure to comply with statutory formalities.
736
The property in question was sold three times after the lien was recorded.737
The last owner, Maggie Kaspersetz, discovered the lien after she purchased
the property and received a warranty deed from Attorneys' Title Insurance
726. Id. (citing Viking Builders, Inc. v. Felices, 391 So. 2d 302, 303 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1980)).
727. Herpel, 682 So. 2d at 663 (relying on Century Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Allison
Realty Co., 141 So. 612 (Fla. 1932)).
728. Id.
729. Id.
730. Id.
731. Id.
732. Herpel, 682 So. 2d at 663.
733. Id.
734. Id.
735. 685 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
736. Id. at 20.
737. Id.
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Fund. Attorneys' Title Insurance paid the lien and then sued Jacobson, as
subrogee.738 The trial court found for Attorneys' Title Insurance who also
gained attorneys' fees at a later hearing.
739
The third district reversed, reasoning that a lien is not acquired unless
notice requirements are strictly complied with.740 Section 162.12(1) of the
Florida Statutes "requires that the alleged violator be sent notice by certified
mail, by hand delivery, or by leaving the notice at the violator's place of
residence. '741 In this case, notice was only sent by regular mail.742
"In addition, section 162.09(3), Florida Statutes (1989) states that, if the
lien is to be recorded in the public records, a certified copy of the order
imposing the fine must be recorded. 743 Since the county failed to give notice
of record pursuant to statutory authority, the requirements for obtaining the
lien were not met.744 As such, the court declared the lien invalid.745
Kerrigan v. Mosher.746 The Kerrigans appealed an order denying their
motion to set aside the judicial sale of their homestead in connection with
foreclosure of a mechanic's lien held by Mosher.747 Mosher, being the sole
bidder at a foreclosure sale, purchased the Kerrigans home for $100. The
home had a fair market value between $300,000 and $360,000 and was
burdened by an $87,000 mortgage. The Kerrigans believed their attorney
would represent their interests at the sale. Unfortunately, the appointed
attorney did not attend the sale, nor did he try to redeem the property for the
Kerrigans.748
The First District Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's holding.
749
The foreclosure sale should have been set aside because of irregularity in the
750
sale process. Price is not enough to set aside the sale; however, the bid was
grossly inadequate as a result of the attorney's misrepresentation.751 As such,
the sale should have been set aside and a new sale ordered.
738. Id.
739. Id.
740. Jacobson, 685 So. 2d at 20.
741. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 162.12(1) (1989)).
742. Id.
743. Id.
744. Id.
745. Jacobson, 685 So. 2d at 20.
746. 679 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
747. Id. at 874-75.
748. Id. at 875.
749. Id.
750. Id.
751. Kerrigan, 679 So. 2d at 875.
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XIX. MECHANICS' LIENS
Craftsman Contractors, Inc. v. Brown.752 The First District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's order finding that Craftsman's lien was
unenforceable because it failed to properly list all lienors who had not been
paid in full on its final contractor's affidavit.753 Craftsman's final affidavit
stated that "all lienors, subcontractors, and materialmen" were paid in full.754
However, even though subcontractor McElhany Electric was unpaid and not
in the affidavit, Craftsman argued that section 713.06(3)(d)1) of the Florida
Statutes only required the final affidavit to list lienors. In addition, it
argued that McElhany Electric could not be a lienor since it failed to file
notice to the owner as required by section 713.06(2)(a).75 6
The court recognized that one may be a lienor under chapter 713 of the
Florida Statutes without giving notice.75  Chapter 713 should not be
narrowly construed. The court held that McElhany's failure to file notice to
the owner did not remove it from the definition of "lienor" under chapter
713.06(3)(d)(1). 758
Current Control, Inc. v. Bankers Insurance Co.759 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the issuance of the writ of prohibition granted by
the lower court.760 Current Control filed a complaint to enforce a claim of lien
which was transferred to a bond provided by Bankers Insurance Company.761
Bankers' motion to dismiss, on the basis that the county court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, was denied. Bankers then sought and obtained a writ of
prohibition from the circuit court on the same ground.762
The action before the Fifth District Court of Appeal was one brought on
a bond issued pursuant to section 713.24 of the Florida Statutes. The essence
of subsection three states that "[a]ny party having an interest in such security
or the property from which the lien was transferred may at any time, and any
number of times, file a complaint in chancery in the circuit court of the county
752. 695 So. 2d 750 (Fa. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
753. Id. at 751.
754. Id.
755. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(1) (1993).
756. Craftsman Contractors, 695 So. 2d at 751. See also FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a)
(1993).
757. Craftsman Contractors, 695 So. 2d at 751.
758. Id.
759. 679 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
760. Id. at 79.
761. Id. at 78.
762. Id.
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where such security is deposited. 763 The fifth district distinguished this case
as being distinct from Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enterprises, Inc., which the
appellant raised.7 4 In Alexdex, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that since
a lien foreclosure action is one in equity, the circuit and county courts have
concurrent jurisdiction for such matters, within set monetary limits. 7 65 In
Current Control, Inc., the action involved a mechanic's lien claim transferred
to a surety bond. This action is statutory in nature. The specific statute
delineates that actions should be filed in circuit court regardless of the amount
involved. As such, the writ of prohibition should be affirmed.766
XX. MOBILE HoME PARKS
Meadow Groves Management, Inc. v. McKnight.767 The lessee of a
space in a mobile home park failed to pay the rent. The park sued, obtained a
judgment for possession of the space, got a writ of possession, and had the
sheriff remove the tenant and his goods. However, the tenant's mobile home
was left in the space. The park then advertised the mobile home for sale,
relying on the statutory summary procedure provided in section 718.78 of the
Florida Statutes.768 The former lessee brought this action to enjoin the sale.
The trial court granted the injunction because it concluded that the mobile
home was exempt property because it was a homestead under section 222.05
of the Florida Statutes.769 The Fifth District, sitting en banc, affirmed but for
a different reason.770
The majority opinion, written by Chief Judge Peterson, held that the
mobile home park had no right to use that statutory summary
procedure. 771 The scope of section 713.78, which is entitled "Liens for
recovering, towing or storing vehicles," is provided by subsection two. 772 It
provides a lien for "a person regularly engaged in the business of transporting
763. Id.
764. Current Control, 679 So. 2d at 78. See Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enter., Inc., 641
So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994).
765. Alexdex Corp., 641 So. 2d at 862.
766. Current Control, 679 So. 2d at 79.
767. 689 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
768. Id. at 316. See FLA. STAT. § 718.78 (1993).
769. Meadow Groves, 689 So. 2d at 316 (relying on FLA. STAT. § 222.05 (1993)).
770. Id.
771. Id.
772. FLA. STAT. § 713.78 (1993).
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vehicles by wrecker, tow truck, or car carrier."773 The mobile home park did
not fit that definition.
The court then pointed out that the homestead exemption from forced
sale was only available to a lessee of a mobile home lot if the mobile home
was on land that "he may lawfully possess, by lease or otherwise."774 Since
this tenant had been evicted, he could not lawfully possess the land under his
mobile home. Thus, he lost his homestead exemption. The tenant claimed,
however, that the park prevented him from removing his mobile home while
he still had the right to lawfully possess the land. The district court found
nothing in the record to support that claim, but ruled that, on remand, the trial
court could consider evidence that the park had interfered with his right to
remove his mobile home.775
Both Judge Sharp and Judge Thompson expressed dissent from the
homestead part of the opinion.776 The mobile home was homestead before the
park obtained its judgment for back rent.777 Both argued that homestead
rights to a mobile home should not be cut off by the eviction.77 That would
conflict with and undermine the purpose of homestead, i.e., protecting the
homesteader's home, regardless of its form. Even though the park did not get
the homesteader's home this time, it would only be a matter of time before
clever claimants used this ruling to circumvent mobile home owners'
homestead rights.
XXI. MORTGAGES
BancFlorida v. Hayward.779 Justice Grimes wrote the court's opinion
with which Justices Overton, Shaw, Harding, Wells, and Anstead
concurred. Before the court was a certified question of great public
importance:
WHERE A LENDER REQUIRES A PRE-QUALIFIED
CONTRACT PURCHASER BEFORE IT WILL LEND ON THE
CONSTRUCTION LOAN WHICH CREATES A PURCHASE
MONEY MORTGAGE, DOES THE CONTRACT
PURCHASER'S PRIOR EQUITABLE LIEN AGAINST THE
773. Meadow Groves, 689 So. 2d at 316 (citing FLA. STAT. § 713.78(2) (1993)).
774. Id. at 317 (citing FLA. STAT. § 222.05 (1993)).
775. Id.
776. Id. (Thompson, Sharp, JJ., dissenting).
777. Id. at 319 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
778. Meadow Groves, 689 So. 2d at 319 (Thompson, Sharp, JJ., dissenting).
779. 689 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1997).
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PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGOR HAVE PRIORITY OVER
THE LENDER'S SUBSEQUENT PURCHASE MONEY
MORTGAGE?
780
Shores Contractors developed lots and constructed single family homes in
subdivisions owned by American Newlands. Shores had an option to acquire
individual lots from American. Shores arranged for BancFlorida to provide
funds to acquire lots and construct homes on those lots. When the
developments failed and the homes were incomplete, Shores filed suit against
the bank claiming a breach on the construction loan agreements caused the
failure. The bank sought foreclosure of mortgages on the lots. The contract
purchasers claimed equitable liens on the lots, and the bank claimed
superiority of its mortgages. Final summary judgment of foreclosure was
entered, and the bank foreclosed on the lots then purchased them at judicial
sale.78 The bank later sold them to a third party.782
"The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the contract
purchasers, holding that they held equitable liens on the lots which were
entitled to priority over the bank's mortgages., 73 Although the Third District
Court of Appeal held the bank mortgages were purchase money mortgages, it
affirmed the judgment in favor of the contract purchasers.7 84 The Supreme
Court of Florida agreed that the bank's mortgages were purchase money
mortgages. 85
It is well settled that where the proceeds of a third party mortgage loan
are used to purchase property, the mortgage of that property is a purchase
786money mortgage. Most importantly, purchase money mortgages take
priority over other claims or liens that attach to property through the
mortgagor.78 7 As such, "the court below erred in holding that the claims of
contract purchasers were superior to the bank's purchase money
mortgages."
788
780. Id. at 1052.
781. Id. at 1052-53.
782. Id. at 1053.
783. Id.
784. BancFlorida, 689 So. 2d at 1053.
785. Id.
786. Id. at 1053 (citing Cheves- v. First Nat'l Bank, 83 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1920);
Sarmiento v. Stockton, Whatley, Davin & Co., 399 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1981)).
787. Id. at 1054.
788. Id.
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The court pointed out that it could not "answer the certified question as
worded because it presupposes that the contract purchasers had a prior
equitable lien on the lots." 89 Since the developer only held an option to
purchase at the time the agreements were executed, this option created neither
an equitable interest nor an equitable remedy under Florida law.790 The
developer had no property interest to which an equitable lien could attach.79'
The court held that "the bank's mortgages on the twenty-two lots have priority
over the claims of the contract purchasers but only to the extent that the
bank's funds were used to purchase the lots.
' 792
Beach v. Great Western Bank.793 Judges Overton, Grimes, Harding,
Wells, and Anstead concurred and Judge Shaw recused in this per curiam
opinion. Before the court was the following certified question:
UNDER FLORIDA LAW, MAY AN ACTION FOR
STATUTORY RIGHT OF RESCISSION PURSUANT TO THE
TRUTH IN LENDING ACT, 15 U.S.C.A. SECTION 1635, BE
REVIVED AS A DEFENSE IN RECOUPMENT BEYOND THE
THREE-YEAR LIMIT ON THE RIGHT OF RECISSION SET
FORTH IN SECTION 1635(F)? 794
The Beaches got a bank mortgage for home construction reflecting a thirty
year payout. After the Beaches moved into their home, they made two
payments and received another loan from Great Western Bank. They used the
proceeds from that subsequent loan to pay off the initial bank mortgage. The
Beaches defaulted on their mortgage and Great Western Bank sought to
foreclose.795
The Beaches raised affirmative defenses in response to the foreclosure
action based on their right to rescind because of overstatements made by
Great Western Bank on disclosure documents and Truth in Lending Act
796
damage claims.797 The trial court found Great Western Bank overstated the
789. BancFlorida, 689 So. 2d at 1054.
790. Id.
791. Id.
792. Id. at 1055.
793. 692 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1997), cert. granted in part by sub nom. Beach v. Ocwen Fed.
Bank, 66 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1997).
794. Id. at 147.
795. Id. See Beach v. Great W. Bank, 670 So. 2d 986, 989 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
796. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-67 (1994).
797. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 147.
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Beaches monthly mortgage payment and finance charge.798 The trial court
also found the loan was an exempt transaction not subject to rescission, and
held in Great Western Bank's favor on that issue because the Beaches did not
assert rescission rights within three years of closing.799 The Beaches were
awarded damages as per the Truth in Lending Act because of the
overstatements. 800 The damages were then set off against the balance Great
Western still needed to receive.80'
On appeal, the fourth district found rescission was not a defense for
recoupment because recoupment was primarily an equitable remedy to
prevent unjust enrichment. 80 2 "The district court affirmed the trial court's
final judgment, holding that under Florida law the statutory right of rescission
in TILA ("the Truth in Lending Act") expires three years after the
transaction's closing date and may not be revived as a defense in recoupment
in a creditor's foreclosure action."
80 3
The above mentioned certified question was before the Supreme Court of
Florida. The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to ensure a "'meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use
of credit.' 8 4 The consumer has the absolute right to rescind the secured
transaction within three business days following closing and up to three years
from the same closing date if the creditor failed to make all material
disclosures. 0 5 If a borrower rescinds, he is not liable for any finance charges
and a security interest given by the borrower becomes void.0 6
The Truth in Lending Act also allows for damages. Section 1640(e)
"'does not bar a person from asserting a violation.., in an action to collect
the debt.., as a matter of defense by recoupment or set-off in such action,
except as otherwise provided by State law."' 80 7 This savings clause is only
recognized in this particular section and is not found in section 1635,
expiration of the statutory right of rescission. 8  The court recognized that an
analysis of a Truth in Lending Act issue should include Part 226 of Title 12 of
798. Id. at 147-48.
799. Id. at 148.
800. Id.
801. Id.
802. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 148.
803. Id.
804. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1994)).
805. Id. (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (1994)).
806. Id.
807. Beach, 692 So. 2d. at 149 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1994)).
808. Id.
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the Code of Federal Regulations,"9 otherwise known as Regulation Z, and
the official commentary both address the right to rescission.810  In Florida
courts, "'[i]t is well established that the defense of recoupment may be
asserted defensively when the underlying claim is barred by the statute of
limitations.' 81' The court addressed the cases relied on by the Beaches and
deemed them to be inapplicable in the case at bar.812 None of those cases
dealt with the situation where a statute treated a right and its remedy
simultaneously.
813
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the Fourth District Court of
Appeal that the real danger is that borrowers "'could take advantage of the
remedy throughout the entire life of the secured transaction, rendering
statutory limitation meaningless."'8 14  The three-year right of rescission
expired in 1989, the Beaches defaulted in 1991, and the foreclosure was
sought by Great Western in 1992.1 The Beaches had control over Great
Western's ability to foreclose by making monthly payments. The remedy in
the form of damages was extraneous to foreclosure. The savings clause in
section 1640 saved the damages remedy beyond the one-year statute of
limitations as a "defense by recoupment or setoff."816
Section 1635(f) provided that the right and the remedy expire three years
after the closing date.817 This clause did not have such a savings clause
regarding the right of rescission.818 As a general rule, when Congress leaves
out particular language in a statutory provision, and such language is provided
for in another section of the same statute, it is presumed that Congress
intended to omit that language from the provision. 9 Section 1635(f)
expresses the Congressional intent to omit the statutory right of rescission
820three years after the transaction.
809. Id. See 12 C.F.R. § 266.23(a)(3) (1996).
810. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 149 (discussing Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S.
205, 219 (1981)).
811. Id. at 150 (quoting Willoughby v. Dowda & Fields, Chartered, 643 So. 2d 1098,
1099 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
812. Id.
813. Id.
814. Id. at 152 (quoting Beach v. Great W. Bank, 670 So. 2d 986, 991 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
815. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 152.
816. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1994).
817. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 152.
818. Id.
819. Id. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
820. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 152.
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The court recognized the controlling case here was Bowery v. Babbit821
which stated "'when the right and the remedy are created by the same statute,
the limitations of the remedy are treated as limitations of the right."'' 822 As
such, the court held that under Florida law "an action for statutory right of
rescission pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635 may not be revived as a defense in
recoupment beyond the three-year expiration period contained in section
1635(fJ. ' 8
23
Bee Bee Medical Center, Inc. v. Strategic Consulting & Managing,
Inc. 24 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order
setting aside the clerk's certificate of redemption after Bee Bee paid the
judgment amount before attorneys' fees and costs had been assessed.8 25 A
final judgment of foreclosure was issued to Strategic whereby they were
entitled to $125,000 plus interest.826 However, Bee Bee paid the ordered
amount before attorneys' fees and costs were calculated. The court clerk
issued a certificate of redemption on Bee Bee's behalf. 7 Strategic filed an
emergency motion asserting that Bee Bee did not pay the full amount owed
because attorneys' fees and costs were not assessed. The trial court granted
Strategic's motion and set aside the clerk's certificate of redemption.
828
The question before the district court of appeal was whether Bee Bee, as
mortgagor, properly exercised their right of redemption. The district court
held that Bee Bee paid the $125,000 plus interest ordered by the judgment
and therefore, properly exercised their right to redemption under section
45.0315 of the Florida Statutes.8 29 The statute states that "a mortgagor may
exercise redemption rights at any time before the clerk's filing of a certificate
of sale 'by paying the amount of moneys specified in the judgment, order, or
decree of foreclosure.' '830  The second district recognized that Bee Bee
should not be prevented from exercising redemption rights just because
Strategic failed to enter attorneys' fees and costs in its judgment.8 3'
821. 128 So. 801 (Fla. 1930).
822. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 152 (quoting Bowery v. Babbit, 128 So. 801, 806 (Fla.
1930)).
823. Id. at 153.
824. 677 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
825. Id. at 84.
826. Id.
827. Id.
828. Id.
829. Bee Bee, 677 So. 2d at 85.
830. Id. at 84-85 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 45.0315 (1993)).
831. Id. at85.
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Estepa v. Jordan.32 The Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida
reversed summary judgment granted in favor of Jordan because the record
was insufficient to establish the amount of the deficiency following a
mortgage foreclosure suit. 33 On March 31, 1995, the trial court entered
judgment of foreclosure after Jordan filed a foreclosure suit against Estepa
seeking payment of a promissory note, foreclosure and sale of real estate,
attorneys' fees, and deficiency judgment.8 34 Jordan bought the property at a
foreclosure sale on May 11, 1995, and later filed a motion for deficiency
judgment. Estepa's attorney moved for a continuance on October 20, 1995,
because he was unable to reach Estepa about the suit. Estepa filed an
objection to the entry ofjudgment on the ground that they were not personally
served with notice. The trial court recognized that Estepa did not need to be
served with process personally because service of notice on Estepa's attorney
was adequate.83 5 It was also found that a deficiency existed "between the fair
market value of the property on the date of the foreclosure sale and the
balance of the mortgage debt owed." '836
The Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed that new service of process
was not needed. 3 The law of mortgage foreclosure in Florida contemplates
that a deficiency judgment may be needed in a foreclosure suit and that the
deficiency proceeding should be a part of the original foreclosure suit.838 The
party seeking the deficiency judgment has the burden of proving that the fair
market value of the property foreclosed upon was less than the total mortgage
debt owed. 39
In addition, the fifth district concluded that the evidence was insufficient
to establish the amount of the deficiency.8 0 The appraisal value was given
twenty-seven days after the foreclosure date when the fair market value must
be established on the date of the foreclosure sale. 41 Since the fifth district
reversed the deficiency judgment, it was determined that the trial court erred
in awarding Jordan interest on the full amount of the judgment through the
832. 678 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
833. Id. at 877.
834. Id.
835. Id.
836. Id. at 878.
837. Estepa, 678 So. 2d at 878.
838. Id.
839. Id.
840. Id.
841. Id.
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date of the deficiency judgment.8 42 The secured party was not entitled to the
interest on the entire foreclosure after the foreclosure sale took place.
8 43
Goldfarb v. Daitch.84 Goldfarb appealed the trial court order that
granted Daitch's "Verified Emergency Motion to Vacate Order of
Disbursement of Funds" filed pursuant to rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure.8 45  Federal National Mortgage Association sought to
foreclose the mortgage on Daitch's residence after Daitch defaulted. Final
judgment was entered against Daitch, and a foreclosure sale date was
arranged.846 Caro Investments, Inc. ("Caro") was the highest bidder for the
property and Caro requested the court to assign the bid to Claire
Blanken. Goldfarb filed a motion on behalf of Daitch seeking disbursement
of surplus funds in the court's registry. Argo Mortgage Corporation ("Argo")
filed its own motion for disbursement. 47 The trial court entered its order
granting disbursement and the clerk issued a certificate of disbursement for
payment to the Federal National Mortgage Association. 848 The trial court then
issued an amended disbursement order providing disbursement to Argo, as the
second mortgage holder.
8 49
A representative for Daitch filed a "Verified Emergency Motion to
Vacate Order of Disbursement of Funds." The motion alleged Daitch was
unaware of Goldfarb's motion to disburse and that Goldfarb had
misrepresented Daitch. The trial court ruled as to the motion and found that
Goldfarb "'had no authority to represent' Daitch 'and obtain surplus funds on
her behalf.' ' 850 In addition, the trial court established "'there existed no valid
attorney/client relationship by and between' Goldfarb and Daitch."851 The
orders to disburse the funds were vacated.852
Goldfarb appealed on the ground that the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction in entering the order to vacate disbursement."' The Fifth District
Court of Appeal recognized that the law granted the trial court inherent power
842. Estepa, 678 So. 2d at 878.
843. Id.
844. 696 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
845. Id. at 1200.
846. Id.
847. Id.
848. Id.
849. Goldfarb, 696 So. 2d at 1200.
850. Id. at 1203 (quoting the trial judge's order).
851. Id.
852. Id.
853. Id.
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to vacate its own previous orders. 4 Daitch correctly filed her motion under
rule 1.540(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to raise the issue of
fraud perpetrated in obtaining earlier orders. 855 The trial court recognized that
Daitch's grant of a limited power of attorney to B.G. Gross and/or Jaime
Gross was void, but that did not operate to prevent the court from considering
Goldfarb's authority.85 6 The trial court may vacate orders entered at the
attorney's wishes when the attorney purports to represent a party without the
authority to do so.8
5 7
Kasket v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp.8  Resolution Trust Corp.
("RTC") sought foreclosure on Kasket's home and Kasket filed affirmative
defenses and alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act ('TILA") seeking
rescission of the mortgage and damages.859 The trial court found Kasket
could not bring affirmative defenses and counterclaims.8 60  The Fourth
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision regarding the
rescission issue, but reversed its decision to bar the affirmative defenses
seeking damages.8 6'
Kasket entered a mortgage with Carteret Savings, which was later taken
over by RTC. Then, RTC sought to foreclose on the mortgage after Kasket
defaulted on his payments. Kasket filed affirmative defenses and
counterclaims based on section 1640 of TILA. In the meantime, Chase
Manhattan Mortgage Corp. ("Chase") bought the mortgage and note from
RTC. Eventually, the trial court concluded that Chase had the right to
foreclose.
8 62
The fourth district stayed the proceedings to wait for the Supreme Court
of Florida's ruling in Beach v. Great Western Bank.63 The supreme court in
Beach held that rescission as a remedy under section 1635 of TILA could not
be brought as an affirmative defense in the nature of recoupment after three
years expired from the initial date of the transaction.864 Since Kasket allowed
the three-year period to run, the fourth district focused its attention only on the
854. Goldfarb, 696 So. 2d at 1203.
855. Id. at 1204.
856. Id.
857. Id.
858. 695 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
859. Id. at 432-33.
860. Id. at 433.
861. Id.
862. Id.
863. Kasket, 695 So. 2d at 433. See Beach v. Great W. Bank, 692 So. 2d 146 (Fla.
1997).
864. Kasket, 695 So. 2d at 433. See Beach, 692 So. 2d at 146.
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claim for damages under TILA section 1640.865 Section 1640 provides that a
creditor who fails to comply with the statutory disclosure requirements is
liable to his/her debtor for actual damages as well as penalty damages.
8 66
Section 1640(e) sets forth a one-year statute of limitations, but permits
borrowers to claim recoupment for section 1640 damages as an affirmative
defense to a creditor's action to collect the debt.867 In addition, recovery by
recoupment is allowable in Florida even though the limitations period has run
if the "party pleads it in defense of an action brought by the opposing party in
connection with the same transaction. 8 68 Although Kasket could not assert
his damage claim, he could still assert his recoupment claim. However,
section 1640 constitutes a civil penalty.8 69  Under section 1612(b),
government agencies are exempt from any civil or criminal penalty under
TLA.870 As such, section 1640 damages could not be imposed on RTC. 7'
The question before the fourth district was whether that exemption can
also be asserted by Chase as an assignee of RTC. 72 The fourth district
recognized that the rationale of In re Pinder would control.8 73 That rationale
suggested that a non-governmental assignee of a mortgage given to a debtor
874by a federal agency was liable for a recoupment penalty under TWA.
Section 1641 of TILA defines the liability of assignees and provides no
exception from liability for voluntary assignees of governmental agencies. 5
However, no exemption was asserted here because the assignment from
Carteret Savings to RTC was involuntary.
8 76
Chase argued it had the right to assert all of RTC's defenses based upon
the doctrine that prevents asserting of side agreements to defeat the interest of
877the RTC where those agreements are not in the records of the institution.However, the fourth district court recognized that RTC or its assignees
865. Kasket, 695 So.2d 433.
866. Id. at 434.
867. Id.
868. Id.
869. Id. at 435. See Beach v. Great W. Bank, 670 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
870. Kasket, 695 So. 2d at 435.
871. Id.
872. Id.
873. Id. See also Pinder v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 83 B.R. 905 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988).
874. Kasket, 695 So. 2d at 435.
875. Id. at 435.
876. Id.
877. Id. See also D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447
(1942).
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"needed only to review the truth in lending documents in the records of
Carteret to determine whether they complied with TILA. 878 Mistakes in the
TILA statements come from the face of the institution documents themselves.
If Congress intended for RTC and its assignees to be exempt from liability for
any error in financial documents, it could have provided such an exemption in
the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act. 8 7  RTC
was only exempted from agreements not found in the records of the
institution.
In conclusion, the court held that Chase could be liable for section 1640
damages if Kasket proves Truth in Lending Act violations apparent on the
face of the loan documents.880  The fourth district reversed and remanded
because it determined there were several issues which required findings of
fact based on the evidence by the trial court.881
Lee v. Gadasa Corp.882 The First District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's decision because the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine
of collateral estoppel.883 The trial court took judicial notice of a ruling in
another mortgage foreclosure case against Brock with a different plaintiff.
8 8 4
The trial court in that matter had applied collateral estoppel to resolve the
validity of a power of attorney used by Brock's wife to secure mortgages.88 5
According to the trial court, the doctrine of collateral estoppel could apply
without identifying the parties8 8 6 The first district disagreed.8 7 In Zeidwig v.
Ward,8 88 the use of defensive collateral estoppel was approved to prevent a
criminal defendant, as the plaintiff, from relitigating the same issue which had
already been addressed in court.889 The first district distinguished Zeidwig
from the case at bar and held there was not a comparable relationship among
parties in the two suits. 890 As such, the narrow exception in Zeidwig did not
apply.891 In Florida, the rule has been that unless both parties were bound by
878. Kasket, 695 So. 2d at 435.
879. Id.
880. Id.
881. Id. at 436.
882. 680 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
883. Id. at 1108.
884. Id. Lee was the personal representative of the estate of H. Julian Brock which was
the estate in question. Id. at 1107.
885. Id.
886. Lee, 680 So. 2d at 1108.
887. Id. at 1109.
888. 548 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989).
889. Lee, 680 So. 2d at 1108 (citing Zeidwig v. Ward, 548 So. 2d 209, 209 (Fla. 1989)).
890. Id. at 1108-09.
891. Id.
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the prior judgment, neither can use the judgment as an estoppel against the
other in a later proceeding.
892
National Enterprises, Inc. v. Martin.893 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court.8 94
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") filed an amended
motion for deficiency judgment. Subsequently, National Enterprises, Inc.
("National") moved to substitute itself as the party in the case on the basis that
National purchased FDIC's interest in that matter. National wanted to be able
to introduce evidence concerning the transfer of the asset from FDIC to
National. National's asset manager testified that he had no recollection of any
assignment of an ownership interest in the note and mortgage and that he
inventoried FDIC's documents evidencing indebtedness. 8 95
The trial court granted appellee's motion for an involuntary dismissal
because National had failed to prove it owned the asset by producing a written
assignment of the transfer or sale of the asset from the FDIC. 896 National filed
a motion for rehearing attaching as an exhibit an assignment from the FDIC of
its interest in the final summary judgment of foreclosure. The trial court
failed to grant the motion.897
National did not address Boulevard National Bank of Miami v. Air
Metals Industries, Inc. at trial which stated that "'[f]ormal requisites of such
an assignment are not prescribed by statute and it may be accomplished by
parol, by instrument in writing, or other mode, such as delivery of evidences
of the debt, as may demonstrate an intent to transfer and an acceptance of
it.' ' 898 The fourth district held the trial court did not err in granting
involuntary dismissal but it abused its discretion in denying National's motion
for rehearing.899 According to rule 1.530(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure, "[o]n a motion for a rehearing of matters heard without a jury,
including summary judgments, the court may open the judgment if one has
been entered, take additional testimony, and enter a new judgment." 900 The
892. Id.
893. 679 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
894. Id. at 332.
895. Id.
896. Id.
897. Id.
898. National Enters., Inc., 679 So. 2d at 332 (quoting Boulevard Nat'l Bank of Miami
v. Air Metals Indus., Inc., 176 So. 2d 94, 97-98 (Fla. 1965)).
899. Id. at 333.
900. Id. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530(a).
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written assignment attached as an exhibit at trial established National's
ownership by assignment of final summary judgment of foreclosure. 901
Nerbonne, N.V. v. Lake Bryan International Properties.902 Nerbonne
appealed the dismissal of an entry of a final judgment of foreclosure in a
mortgage foreclosure brought by Lake Bryan International
Properties. Nerbonne also appealed the dismissal of its counterclaim and the
striking of its affirmative defenses. Nerbonne claimed that Robert Figueredo
formed Nerbonne to purchase a tract of land as an investment, and induced
individuals to purchase capital stock of that corporation. The stock-offering
memorandum listed the purchase price of the land but failed to disclose that
Figueredo, K. Dwight Waters, and their corporation, Euro American
Investment Corp., had conspired to purchase the land for a lesser amount and
agreed to split the undisclosed profits when the land was resold.9" 3
Nerbonne paid a portion of the purchase price by a $2,550,000 mortgage
to Lake Bryan which was, allegedly, a Waters entity incorporated to assist in
the conspiracy.90 4 Lake Bryan was to assist in the resale of the land by getting
the purchase money mortgage, collecting payments, and assigning individual
interests in the mortgage to third parties.905 In 1986, Lake Bryan and
Nerbonne were involved in a foreclosure of the same mortgage.90 6 The
judgment in that foreclosure was vacated and was followed by a judgment
that reinstated and modified the mortgage. 0 7 At the time the modified
mortgage was reinstated, Figueredo and his corporation were in control of
Nerbonne and Waters was in control of Lake Bryan. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Lake Bryan on the grounds that Nerbonne's action
was barred by the statute of limitations and by res judicata because of the
1986 judgment.0 8
The fifth district agreed with Lake Bryan's contention that it had no duty
to disclose to Nerbonne if it made a substantial profit upon the purchase of
real estate by Nerbonne.909 However, in the case at bar, Nerbonne alleged that
Figueredo conspired with Waters against Nerbonne, that Figueredo provided
funds for Waters to facilitate the purchase of land at a cheaper price, and then
901. National Enters., Inc., 679 So. 2d at 333.
902. 689 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
903. Id. at 324.
904. Id.
905. Id.
906. Id.
907. Nerbonne, 689 So. 2d at 324.
908. Id.
909. Id. at 325.
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afterwards the same land was sold to Nerbonne at a higher price. 910 In
addition, Waters and Nerbonne calculated how the fraudulent profit would be
distributed between them. It was Figueredo's duty to act in good faith and
purchase the land for Nerbonne's benefit.911 Parties involved with
Figueredo's plan to defraud the corporation, Nerbonne, are liable to the
principal Nerbonne for the loss.
912
The fifth district disagreed with Lake Bryan's contention that Nerbonne
was estopped from disavowing the acts of Figueredo and the indebtedness of
the mortgage because Nerbonne wanted to keep the remainder of the land and
recover the difference between the price paid by Waters, and the price paid by
Nerbonne. 913 If Lake Bryan was involved with Figueredo's conspiracy,
Nerbonne should only have paid $2.4 million, the price at which Figueredo,
as promoter, purchased the land for Nerbonne's benefit.
914
Nerbonne raised an affirmative defense to the mortgage foreclosure and
counterclaim against Lake Bryan based on fraud, but it was countered by a
defense of res judicata on Lake Bryan's behalf.915 The res judicata defense
was grounded upon the 1987 mortgage foreclosure by Lake Bryan. The trial
judge's order stated that the previously entered final judgment be set aside as
null and void, that some of the terms of the manner of repayment be modified,
and that otherwise, the mortgage would remain as is and fully enforceable.
916
The district court recognized that the order contained no language
waiving any defenses that may have been available to Nerbonne, the
mortgagor. The mortgage foreclosure proceeding leading to final judgment
had no effect on defenses because the later order canceled the final
judgment.918  In conclusion, this court vacated the final judgment of
foreclosure, the summary judgment on Nerbonne's counterclaim to Lake
Bryan, and the order striking the raised affirmative defenses.
919
Saidi v. Wasko.920  The court reversed the order dismissing Saidi's
objections to a judicial sale of foreclosed property because Saidi timely sought
to exercise his right of redemption and was unable to do so because of the trial
910. Id.
911. Id.
912. Nerbonne, 689 So. 2d at 325.
913. Id.
914. Id.
915. Id. at 326.
916. Id.
917. Nerbonne, 689 So. 2d at 326.
918. Id.
919. Id. at 327.
920. 687 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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court's order.921 On October 31, 1995, final judgment in favor of the Waskos
provided that if $97,166.60 was not paid, the property would be sold at a
judicial sale.922 Saidi was unsuccessful in his attempt to have the judicial sale
postponed. As such, the property was sold to the Waskos and Saidi filed an
objection to the sale and a motion to exercise right of redemption. This
motion was denied.92
The fifth district recognized the right of redemption as an equitable right
that the mortgagor has to reclaim his estate by paying the amount owed plus
interest and costs. 924 Additionally, the fifth district felt that the law governing
the right of redemption should be strictly construed.925 Section 45.0315 of the
Florida Statutes provides that a mortgagor could exercise redemption rights
any time before certificate of title was issued.926
In this case, the final judgment of foreclosure contained a provision
addressing redemption rights. 927  The provision stated: "[o]n filing the
certificate of title Defendants and all persons claiming under or against
Defendants since the filing of the notice of lis pendens shall be foreclosed of
all estate or claim in the property and the purchaser at the sale shall be let into
possession of the property."928 According to this provision, the mortgagor's
estate is terminated upon filing of the certificate of title.
The fifth district concluded that the provision in the final judgment of
foreclosure had the effect of postponing the termination of Saidi's right of
redemption until the certificate of title was filed. 929 Since a mortgagor did not
need the trial court's permission to exercise the right of redemption, the fifth
district decided that on remand, the trial court should order that Saidi have a
period of time to exercise the right.
930
XXII. OPTIONS AND RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSAL
Fallschase Development Corp. v. Blakey.931 A 1975 contract of sale
included the following terms: "4. Should the Seller later determine to sell all
921. Id. at 11.
922. Id.
923. Id.
924. Id.
925. Saidi, 687 So. 2d at 11.
926. Id.
927. Id.
928. Id. at 11-12.
929. Id. at 12.
930. Saidi, 687 So. 2d at 12.
931. 696 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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of the property retained by her as above-described, then the Buyer shall have
first right of refusal to purchase said property... 6. This agreement shall be
binding upon the parties hereto, their heirs, successors and assigns.,
932
Paragraph four created a right of first refusal. In 1995, the buyer's successor
brought an action to declare that the right of first refusal was void. Buyer's
successor had two theories: 1) the right of first refusal violated the rule
against perpetuities; and 2) the right of first refusal was personal to the
original buyer and, consequently, ended with her death in 1983. The trial
court rejected the latter, concluding, that paragraph six would give the right an
unlimited duration.933 The First District Court of Appeal summarily agreed,934
so the decision focused on the rule against perpetuities question.
Under traditional analysis, the rule against perpetuities was applied to
void rights of first refusal, 935 although there are problems with that analysis.
936
However, Florida's rule against perpetuities was amended in 1976 and
1988.937 Under the 1976 amendment, the rule would not apply to rights of
first refusal.938 In 1988, Florida adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities which included, inter alia,939 a provision allowing the court to
"reform the disposition in the manner that the most closely approximates the
transferor's manifested plan of distribution,"940 even if the nonvested interest
had been created before adoption of the uniform act.
941
932. Id. at 835.
933. Id. at 834.
934. Id. at 834-35.
935. See Ronald Benton Brown, An Examination of Real Estate Purchase Options, 12
NOVA L. REv. 147, 172-80 (1987) (explaining that a right of first refusal is a purchase option
that is subject to a condition precedent). See also id. at 192-96 (explaining the application of
the rule against perpetuities and the rule against restraints on alienation to options, including
rights of first refusal).
936. Id. at 193 (pointing out that the rule against perpetuities did not traditionally apply
to future interests retained by a grantor, such as the seller here, and the propensity for courts to
avoid applying the rule to options). See also id. at 195-96 (pointing out that the policy behind
the rule does not favor its application to options and that options should properly be tested by
the rule against restraints on alienation as occurred in Inglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610
(Fla. 1980)).
937. See FLA. STAT. § 689.22 (1977); see also FLA. STAT. § 689.225 (1995).
938. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)(7) (1977).
939. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities also provided an alternative 90
year wait-and-see provision and limited the application of the rule to gratuitous transfers.
FLA. STAT. § 689.225(l)(a)(2) (amended 1990). If the Uniform version of the rule had
applied, under either of these provisions, the right of first refusal could not have been
adjudged void ab initio as occurred here. Id.
940. Id. § 689.225(6)(c).
941. Id.
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The first district found that the right of first refusal had become void
immediately in 1975 under the traditional rule.942 Consequently, the title,
unencumbered by the right of first refusal, had vested in the buyer at that
time. The later amendments, if applied retroactively, would disturb the
buyer's vested rights, and the Supreme Court of Florida recently held
that "'[e]ven when the Legislature does expressly state that a statute is to
have retroactive application, this Court has refused to apply a statute
retroactively if the statute impairs vested rights, creates new obligations, or
imposes new penalties.' 943 Judge Wolf, however, dissented on this point
noting, "I am... unaware of a vested right to have a court strike down an
obligation voluntarily undertaken as part of an enforceable written legal
agreement."
944
The court decided to certify the question presented as being of great
public importance and formulated it as follows:
WHETHER SECTION 689.225(6)(C), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS
A REMEDIAL PROVISION WHICH MAY BE APPLIED
RETROSPECTIVELY TO REFORM A FIRST REFUSAL
RIGHT TO PURCHASE REAL PROPERTY, SO AS TO BRING
EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE
COMMON LAW RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES. 945
XXIII. PUBLIC LAND USE CONTROLS
Martin County v. Yusem.
946
CAN A REZONING DECISION WHICH HAS LIMITED
IMPACT UNDER SNYDER, BUT DOES REQUIRE AN
AMENDMENT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE
PLAN, STILL BE A QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISION SUBJECT
TO STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW?947
942. Fallschase Dev. Corp. v. Blakey, 696 So. 2d 833, 834 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1997), caused dismissed by Charlesworth v. Mack, No. 91-194, (Fla. Aug. 22, 1997).
943. Id. at 836 (quoting State Farm v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 61 (Fla. 1995)).
944. Id. at 838.
945. Id. at 837.
946. 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997).
947. Martin County v. Yusem, 664 So. 2d 976, 982 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), affd
in part and quashed in part, 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997).
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No! The Supreme Court of Florida responded to calls for clarification 948 by
directly answering the certified question in the negative.949 Both the method
of judicial review and standard to be applied by the reviewing court depend
on whether the governmental decision was classified as judicial or legislative
in nature. Following Snyder95° and Puma,951 courts,952 including the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in this case, had applied a functional test to
determine whether a decision to amend a comprehensive plan was judicial or
legislative. However, the supreme court has now clearly stated that
"amendments to a comprehensive land use plan which was adopted pursuant
to chapter 163, Florida Statutes, are legislative decisions subject to the 'fairly
debatable' standard of review.' 953 Furthermore, "[t]his conclusion is not
affected by the fact that the amendments to comprehensive land use plans are
being sought as part of a rezoning application in respect to only one piece of
property." 54 The holding was based upon the type of information that should
be considered in a decision to amend the comprehensive plan and the
statutory process mandated. Henceforth, the method of obtaining review of
an amendment to the comprehensive plan and the standard to be applied by
the reviewing court will no longer be in doubt. It will no longer be necessary
to do a functional analysis to determine if a particular amendment was
legislative or judicial in nature, even though that method of analysis remains
in effect for determining the method and standard of review for rezoning
decisions. In the future, parties aggrieved by amendments to a comprehensive
plan "will know to file such challenges as original actions in the circuit
court." 9 55
Beach v. Village of North Palm Beach City Council.956  Hoping to
construct a large store, the developer sought a certificate of appropriateness
from the village's planning commission. It issued the preliminary approval on
February 14, 1995, and the final certificate of appropriateness was issued on
May 10, 1995. To comply with the requirements of section 163.3215(4) of
948. See e.g., Ronald Benton Brown & Joseph M. Grohman, Property Law: 1996
Florida Survey, 21 NoVA L. REv. 279, 338 (1996).
949. Martin County, 690 So. 2d at 1289.
950. Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
951. City of Melbourne v. Puma, 630 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1994).
952. E.g., Martin County v. Section 28 Partnership, Ltd., 676 So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1553 (1997).
953. Martin County, 690 So. 2d at 1289.
954. Id. at 1293.
955. Id. at 1295.
956. 682 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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the Florida Statutes,95 7 opponents of the development filed a verified
complaint challenging the decision to issue the certificate with the
village. When relief was denied, the opponents began this court challenge,
but the trial court dismissed the complaint on the theory that the verified
complaint had been filed with the village too late.
958
The statute required that, "[t]he verified complaint shall be filed no later
than 30 days after the alleged inconsistent action has been taken., 959 It had
been filed with the village on June 9, 1995. This was within thirty days of the
issuance of the final certificate of appropriateness, but far more than thirty
days after the preliminary approval. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
decided that the "alleged inconsistent action" was the issuance of the final
certificate.960 The procedure set out in the North Palm Beach Code required
two steps: a preliminary approval and a final approval. 961 The fifth district
reasoned that the approval was the development order which had the effect of
allowing the development to proceed and a development permit to be issued.
The fourth district distinguished an earlier rezoning case in which a two step
process was not involved.962 Judge Stone wrote a dissenting opinion.963 The
North Palm Beach Code provided: "'[s]uch [preliminary] approval will be
irrevocable and makes the issuance of the certificate of appropriateness
mandatory upon application, unless the final presentation does not comply in
all respects with the preliminary presentation upon which the preliminary
approval was based."' 964
Thus, the process was not really a two stage decision-making process,
and the "inconsistent action" taken was the issuance of the preliminary
approval. For this reason, the instant case is indistinguishable from the earlier
rezoning decision. 965 In addition, Judge Stone disagreed with the conclusion
that the issuance of the certificate of appropriateness constituted a
development order.
966
957. FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(4) (1993).
958. Beach, 682 So. 2d at 165.
959. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(4) (1993)).
960. Id.
961. Id. (citing Board of Trustees v. Seminole County Bd. of County Commiss'rs, 623
So. 2d 593 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
962. Id.
963. Beach, 682 So. 2d at 165 (Stone, J., dissenting).
964. Id. at 164 n.1 (quoting NORTH PALM BEACII, FLA. CODE § 6-56 (1996)).
965. Board of Trustees v. Seminole County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 623 So. 2d 593
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
966. Beach, 682 So. 2d at 166 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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Chung v. Sarasota County.967 When the county rejected the landowner's
rezoning petition, he filed suit. The parties reached a settlement under which
the county was required to rezone the property subject to certain stipulations
and conditions. A neighboring property owner and a homeowners'
association intervened and objected to the settlement. After rehearing, the
circuit court vacated the settlement. 968  The Second District of Appeal
affirmed the decision based on its conclusion that the settlement constituted
contract zoning.
969
Contract zoning is zoning by agreement rather than by legislative process
which complies with statutory and constitutional requirements. Because the
government has no power to dispense with these requirements, contract
zoning is ultra vires, i.e., beyond the legitimate powers of the government.
The second district reasoned that the settlement in this case did not comply
with the notice and hearing requirements of rezoning.970  Any subsequent
hearing would have been a sham because the city was already required to
rezone the property. Consequently, the settlement was invalid.971 The second
district noted that this conclusion was supported by analogy to suits
commenced under section 163.3215(1)972 because local governments must
have a public hearing on any proposed settlement.
973
The second district, however, noted that the fourth district's decision in
Molina v. Tradewinds Development Corp.974 and the third district's decision
in Zoning Board of Monroe County v. Hood9 75 upheld similar settlements,
although neither discussed contract zoning. Furthermore, it expressed
concern about "impairing a local government's ability to settle litigation."
976
Therefore, it certified the following question as being of great public
importance:
WHETHER A COUNTY OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAN
ENTER INTO A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IN ZONING
967. 686 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
968. Id. at 1359.
969. Id.
970. Id. at 1360.
971. Id.
972. Chung, 686 So. 2d at 1360 (citing FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(7) (1995) (allowing
aggrieved parties to bring suit to prevent local governmental action that is inconsistent with
the comprehensive plan)).
973. FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(1) (1995).
974. 526 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
975. 484 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
976. Chung, 686 So. 2d at 1360.
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LITIGATION WITHOUT FIRST ADHERING TO THE DUE
PROCESS AND STATUTORY/ORDINANCE REQUIREMENTS
FOR ENACTING THE ZONING CHANGES CONTEMPLATED
BY THE AGREEMENT? 977
City Environmental Services Landfill, Inc. v. Holmes County.978 The
landowner acquired property on which was the site of the former county
landfill. By contract, the landowner assumed responsibility for closing the old
landfill in return for the right to operate a landfill at that site if the
environmental approvals could be obtained. The county's comprehensive
plan did not have a category for landfills. When the landowner applied for a
development permit to operate a regional landfill, it was informed that it
would need to obtain an amendment to the comprehensive plan to create 4.
landfill category. The proposed amendments were rejected by the planning
commission and the board of county commissioners who expressly treated the
decision making as legislative in nature. The landowner filed this petition for
a writ of certiorari, brought suit in circuit court for a declaration that it did not
need to amend the plan, and also filed suit in federal court on a claim that an
ordinance that prohibited solid waste being brought in from outside the
county would be unconstitutional. 979 Although the landowner won the federal
suit, it lost the certiorari action and brought a petition for a writ of certiorari in
the district court for review.
980
The First District Court of Appeal denied the petition for a writ of
certiorari, leaving in effect the circuit court's denial of certiorari. The court
noted that in dealing with a certiorari petition "[a]t the district court level, the
inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process
and whether the circuit court applied the correct law."98' As to the correct
law,
[t]he resolution of this case hinges on whether the board of county
commissioners' denial of petitioner's proposed amendments to the
comprehensive land use plan was a legislative action (reviewable in
a de novo hearing in a suit for injunctive or declaratory relief under
the very broad "fairly debatable" standard) or a quasi-judicial
977. Id. at 1361.
978. 677 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct App. 1996).
979. Id. at 1328-3 1.
980. Id. at 1331.
981. Id. at 1332.
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action (reviewable by certiorari under the "competent substantial
evidence" standard).982
The first district simply stated that "[t]he case law indicates that the board's
action in this case was legislative, and that the circuit court therefore properly
denied the petition .,983 The decision seems based on the circuit court's
conclusion that, the proposed amendment to the comprehensive plan is
drafted in such a way that, if adopted, it is conceivable that landfills could be
situated at any location permitted by state environmental agencies. Such an
amendment clearly contemplates a legislative policy-making function of
Holmes County because, if approved, it would not only transfer much of the
county's authority to determine the location of landfill sites to state regulatory
agencies, but would also impact the general population of Holmes County by
potentially allowing numerous landfill sites to be placed through the
environmental landscape of Holmes County.984
Das v. Osceola County.985 The landowners were the defendants in a
condemnation proceeding brought by Central Florida Petroleum Corporation
("CFP") to acquire a permanent easement for a liquefied petroleum pipeline.
The landowners filed a cross claim against the county seeking a writ of
mandamus to enforce its comprehensive plan. The Fifth District Court of
Appeal determined that "the gravamen of [the landowners'] claim is that
Osceola County has not carried out its duty to conduct a public consistency
review of the pipeline project and issue a valid development order granting or
denying CFP permission to construct the pipeline. 986
The circuit court had dismissed the mandamus action with prejudice on
the theory that the court lacked jurisdiction.98 7 It reasoned that the sole
method of challenging the pipeline project as being inconsistent with the
comprehensive plan was under section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes, and
that the landowners had failed to pursue that remedy within the specified time
period.988 The fifth district reversed because that section was predicated upon
affected landowners getting notice of possible governmental action that would
affect their land.989 In this case, the county gave neither notice to affected
landowners that it was going to consider whether the pipeline was consistent
982. Id. at 1332-33.
983. Holmes County, 677 So. 2d at 1333.
984. Id.
985. 685 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
986. Id. at 993.
987. Id. at 992.
988. Id.
989. Id. at 994.
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with the comprehensive plan, nor notice of the decision once it had been
made. The landowners first learned of it in the condemnation proceeding. In
essence, the fifth district declared that they should not be barred from
challenging a decision affecting their land when they had no reasonable
opportunity to learn that the decision had been made.990 The fifth district
concluded that "[a] county should, at the least, issue an order or permit of
public record before the rights of the public to file a consistency challenge are
foreclosed by the expiration of time.
'991
Debes v. City of Key West.992 The landowner sought the redesignation of
her land from Medium Density Residential to Commercial General on the
Future Land Use Map so that she could build a shopping center. The land
was located in the center of an area designated commercial on the map and
both the city planner and the planning board approved of the
change. However, the city commission repeatedly refused. The commission
relied upon concern for an increase in traffic and the desire to generate
affordable housing. The Third District Court of Appeal, finding the
commission's refusal arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable as a matter
of law, reversed. 993
It concluded that the increase in traffic would not justify denying a
commercial use because every commercial use necessarily generates an
increase in traffic. 994 Thus, being able to rely upon that would, in effect, give
the commission free reign to deny any commercial designation. Furthermore,
limiting the use of the property to affordable housing would be to ignore
proper land use concepts in the decision-making process. The third district
concluded that this was the inverse of spot zoning, with all of spot zoning
ills. 99
5
Hernando County v. Leisure Hills, Inc.9 96 Having obtained conditional
plat approval from the county's planning and zoning commission, the
developer spent more than $500,000 to develop the subdivision. But when it
sought final plat approval, the county commission decided that supplying
positive drainage for the house on each two and one-half acre lot would no
longer be enough. It was now requiring positive drainage for the entire lot.
990. Das, 685 So. 2d at 994.
991. Id.
992. 690 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
993. Id. at 701.
994. Id.
995. Id. at 702.
996. 689 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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Consequently, the developer's plat was rejected. The developer sought
equitable relief based on the theory of estoppe.
997
Noting, "[i]t is clear from the record that the [c]ommission was looking
for a way to deny the plat . . . [,],,118 the Fifth District Court of Appeal
"agree[d] with the trial court that equitable estoppel was proved." '999 It then
dealt with the county's effort to invoke Board of County Commissioners of
Brevard County v. Snyder °°° as a basis for finding that the court had no
jurisdiction to hear claims for equitable relief 1001 The fifth district seemed to
avoid applying Snyder by pointing out that Snyder was decided years after this
action was filed and the county had not raised their jurisdictional argument at
that time. 100 2 However, in the decision denying the motion for rehearing, the
court stated that this was merely its "observation" and not the basis for its
decision.10
0 3
The fifth district also concluded that the commission's action was, in
essence, a legislative act adopting a new policy on drainage because it would
apply to all plats which would come before the commission, not just this
developer's plat.100 4 Since Snyder stands for the proposition that review of a
quasi-judicial decision must be by certiorari, l '00 it follows that Snyder would
not bar equitable relief from this quasi-legislative decision.
The district court also found that there was also no logical reason to limit
review to a certiorari petition.100 6  The case for estoppel might include
testimony about assurances that the developer had relied upon. Such
testimony would not necessarily be reflected by the commission
record. Consequently, "[a]n independent, de novo hearing was required."'
007
Kahana v. City of Tampa 008 The property in question was zoned YC-l,
indicating that it was "in the central commercial core of the district."'1009 In
order to sell alcoholic beverages, the owner had to petition to rezone the
specific lot for that purpose. However, that rezoning would simply add that
997. Id. at 1104.
998. Id.
999. Id.
1000. 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
1001. Leisure Hills, 689 So. 2d at 1104.
1002. Id.
1003. Id. at 1105.
1004. Id. at 1104.
1005. See Ronald Benton Brown and Joseph M. Grohman, Property Law: 1994 Survey
of Florida Law, 19 NovA L. REv. 215, 304-06 (1994).
1006. Leisure Hills, 689 So. 2d at 1104.
1007. Id. at 1105.
1008. 683 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1009. Id. at 619.
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use to the land's YC-1 designation. At the hearing on rezoning, the
parishioners of a nearby church displayed their opposition and the rezoning
was denied. The landowners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the
circuit court. The trial court concluded that the council's action was
legislative and not reviewable by certiorari, so it dismissed the petition.
1010
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed.1011
The second district held that the circuit court had misconstrued the test
for determining whether zoning activity was legislative or quasi-judicial. 10 12
Legislative action is the formulation of a general rule of policy. Such a policy
would, naturally, affect many people. In contrast, quasi-judicial activity
"merely applies an existing general rule of policy to a specific parcel., 10 13
Because "[t]here [wa]s nothing in [the] sparse record establishing the City
Council formulated any general rule of policy when it voted to deny [the
rezoning] petition. .. [,],1014 the trial court's decision was quashed and the
case was remanded. The fifth district had not decided that the rezoning was
legislative or quasi-judicial, but only that the trial court had no basis for
deciding that it was legislative. 015
Mandelstam v. City of South Miami.0 16 Landowners filed suit against
the city and its vice mayor alleging that the delays they had endured in finally
getting approval for their gymnastics school, following protracted litigation
and administrative proceedings, constituted inverse condemnation and the
denial of due process. The Third District Court of Appeal quoted from a
recent third district decision, stated "'there is no guarantee that regulatory
bodies will not become embroiled in disputed [sic] with property owners in
which the owners ultimately will prevail."", 10 17 Furthermore, the court stated
"there is no concomitant guarantee that property owners may recover for harm
,,1018
caused by these disputes. Due process requires that the city employ fair
procedures, not that it must always make the correct decision.' 9 The fact
that the final approval took so long was not enough to justify a finding of
1010. Id.
1011. Id. at 619-20.
1012. Id.
1013. Kahana, 683 So. 2d at 620 (interpreting Board of County Commiss'rs of Brevard
County v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993)).
1014. Id.
1015. Id.
1016. 685 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1017. Id. at 869 (quoting Jacobi v. City of Miami Beach, 678 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1996)).
1018. Id.
1019. Id.
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liability. 10 20 Moreover, the vice mayor was entitled to qualified immunity
because there was no allegation that she had acted with malice or contrary to
clearly established law.
10 2
'
Monroe County v. Whispering Pines Associates.1022 A mobile home
park covered three lots. Mobile homes were permitted on two of the lots, but
prohibited by the zoning on the third lot. The owner obtained permits to place
three mobile homes on lots where they were allowed by the zoning, but the
mobile homes were actually placed on the lot where they were prohibited.
This was an unpleasant surprise for the subsequent purchaser of the park
because when the building officials discovered it, they revoked the building
permits and gave the park owner ninety days to remove the homes. It did not
comply, so this code enforcement proceeding was initiated.
102 3
The Monroe County Code Enforcement Board gave the park owner
seven months to remove the mobile homes or obtain a variance, and set the
fine for noncompliance at $100 per day. The owner appealed to the circuit
court which remanded the case with the direction to join the mobile home
owner.10 24  The Third District Court of Appeal, however, reinstated the
Monroe County Code Enforcement Board's order. 0 21 The third district found
that the current owner can be cited for code violations even though the
improper use was actually begun by the prior owner.1026 The current owner is
the only one to have the power to bring the property into compliance. Thus, it
concluded, "code violations 'run with the land 102 and the current owner
could be fined for failing to bring the property into compliance where it had
been given time to comply or get a variance.1 2 8
Sunshine Key Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Monroe County.029 The
Monroe County Code specified land use districts that were designated for
recreational vehicles. The county's director of planning decided that the
county code did not allow "park models,"' '° i.e., expandable recreationalvehicles over eight feet wide that were designed and built to be permanent
1020. Id. at 869-70.
1021. Mandelstam, 685 So. 2d at 870.
1022. 697 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1023. Id. at 874-75.
1024. Id. at 875.
1025. Id.
1026. Id.
1027. Whispering Pines, 697 So. 2d at 875.
1028. Id.
1029. 684 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1030. Id. at 877.
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residences. 0 31 When the county tried to enforce that interpretation, this
recreational vehicle park filed an unsuccessful administrative appeal to the
County Planning Commission. Subsequently, the park unsuccessfully sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, in the circuit court.1032
Finally, in the Third District Court of Appeal, they succeeded.
0 33
The third district noted that the essence of the park's argument was that
the eight-foot maximum width was arbitrary. 10 34 As a constitutional claim,
apparently a due process violation, it was not barred by administrative res
judicata. 0 35 The next step in the analysis was that recreational vehicles,
unlike mobile homes, were designed for tenancies of less than six months and
were "highway ready."' 0 36 Both parties conceded at oral argument that "the
[RV] industry is moving towards wider vehicles.' 0 37  Furthermore, in all
other attributes, these trailers met the criteria for recreational
vehicles. Therefore, the third district concluded the eight-foot maximum
width was arbitrary and unenforceable.1
0 38
XXIV. Remedies
Nystrom v. Cabada.10 39 Nystrom, who was not a licensed contractor,
built his own house in Naples. After living in the house for about one year,
he sold it to Cabada for $126,000. Cabada then sued after she experienced
problems with walls cracking and doors sticking. Engineers inspected the
property and reported it to be hazardous. Cabaca alleged "breach of implied
warranty, fraud, rescission of contract, breach of contract, negligence, and
intentional violation of the Collier County Building Code.', 10 40 The trial court
gave her the option to rescind the purchase and obtain her payment of
$126,000, or to take $126,000 in damages and keep the property. 04 ' Of
course, she kept the property, chose the judgment, and continued to live in the
house. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed on the issue of liability,
1031. See MONROE COUNTY FLA. CODE § 9.5-4. See also Sunshine Key, 684 So. 2d at
877 n.1.
1032. Sunshine Key, 684 So. 2d at 877.
1033. Id. at 878.
1034. Id.
1035. Id.
1036. Id. at 877 n.1. See also MONROE COuNTY FLA. CODE § 9.5-4.
1037. Sunshine Key, 684 So. 2d at 878.
1038. Id.
1039. 652 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
1040. Id. at 1267.
1041. Id. at 1268.
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holding that the Nystroms had a duty to disclose both the defects and the fact
that the house was built by an unlicensed contractor.10 42 The second district
reversed on the issue of damages holding that Cabada should not have been
given the option of obtaining a money judgment for the full purchase price of
the property and keeping the property. 0 43 The second district remanded for a
new trial on the issue of damages. 1
044
XXV. Sales
Gilchrist Timber Co. v. IT Rayonier, Inc.10 45 The seller of a 22,000
acre tract provided the buyer with a year-old appraisal. Unfortunately, the
zoning shown on the appraisal was inaccurate. After "unsuccessfully" trying
to get the zoning changed, the buyer filed suit in federal district
court.104 6 When the case reached the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, it certified the following question to the Supreme Court of
Florida:
WHETHER A PARTY TO A TRANSACTION WHO
TRANSMITS FALSE INFORMATION WHICH THAT PARTY
DID NOT KNOW WAS FALSE, MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION WHEN THE
RECIPIENT OF THE INFORMATION RELIED ON THE
INFORMATION'S TRUTHFULNESS, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT AN INVESTIGATION BY THE RECIPIENT WOULD
HAVE REVEALED THE FALSITY OF THE
INFORMATION.
1047
To simplify matters, this question could be broken into two parts. First,
could this seller be held liable for the misinformation in the appraisal which it
gave the buyer when there was no evidence of fraudulent intent? Yes, was
the court's answer. 104 8 It relied upon section 552 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts for the proposition that a person "in the course of his business,
profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in
1042. Id.
1043. Id.
1044. Nystrom, 652 So. 2d at 1268.
1045. 696 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1997).
1046. Id. at 336.
1047. Id. at 335.
1048. Id. at 337.
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their business transactions, is subject to liability ... if he fails to exercise
reasonable care." 1049 However, the question has a second part: Does the
buyer have a right to rely upon that information when a reasonable person
would have sought independent verification? Where the misrepresentation
was negligent rather than intentional, the answer was in the negative. 0 50 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that liability only extends to a person
who justifiably relies on that information, 10 51 and the court expressly adopted
the position as expressed in section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. 0 52 Consequently, this seller should be held liable only if the seller
failed to exercise reasonable care in giving the appraisal to the buyer and if
the buyer was justified in relying on that appraisal without further checking.
The court further noted that Florida uses comparative fault to apportion
damages in negligence cases.10 3 Since the seller in this case was accused of
negligently supplying incorrect information to the buyer, comparative fault
should be applied. In this case, the buyer might have been negligent in failing
to communicate the purpose for which it was acquiring the property or in
failing to verify the zoning. Thus, the negligent seller may ultimately be
liable for little or nothing if the buyer was also negligent.
Decker v. Strom & Strom Realtors, Inc.10 54 The buyers apparently had a
bad credit history so the only loan the broker could locate was at an interest
rate above the current market. When the buyers realized how high the
payments would be, they refused to close. The sale was subject to financing
under the standard Sarasota County Board of Realtors and the Sarasota
County Bar Association purchase contract that had been used; however, that
clause was silent as to interest rates. The Second District Court of Appeal
reluctantly held that the buyers had breached the contract. 0 55 It is unclear
whether this court was saying that the clause should be interpreted to allow
buyers to cancel if unable to find reasonable financing, or that buyers could
not cancel unless they were unable to find any financing. The Second District
Court of Appeal only stated that this financing was reasonable in light of the
buyers' credit history.1 56 However, the court noted that the buyers would
1049. Id.
1050. Gilchrist, 696 So. 2d at 339.
1051. See id. (distinguishing Lynch v. Fanning, 440 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1983)).
1052. Id.
1053. Id. at 338 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1995)).
1054. 695 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1055. Id. at 803.
1056. Id.
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have been better off using the standard Florida Bar contract because it has a
space for the buyer to specify a maximum acceptable interest rate.
10 57
Miami Child's World, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach.' 58 The purchase and
sale contract had a clause providing that time was of the essence, but it also
provided for a three-month extension if the buyer paid an extension fee. The
buyer paid the fee and got the extension. At the end of the three months, the
buyer was still not ready to close and asked for an eighteen-month extension.
The seller agreed only to a four-month extension. As the deadline neared, the
buyer asked the seller to extend for another year. The seller responded by
giving a three-week extension. When the buyer again could not meet the
deadline, the seller gave notice of termination, but the buyer then claimed that
the seller had waived the "time is of the essence" clause.
°59
The trial court rejected that claim and the district court of appeal
affirmed1060 Noting that the only basis for the buyer's waiver argument was
the sellers "patience and forbearance evidenced by its repeated granting of
extensions,"'0 61 the court held that, "[a]s a matter of law, the [seller's]
repeated extensions of the closing date did not amount to a waiver of the 'time
is of the essence' clause."'0 62 Clearly, the court was correct. Waiver is an
intentional or voluntary act. The seller's conduct here did not evidence an
intent to relinquish tight control over the time for performance.
Licea v. Anllo10 63 The buyer brought this suit for specific performance
of a real estate sales contract and filed a notice of lis pendens. In response,
the seller filed a motion to discharge the lis pendens or, in the alternative,
require the buyer to post a bond. Over the buyer's objection, the court set the
hearing on its motion calendar and then set the bond without an evidentiary
hearing.1064 The district court of appeal held that to be reversible error.
The court reasoned that the property owner could prevail in its motion
for the setting of a bond only if it could show: "(1) that the notice of lis
pendens, if unjustified, will likely result in loss or damage, and (2) the amount
of the damages which will likely result."'10 65 The first element would be to
determine if a bond was required. The second element would be to determine
the proper amount of the bond. The property owner could not make the
1057. Id.
1058. 688 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1059. Id. at 943.
1060. Id.
1061. Id.
1062. Id.
1063. 691 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1064. Id. at 30.
1065. Id.
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required showing without evidence; therefore, the trial court should not have
set the bond without an evidentiary hearing.1"66
XXVI. Taxes
Alachua County v. Adams.10 67 At issue was the "validity of a special act
permitting Alachua County to use tax revenues raised under a general law for
a purpose not enumerated in ... that general law."10 68 Section 212.055(2) of
the Florida Statutes, a general law, "authorizes Florida counties to levy an
infrastructure surtax and use the proceeds" for enumerated purposes. 10 69 The
"proceeds ... nor any interest accrued thereto shall be used for operational
expenses of any infrastructure." 1'07 In addition, chapter 94-487, Laws of
Florida, expanded section 212.055(2) "to allow Alachua County and its
municipalities to use the surtax revenues 'for operation and maintenance of
parks and recreation programs and facilities established with proceeds of the
surtax.""2
071
Alachua County and its municipalities entered an agreement under the
two statutes to "provide for the dedication of the use of Surtax proceeds by
the County and all municipalities within the County . . . provision and
operation of recreation programs in the implementation of a countywide
recreation partnership.' 01 72 Adams, as a taxpayer, sought an injunction and
claimed chapter 94-487 was unconstitutional. 0 73 The lower court agreed and
Alachua County appealed. 10 74
Alachua County relied upon Rowe v. Pinellas Sports Authority.10 75 In
Rowe, the county was pursuing the purpose of building a stadium specifically
authorized by general law. 10 76 The court recognized that the same situation
was not occurring here. 10 77 Alachua County was attempting, under chapter
1066. Id.
1067. 677 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1068. Id. at 397.
1069. Id.
1070. Id.
1071. Id.
1072. Adams, 677 So. 2d at 397.
1073. Id.
1074. Id.
1075. 461 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1984).
1076. Adams, 677 So. 2d at 397. See also Rowe v. Pinellas Sports Auth., 461 So. 2d
72, 74 (Fla. 1984).
1077. Adams, 677 So. 2d at 398.
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94-487, to use tax revenues for the specific objective of maintaining an
infrastructure which was not authorized by general law.1
078
When a taxing statute specifically sets out the ultimate use for revenues
collected pursuant to the statute, a change in the use must be considered a
change in the tax. 0 79 Appellants also contend there was a distinction between
the power to tax and the power to spend and that only the power to tax must
be authorized by general law.10 80  The court held this distinction to be
unpersuasive. 10 8' The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court
and held chapter 94-487 to be an unconstitutional special act.
108 2
Appleby v. Nolte. 10 83 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a
final judgment entered in favor of the Indian River County Property
Appraiser. 10 8 4 The appellants contested the assessed value of their homes for
ad valorem tax purposes. 0 85 They were residents and equity members entitled
to full golf privileges of John's Island Club, a Florida corporation. 1086 Full
golf members, as with the other equity members with lesser privileges, would
receive a proportionate share of property and assets at the club's dissolution
after outstanding debts were satisfied. When the property was appraised, the
appraiser considered the type of membership when determining appraisal
value. 0 87  Individuals owning homes with full golf memberships were
assessed forty percent higher than all other residents having lesser club
privileges. At trial, appellants argued that increasing the value assessment of
their homes based on the full golf membership was an inappropriate ad
valorem tax on intangible property. 10 88 The trial court disagreed and held that
the ability to obtain the full golf membership added value to the property
which was "reflected in the sales price."'1 8
9
Appellants brought the same issue before the Fourth District Court of
Appeal. The Florida Constitution prohibited "counties from levying ad
valorem taxes on intangible personal property."'10 90 Section 192.001(1 1)(b) of
1078. Id. at 398.
1079. Id.
1080. Id.
1081. Id.
1082. Adams, 677 So. 2d at 398.
1083. 682 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1084. Id. at 1140.
1085. Id.
1086. Id.
1087. Id. at 1141.
1088. Appleby, 682 So. 2d at 1141.
1089. Id.
1090. Id. See also FLA. CONST. art VII, § 9(a) (1968).
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the Florida Statutes defined intangible personal property as "'money, all
evidences of debt owed to the taxpayer, all evidences of ownership in a
corporation or other business organization having multiple owners."'
109
'
Likewise "'[m]embership [c]ertificates' fit the above definition." 092  The
appraiser had based his assessment "partially on the value of the real property,
and partially on evidence of ownership in a corporation" which violated
article VII, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. 0 93 An ad valorem tax can
not be based on the fact that appellants possessed scarce full golf
memberships.
10 94
In addition, the appraiser based the assessments on who owned the
property. If the golf member owned a residential unit, the assessment would
be one amount. However, a member who does not golf, owning the same
unit, would be assessed a lower amount. 10 95 The Supreme Court of Florida
has previously held this was not a valid criterion for valuing roperty. 1096
Canaveral Port Authority v. Department of Revenue. I°97 Justice Wells
wrote the court's opinion with Chief Justice Kogan, and Justices Grimes and
Harding concurring, and with Justice Overton dissenting with an opinion with
which Justices Shaw and Anstead concurred. 0 98 The case at bar conflicted
with the opinion in Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority v. Mikos.0 99
Canaveral challenged Brevard County's authority to assess ad valorem
taxes pursuant to section 196.199(4) of the Florida Statutes "on the fee
interest of real property owned by Canaveral and leased to private entities
engaged in nongovernmental activities."' 100 Canaveral contended it was not
subject to taxation "because it was a political subdivision" or otherwise,
"exempt from taxation pursuant to" section 315.11 of the Florida Statutes.1101
The trial court found, in accord with the Sarasota-Manatee court, that
Canaveral was a political subdivision and was immune from ad valorem
taxation." 02 The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed and the Supreme
1091. Appleby, 677 So. 2d at 1142 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 192.001(11) (1993)).
1092. Id. at 1142.
1093. Id.
1094. Id.
1095. Id.
1096. Appleby, 677 So. 2d at 1142. See also Interlachen Lake Estates, Inc. v. Snyder,
304 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1973).
1097. 690 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 1996).
1098. Id. at 1230.
1099. Id. at 1227. See also Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth. v. Mikos, 605 So. 2d 132
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
1100. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1227. See also FLA. STAT. § 196.199(4) (1991).
1101. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1227. See also FLA. STAT. § 315.11 (1991).
1102. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1227.
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Court of Florida agreed that Canaveral's fee simple interest in property was
not immune from taxation."
10 3
Immunity from taxation must be kept within limited bounds.11 04  As
such, only the state and those entities expressly recognized in the Florida
Constitution as performing a function of the state comprised "the state" for
purposes of tax immunity. 1105 Since Canaveral did not meet the level as to be
declared "the state," Canaveral must be taxed.
1 0 6
The court in Sarasota-Manatee held that immunity from taxes was based
upon whether an entity was more like a county than a municipality.! 10 7 This
court rejected that view.1108 Immunity does not flow from a judicial
determination that the entity is like a county. 1109 This court also rejected the
Sarasota decision that the Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority was a
"political subdivision" as declared by the legistaure. 1110 The Sarasota-
Manatee court recognized that the Florida Constitution did not allow the
legislature to decide which entities were immune from ad valorem
taxation. 1 1
Since Canaveral was not immune from taxation, Canaveral also argued
in the alternative that it was exempt from ad valorem taxation under section
315.11 of the Florida Statutes.1 2  Section 315.11 provided a statutory
exemption from taxes for port authorities and their properties.1113 Canaveral
contended that sections 196.001 and 196.199 of the Florida Statutes
superseded section 315.11 and made Canaveral's leased property taxable to
the extent the property was not subject to governmental use.1 14 Section
196.001 of the Florida Statutes states that all property is subject to taxation
unless expressly exempted."15 Section 196.001 establishes exemptions that
apply to Canaveral property leased to non-governmental agencies.' 16
1103. Id.
1104. Id.
1105. Id. at 1228.
1106. Id.
1107. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1228. See also Sarasota-Manatee, 605 So. 2d 132, 133
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
1108. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1228.
1109. Id.
1110. Id. See also Sarasota-Manatee, 605 So. 2d at 133.
1111. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1228.
1112. Id.
1113. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 315.11 (1991).
1114. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1229.
1115. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 196.001 (1991).
1116. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1229. See also FLA. STAT. § 196.199 (1991).
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The Supreme Court of Florida recognized that by the term "authorities"
used in sections 196.001 and 196.199(a)(4), "the legislature intended to
provide only a limited exemption for fee interests in port authority
property."'11 7 This court construed section 315.11 of the Florida Statutes
with sections 196.001 and 196.199 and held that "section 315.11 provide[d]
an exemption only when port authority property [was] being used for a
purpose which [was] specifically set forth in section 196.199(2) and (4). '1"8
As long as the property was being used for some other purpose not set out in
the statute, the fee interest would be taxable."
1 19
In conclusion, "the fee interest in the property at issue [was] not exempt
from... taxation because the property [was] leased to a nongovernmental
entity for a nongovernmental [purpose]. 11 20 In addition, property could only
be taxed on its total appraised value.1 21 The leased property was not to be
taxed twice by assessing both the leasehold and the fee in a way that the value
of the leasehold included the fee, or that the value of the fee, included the
leasehold. The two must be taxed separately.
Subsequently, Chief Justice Kogan and Justices Grimes, Harding, and
Wells concurred as to the petitioner's motion for rehearing and Justices
Overton, Shaw, and Anstead dissented."22 Chief Justice Kogan and Justices
Overton, Shaw, Grimes, Harding, Wells, and Anstead concurred as to the
respondent's motion for clarification! n1 3  Motions for rehearing and
clarification filed on behalf of both parties were considered and denied. 12 4
Florida Department ofRevenue v. Pirtle Construction Co. 112 This court
reversed the trial court's decision and construed section 199.185(1)(d) of the
Florida Statutes to mean Pirtle's receivables were not exempt from intangible
tax.1126 Pirtle, a general contractor, established construction contracts with the
school board for the 1988 and 1991 tax periods. Pirtle claimed exempt
intangibles as accounts receivable on his books and records. Later, Pirtle
applied to the Department of Revenue for a refund of the intangible taxes
1117. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1229.
1118. Id.
1119. Id.
1120. Id. at 1229-30.
1121. Id. at 1230.
1122. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1230.
1123. Id.
1124. Id.
1125. 690 So. 2d 709 (FMa. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1126. Id. at 710. See also FLA. STAT. § 199.185(1)(d) (1991).
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paid, and the Department declined. The Circuit Court ruled in Pirtle's
favor.11
27
Pirtle relied on section 199.185(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes which
stated, "'(1) The following intangible personal property shall be exempt from
the annual and nonrecurring taxes imposed by this chapter:... (d) Notes,
bonds, and other obligations issued by the State of Florida. .... 8 Pirtle
contended the accounts receivables are "other obligations" that are
exempt. The court recognized that the construction of the words "other
obligations issued" was warranted. 1129 The court looked to legislative intent
and turned to "the doctrine of ejusdem generis," a "tenet of statutory
construction that helps discern legislative intent." 130  In addition, the court
stated that "where the enumeration of specific things is followed by a more
general word or phrase, the general phrase is construed to refer to a thing of
the same nature as the preceding specific things."
'
"
131
Therefore, "because the general language 'and other obligations'
follow[ed] the specific enumeration of the words 'note' and 'bond,' the
principle of ejusdem generis" allowed the court to properly interpret the1132 ,
statute. Also, "[t]he Legislature could not have intended 'other obligations
issued' . . . to include accounts receivable arising from a government contract
because those accounts receivable are not of the same nature of notes and
bonds.""1 33 Once the government issues notes or bonds, full faith and credit is
pledged for later payment. 134  This is not the case when a construction
contract is entered. 
135
The court compared the language here to the statutory language
appearing in Smith v. Davis.113 6 In Smith, "'all stocks, bonds, Treasury notes,
and other obligations of the United States"' were exempt.1 37  The Smith
court applied ejusdern generis and held "other obligations" referred only to
obligations or securities of the same type as those specifically enumerated
1127. Pirtle, 690 So. 2d at 710.
1128. Id. at 711 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 199.195(1)(d) (1991)).
1129. Id.
1130. Id.
1131. Id. (citing Hanna v. Sunrise Recreation, Inc., 94 So. 2d 597, 599-600 (Fla.
1957)).
1132. Pirtle, 690 So. 2d at 711.
1133. Id. at 712.
1134. Id.
1135. Id.
1136. Id. See also Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 116 (1944).
1137. Pirtle, 690 So. 2d at 712 (quoting Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 116 (1944)).
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such as stocks, bonds, and Treasury notes. 13 8 Legislative intent was to limit
exemptions only to government obligations needed to secure credit to carry on
necessary government functions.1 139 Since the language was nearly identical
to that in the Smith case, the result should be the same here." 40 The court
reversed and remanded.
14 1
Leon County Educational Facilities Authority v. Bert Hartsfield.1142
Justice Grimes wrote the court's opinion and Chief Justice Kogan and Justices
Overton, Shaw, Harding, Wells, and Anstead concurred. 1143  Leon 2ounty
Educational Facilities Authority was organized to own, lease, and finance
higher educational facilities."144 Authority entered into a lease with SRH, Inc.
where SRH would acquire, construct and equip the dormitory and food
service project and then lease it to Authority in exchange for rent. Authority
was responsible for maintenance, insurance, and any taxes assessed against
the property."1 45 Although the project received a tax exemption in 1992, it
was denied exemption in 1993.'46 Authority and SRH sued the appraiser for
declaratory relief and the trial court found in favor of the property
appraiser.1
47
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed based on sections 196.192
and 196.199 of the Florida Statutes."148 Authority was not entitled to a tax
exemption because SRH held legal title to the project. 1149  This court
recognized the concept of equitable ownership in ad valorem taxation and
pointed out cases illustrating such." 50 The court stated that "the doctrine...
should be applied evenhandedly regardless of whether a tax is being imposed
or an exemption being claimed." 1151 The court pointed out the issue as
turning on whether the Authority has equitable ownership of the project. 1152
The court believed "the project [was] exempt from taxation because the
1138. Smith, 323 U.S. at 117.
1139. Pirtle, 690 So. 2d at 712.
1140. Id.
1141. Id.
1142. 698 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1997).
1143. Id. at 530.
1144. Id. at 527.
1145. Id.
1146. Id.
1147. Leon, 698 So. 2d at 527.
1148. Id.
1149. Id. at 528.
1150. Id. at 528-29. See Bancroft Inv. Corp. v. City of Jacksonville, 27 So. 2d 162 (Fla.
1946); Hialeah, Inc. v. Dade County, 490 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
1151. Leon, 698 So. 2d at 529.
1152. Id.
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Authority [was] the equitable owner."'1 153  Section 243.33 of the Florida
Statutes was written with the intent to exempt a project operated and
maintained by an authority under taxation provisions. 1154  The legislature
would not intend property being used by the Authority to be denied a tax
exemption because it did not hold legal title."" SRH held legal title to
facilitate financing for the project, not to make profit. It was insignificant that
the Authority did not automatically gain legal title at the leasehold's end.'156
The amendment to section 196.192(1) of the Florida Statutes which
added the words "'owned by an exempt entity' did not prevent the Authority,
as equitable owner, from obtaining a tax exemption. 157 Section 196.011(1)
also did not prevent a tax exemption for the project. 158 This section supports
a conclusion that the owner of property for the purpose of obtaining a tax
exemption could be one who has been determined to be an equitable
owner.1 59 The facts of this case forced the court to hold that the project was
not subject to ad valorem taxation because the Authority held all the benefits
and burdens of ownership.
1 160
Palmer Trinity Private School v. Robbins.1 161 Palmer Trinity appealed an
order granting final summary judgment in favor of Robbins, the property
appraiser of Dade County. 16 2  In 1988, Palmer Trinity applied for an
educational tax exemption from ad valorem taxes for the private
school. 163 After the application was denied, Palmer petitioned the Property
Appraisal Adjustment Board who approved the exemption at the special
master's recommendation. 64 On August 25, 1989, the property appraiser
filed suit challenging the exemption, but the circuit court later said no
exemption would apply. 165 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
circuit court's decision and found that the private school was qualified to
receive the educational exemption1
66
1153. Id.
1154. Id.
1155. Id.
1156. Leon, 698 So. 2d at 529.
1157. Id. at 530 (quoting FLA. STAT. §196.192(1) (1988)).
1158. Id.
1159. Id.
1160. Id.
1161. 681 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1162. Id. at 809.
1163. Id.
1164. Id.
1165. Id.
1166. Palmer, 681 So. 2d at 809.
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Section 196.011 of the Florida Statutes required the property appraiser
to mail a renewal application for exemption on or before February 1 "'once an
original application for tax exemption had been granted.', 1167 The appraiser
failed to send a renewal application to Palmer for 1989 because the appraiser
believed the renewal application was only for those granted a tax exemption
in the previous year and not to those whose exemption was still in litigation at
the appeal level. 1168  The appraiser did mail notice of the proposed tax
assessment to Palmer and later mailed the actual bill.
1169
While litigating, Palmer sold the property to the Board of Trustees of the
State of Florida.1 170 Palmer agreed to pay the 1989 ad valorem taxes to
release the tax lien." 71 Palmer, not receiving a refund for the 1989 taxes,
brought suit challenging the assessment of ad valorem taxes for the 1989
year. 172 The circuit court held it did not have jurisdiction because Palmer had
not filed the action contesting assessment within sixty days from the date the
assessment was certified for collection. 1173 Section 194.171(2) of the Florida
Statutes provided that:
No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days
from the date the assessment being contested is certified for
collection under section 193.122(2), or after 60 days from the date
a decision is rendered concerning such assessment by the property
adjustment board if a petition contesting the assessment had not
received final action by the property appraisal adjustment board
prior to extension of the roll under section 197.323.1174
Palmer wanted the court to follow Chihocky v. Crapo 1175 and hold that
the failure to send an exemption renewal application was equal to the failure
of the property appraiser to publish notice of the certification of the tax roll as
required by statute.'176 Therefore, the sixty-day period should be tolled. 7 7
The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed." 78 In Chihocky, the appraiser
1167. Id. at 810 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 196.011(6) (1995)).
1168. Palmer, 681 So. 2d at 810.
1169. Id.
1170. Id.
1171. Id.
1172. Id.
1173. Palmer, 681 So. 2d at 810.
1174. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 194.171(2) (1988)).
1175. 632 So. 2d230 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
1176. Palmer, 681 So. 2d at 810.
1177. Id. See also Chihocky v. Crapo, 632 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
1178. Palmer, 681 So. 2d at 810.
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failed to comply with statutory notice.'17 9 Chihocky was never extended to
cases where the taxpayer received actual notice of the date of the certification
of the tax roll.180
Here, the failure to send the renewal application did not affect Palmer's
ability to challenge the denial of the exemption because it had actual notice of
the date of the certification of the tax roll.1181 The action to challenge the tax
assessment took place two and a half years later.1182 The Property Appraisal
Adjustment Board's final decision in the 1988 litigation was in July, 1989,
and the property appraiser appealed on August 25, 1989.1183 When the sixty-
day period expired on December 18, 1989, Palmer must have known it was
not certain the exemption would be approved.118 4 The statute of nonclaim
was strictly enforced, and as such, no exception would be made in this
case.
185
Tamar 7600, Inc. v. Orange County."186 The Fifth District Court of
Appeal reversed the dismissal of the entire case and directed the lower court
to permit Tamar to amend the complaint to allege claims such as those set
forth in Counts Il-VI, and X. 1 8 7  This case involved Orange County's
assignment of a one percent tourist tax pursuant to Florida's Local Option
Tourist Development Act.' 188 The statute authorized the county to impose
taxes on short term rentals of living quarters within the county for certain
purposes unless an exemption applied. 189 The tourist tax was enacted to get
funds for the construction of a baseball stadium. 1190 The letter of intent
executed obligated Orange County and the City to work with baseball owners
in an attempt to bring major league baseball to the Orlando area. 1191 If the
attempt was successful, Orange County and the City were to enter a baseball
stadium lease within the parameters of a "Summary of Expected Lease
Terms."
1 192
1179. Id.
1180. Id.
1181. Id.
1182. Id.
1183. Palmer, 681 So. 2d at 811.
1184. Id.
1185. Id.
1186. 686 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1187. Id. at 793.
1188. Id. at 790. See also FLA. STAT. § 125.0104(3)(1) (1993).
1189. Tamar, 686 So. 2d at 790 (citing FLA. STAT. § 125.0104(3)(1) (1993)).
1190. Id.
1191. Id.
1192. Id. at 791.
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The "Summary of Expected Lease Terms" required Orange County to
construct the stadium while baseball owners would retain revenues from the
ballpark.1193 However, the owners were to assume all responsibility for
facility operations. In addition, when the lease was up, the baseball owners
had a first option to purchase the ballpark. The County's Board of
Commissioners approved a "Revised Summary of Expected Lease Terms"
which kept the earlier terms and amended them.1 194 The Board adopted the
resolution imposing the tourist tax and adopted a Budget Resolution which
stated how tax revenue would be spent. Tamar filed suit challenging the
legality of the tourist tax. The lower court granted Orange County's motion to
dismiss.1195 Hotel Group filed a motion to amend the amended complaint
1 96
This court recognized the lower court's refusal to allow any amendment
and the dismissal of the entire suit was erroneous in light of Tamar's raising
the issue concerning the county's power to assess tax and then accrue the
money to fund a project not permitted under section 125.0104(3)(1) of the
Florida Statutes.1 97 The court concluded that the county could not assess and
accrue tax money for the purpose of spending it on a ballpark under a specific
agreement and then dictate that the taxpayer had no right to challenge the
matter.! 198 If the county embarked on the enterprise, there must be a present
right to challenge its legality since the legality would affect the existence of
the tax.199
TEDC/Shell City, Inc. v. Robbins.1200  The Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed final summary judgment denying the taxpayers ad valorem
tax exemption. 1201  Tacolcy acquired property from Dade County and
accepted a restrictive deed obligating it to build low income housing
controlled by rental regulatory agreements. The agreements mandated that
Tacolcy would operate the buildings as low income housing for thirty years.
If the deed restriction was violated, the property reverted to Dade County.120 2
The taxpayers filed an application for a 1991 ad valorem tax charitable
exemption. The application was denied and taxpayers appealed to the Dade
County Value Adjustment Board ("VAB") which granted the
1193. Id.
1194. Tamar, 686 So. 2d at 791.
1195. Id.
1196. Id. at 792.
1197. Id. at 793.
1198. Id.
1199. Tamar, 686 So. 2d at 793.
1200. 690 So. 2d 1323 (Fa. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1201. Id. at 1323.
1202. Id.
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petition. 1203 The property appraiser appealed. The next year, taxpayers again
sought a charitable exemption for ad valorem tax, and it was again denied by
the property appraiser. However, the VAB granted a seventy-five percent
exemption for the 1992 tax year. The property appraiser appealed and the two
appeals from the 1991 and 1992 actions were consolidated. 1204
The issue before this court was "[w]hether a federal income tax credit
inuring to a taxpayer is a benefit that disqualifies a taxpayer from exempt
entity status under section 196.195(3), Florida Statutes (1991), and therefore
disqualifies the taxpayer from receiving an ad valorem tax charitable
exemption. ' ' 1205 This court held the entity receiving such a credit did not
qualify for exempt entity status. 120 6 In addition, to receive ad valorem tax
exemption, the property must be "'owned by an exempt entity and used
exclusively for exempt purposes." ' 1207  Section 196.195 of the Florida
Statutes gives criteria to determine whether an entity is a nonprofit venture
eligible for exemption. 12  Here, the question centered on the requirement
that taxpayers 'affirmatively show that no part of the subject property, or the
proceeds of the sale, lease, or other disposition thereof, will inure to the
benefit of its members, directors, or officers or any person or firm operating
for profit or for a nonexempt purpose."
1209
"The plain language of section 196.195(3) require[d] an exemption
applicant to demonstrate that the entity ... [was] not receiving any benefits
from the property."' 1210 Even though the taxpayers did not realize profits from
the property, the receipt of a federal income tax credit on behalf of the
partners was a benefit as based on its plain and ordinary meaning. 121 Since
the taxpayers were receiving a benefit in the form of an income tax credit,
they were not exempt entities allowed to qualify for the exemption from ad
valorem taxation.1212
Terra Mar Capital, Inc. v. Auxier. 213 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's setting aside of a tax deed because proper
1203. Id. at 1324.
1204. Id.
1205. Robbins, 690 So. 2d at 1324.
1206. Id.
1207. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 196.192(1) (1991)).
1208. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 196.195 (1991).
1209. Robbins, 690 So. 2d at 1324 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 196.195(3) (1991)).
1210. Id. at 1325.
1211. Id.
1212. Id.
1213. 694 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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notice was not received. 2 1 4  An executors deed was recorded showing
ownership of property by Janice Fay Underdown Auxier, Patricia Ann
Underdown Smith, and Charlotte Underdown (deceased). The property was
subject to a lease term of ninety-nine years and was used as a parking lot. 215
Section 197.522(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes requires notice be given to
an owner.1 6 In turn, section 197.502(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes states
notice must be sent to "'[a]ny legal title holder of record if the address of the
owner appears on the record of conveyance of the lands to the owner."
' 217
Here, appellees were not given proper notice because the recorded deed gave
the full names of the three owners individually with their mailing addresses,
while the notice was mailed to a Fort Lauderdale address to the name
"Underdown Smith & Auxier."'1211 Since it was likely that all owners did not
reside at the same address, notice must be given to each owner. No notice
was given in this case.
219
Washington Square Corp. v. Wright. 220  The First District Court of
Appeal affirmed the circuit court's final order of dismissal because the failure
to pay ad valorem taxes in succeeding years extinguished the right to maintain
a contest, unless the taxpayer sought timely review of every assessment as to
which taxes were not paid in full. 22 ' Washington Square Corporation
("Corporation") owned real property in Washington County. The Corporation
petitioned Washington's Property Appraisal Adjustment Board seeking
review and adjustment of the ad valorem tax assessment received for the 1993
year. After the Board denied review, the Corporation paid the amount owed
and filed a complaint seeking an adjustment of the appraisal attaching the
receipt of the paid tax amount to the complaint. The Corporation also paid
the assessments for the years 1994 and 1995 which were less than the 1993
year that was petitioned.
The issue before the court was "what the statute require[d] to prevent
dismissal of a judicial challenge to an assessment when duly initiated court
proceedings have not concluded by the time taxes fall due in subsequent
year(s)."'1 3 Section 194.171 of the Florida Statutes provides that no tax
1214. Id. at 779.
1215. Id.
1216. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 197.522(1)(a) (1993).
1217. Auxier, 694 So. 2d at 780 (citing FLA. STAT. § 197.502(4)(a) (1993)).
1218. Id.
1219. Id.
1220. 687 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1221. Id. at 1374.
1222. Id. at 1374-75.
1223. Id. at 1375.
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assessment can be contested unless all the taxes due in the subsequent years
after the action is brought are timely paid.
22 4
The circuit court concluded that the Corporation's failure to pay ad
valorem taxes in full for the 1994 and 1995 taxable years required dismissal
of its complaint challenging the 1993 Board's assessment. This court
recognized that the Corporation, after it paid in good faith estimates of the
1994 and 1995 tax assessments, could obtain judicial review of them by filing
suits within the time period allowed. 22 6 However, the time expired. Thus,
"'[n]o action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after [sixty] days
from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection"'
unless the petition is pending before the Board when the assessment is
certified for collection.
Once the time to bring the contest had passed, the tax assessments for the
1994 and 1995 years were no longer subject to adjustment. 228  The full
amount was owed. Since judicial review for the 1994 and 1995 years were
not timely sought and the full amount was not paid, the Corporation's
complaint challenging the 1993 assessment must be dismissed.1
229
Westring v. Florida.230 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the
lower court's dismissal of the action on the ground that Westring did not file
for a refund of a documentary stamp tax paid at the time a quitclaim deed
conveying title to the home was executed.'2 ' In 1994, Westring and his wife
at the time executed a quitclaim deed conveying title to their home from the
entireties back to Westring individually (provided by marital settlement
agreement). 23 2  Westring paid a documentary stamp tax even though no
money changed hands and the outstanding mortgage was not affected.
Westring sued individually and as the representative of a class of similar
taxpayers. Westring sought declaratory and injunctive relief and a refund of
the tax. contending that it was invalidly imposed. 23 3 The certified question is
whether a plaintiff challenging the validity of a specific tax must first request
a refund before a court can exercise jurisdiction over the action.1234
1224. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 194.171 (1995).
1225. Wright, 687 So. 2d at 1375.
1226. Id.
1227. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 194.171(2) (1993)).
1228. Id.
1229. Id.
1230. 682 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1231. Id. at 171-72.
1232. Id. at 171.
1233. Id. at 172.
1234. Id.
[Vol 22:269
Brown / Grohman
Westring is required to file a claim for a refund of the tax pursuant to
section 215.26 of the Florida Statutes before seeking jurisdiction of the
circuit court.12 35 The nature of nonclaim statutes is to preclude a right of
action unless and until the claim is filed within the time period designated by
statute.1236 Since Westring was still within the three-year-statutory nonclaim
period specified by section 215.26 of the Florida Statutes, the district court
dismissed Westring's complaint without prejudice so that Westring could
apply for a refund in accordance with the statute.
23 7
XXVII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey of cases and legislation presents selected materials
of significance to real estate professionals. Although there seems to be no
consistent pattern to the case law and legislative development, the survey is
useful in maintaining contact with the progression of real property law.
1235. Westring, 682 So. 2d at 172. See also FLA. STAT. § 215.26 (1993).
1236. Westring, 682 So. 2d at 172.
1237. Id.
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